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Abstract
Risk assessment on interbank networks has drawn attention from researchers since
the 2007 Subprime mortgage crisis.The lack of data for interbank transactions, which
are usually not disclosed unless required by regulatory bodies, is one of the most
critical difficulties to this research. A remedy to this issue is the dense reconstruction of
interbank networks by using balance sheet data. The Maximum-Entropy estimation has
been adopted by literature, however, this method produces networks with unrealistic
properties: too dense in terms of having too many links. One alternative is sparse
reconstruction that proposed by literature recently. This thesis applies the Message-
Passing algorithm, which is extensively applied in Thermodynamics or Computer
Science, and is suggested by Mastromatteo et al. [2012] for application in network
reconstruction. Dense networks and sparse networks are reconstructed from Statistics
on Depository Institutions data provided by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and
are compared by performance in both network properties and contagion simulations.
The popular contagion mechanisms proposed by Furfine [2003] and the model of
liquidity dry-up contagion proposed by Malherbe [2014] are adopted and compared
in contagion simulations. Results show that dense networks and sparse networks
perform differently in network properties and in contagions triggered by single-bank
failures, while for contagions triggered by multiple-bank failures, both types of networks
perform similarly. Furfine’s mechanism fail to predict some bank failures via the credit
risk contagion on liquidity side, while these failures can be simulated by the liquidity dry-
up model via fire-sale and marking-to-market effect. Both mechanisms overestimate the
losses before the crisis, yet this signals the instability of the banking system, while the
liquidity dry-up model proposes an explanation for why the banking system did not fail
before the crisis, regarding to whether the equilibrium of high liquidity will shift to the
self-fulfilling liquidity dry-up equilibrium. Implications on regulation are given.
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1 Introduction
The network structure of banking system and the financial contagion (i.e. one bank’s
failure incurs distress or even failures in others) that spread via networks are not novel
topics in the research world of finance. Since the world witnessed the recent 2007
financial crisis, studies on these topics became relevant as the direct financial linkages
between banks are considered to have played an important role in transmitting losses.
However, this may not be the whole story, as the liquidity freeze issue had also made a
great contribution to the crisis.
My thesis focuses on the contagion in interbank market. To study the contagion
effect via direct linkages, the first step must be obtaining the network structure. The
main obstacle to this topic is the lack of data: not only is the network structure usually
not disclosed to the public, but also the volume of bilateral tradings between any two
banks is confidential. Therefore, the literature has tried to reconstruct the network
structure from those publicly-available data from payment systems, overnight repo
markets or balance sheet disclosure, etc. One attempt is Maximum-Entropy estimation,
which minimises the loss of information during the reconstruction, but simply assumes
the network to be maximally-connected if network adjacency structure is not given.
In other words, all the links between any two banks are made, including those links
between small banks, i.e. two small banks directly hold interbank loans in each other,
which is uncommon in real banking systems. The literature has found that in a real
banking network, the tradings between small banks will usually be intermediated by
large banks rahter than directly made. Moreover, banking networks are found to be
sparse, i.e. there are much fewer links between banks than a maximally-connected
network may contain. These findings question the reconstruction of dense banking
networks, and raise the issue of reconstructing sparse networks.
Additionally, incorporating the fire-sale effect into the interbank network contagion
model may improve the simulation results. Banks are allowed to transfer their non-liquid
long-term assets into liquidity as long as the market is willing for purchase, and one
bank might be saved even though facing with mass withdrawal from its creditor banks.
Yet in the situation of liquidity freeze along with fire-sale, banks may prefer hoarding
their cash than buying others’ lemons. This might have explained why the interbank
market was stable before the crisis because banks were confident about the market
liquidity, but panicked to sell their assets while they realised that the liquidity might be
frozen as no one is willing to buy, triggering and spreading the liquidity contagion.
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My research questions are: (1) how to construct sparse networks from publicly-
available information; (2) whether the network model can simulate the banking failures
incurred via interbank loans; and (3) whether the contagion mechanisms adopted in my
research can predict the occurrence of systemic crisis.
The sparse reconstruction in my thesis adopts the ‘Message-Passing algorithm’,
which is mainly used in physics and computer science, as it has been suggested
in literature that it can produce sparse networks with power-law distributions of node
degrees, which are exactly the features of interbank networks that found by literature.
The data set is the Statistics on Depository Institutions provided by Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation to the public. I reconstruct the banking networks for every six
months between the first quarter in 2006 and the third quarter in 2010, during which
the 2007 finanical crisis took place. The network measures show differences between
sparse networks and dense networks, implying that dense reconstruction might have
distorted our understanding for the real structure of banking systems.
Contagion simulations are conducted with the contagion mechanism proposed
by Furfine [2003] via interbank loans, and the liquidity dry-up model by Malherbe
[2014], respectively. The contagion results for Furfine’s mechanism show that in
sparse networks, bank failures that triggered by a single bank’s failure are more
common than in dense networks. If contagion is triggered by extreme events such
as several large banks failing simultaneously, the difference between sparse networks
and dense networks will be minor (in terms of the number of simulated faiures and
successfully predicted failures). Sparse reconstructions might be unnecessary in this
sense, however, the two types of networks should still be distinguished: sometimes
those actual bank failures which can be predicted by contagions on sparse networks
may not be detected by contagions on dense networks; and sparse networks are still
preferred in studies on other perspectives of banking networks, not only for systemic
risk assessment. Furthermore, the results of liquidity dry-up model suggest that the
banking system believed the market would be liquid in recent future, so that the
equililbrium of high-liquidity was achieved. But as the hoarding of cash and the cutting
of interbank lending progressed, banks anticipated the market to become illiquid, and
this anticipation drove them to perform fire-sale for extra liquidity hoarding, shifting the
equilibrium to a liquidity freeze. In this case, banks could no longer transfer their long-
term assets into liquidity when they faced with liquidity demand, while they also suffered
losses in asset value due to the marking-to-market effect.
The prediction of bank failures is also examined. Furfine’s mechanism can only
make some successful predictions for those banks that have insufficient cash to afford
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withdrawals of interbank liabilities from most of their creditors. The recognition of bank
failures is similar in liquidity dry-up model, however, since fire-sale is the main channel
to trigger and to spread the contagion in this model, banks that sufferring huge asset
write-downs might eventually turn to fail by insolvency. Some of those banks that
have sufficient liquidity for runs on their interbank liabilities may fail by this fire-sale
channel, since they might be vulnerable as holding large amount of long-term assets
with relatively small amount of capital, which absorbs losses on the asset side.
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the
literature on banking crisis and risk models that transmit risk across banking network,
along with historical examples of banking crisis. Chapter 3 defines the network structure
of interbank market and introduces the network measures that employed by literature
in analysing the interbank networks, with empirical application in the banking system of
different countries. Chapter 4 reviews the reform of Basel III in both macroprudential
and microprudential regulation, and the risk assessment techniques that have been
adopted by the literature. Chapter 5 introduces several types of network reconstruction
methodologies. Chapter 6 specifies my dataset, and presents and analyses the
network measures for the reconstructed networks from the dataset. Chapter 7 conducts
simulations of contagion in the networks that reconstructed in Chapter 6, and analyses
the results. Chapter 8 concludes.
4
2 Banking Crisis
A bank failure, or a series of bank failures, is not necessarily systemic, if it only starts
and ends within each individual institution (i.e. no contagion effect incurred), or if the
scale of affected banks is not large1. Although the recent financial crisis feared people
by its contagiousness and large scale, it is still worth reviewing those classic models for
banking crises (or typical events) in the history.
Banking failures could be caused by various factors. A bank could face problems
when it suffers a depositor run, i.e. mass withdrawals at the same time imposing
huge liquidity demand on a bank, which may exceed the amount that the bank’s liquid
assets can afford. The bank may sell its assets at fire-sale prices to meet the liquidity
demand, then the loss on fire sale will be covered by Tier 1 capital, and an insolvency
may be incurred. Section 2.2 reviews banking crises including (1) German crisis in
1930s, which was a banking crisis accompanied by a currency crisis, when both crises
reinforced each other; (2) Savings and Loan (S&L) crisis in US in 1980s and early
1990s, which was rooted in maturity mismatch and was not systemic in the sense of
‘contagious’, but affected a substantial part of the S&L system (with nearly a half of
S&Ls closed down, as per Curry and Shibut [2000]); (3) Scandinavian banking crisis
(or the Nordic crisis), including crises in three Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden and
Finland), which was regarded as part of a typical boom-bust cycle that attributed to
deregulation and the following credit expansion with prices boom and bust, and was
also fuelled by shocks on currency; (4) the recent Subprime mortgage crisis, which
originated from the mortgage market of real estate, and was enhanced through the
shadow-banking system (explained in Section 2.2.4.1) and spread via various channels
including interbank loans, credit derivatives and common exposure in assets. Finally, it
became a systemic crisis not only for its scale2, but also for its contagiousness.
This chapter defines and discusses the terms of ‘Systemic Risk’ and ‘Systemic
Crisis’, and reviews historical examples of banking crises, banking crisis models such
as bank run, and mechanisms for contagious banking failure.
1By Sandal [2004] and Moe et al. [2004], the ‘large’ scale is defined as over a half of the market share,
in terms of total banking assets or total interbank assets.
2The crisis has involved the failures of large financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers and Bear
Stearns, the fourth and fifth largest investment banks in US at that time.
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2.1 Systemic Crisis
The definition of ‘systemic risk’ has been revised to meet the ever-changing market
environment. Before the recent crisis in 2007, early studies, such as the survey
of systemic banking distress by Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache [2005], tend to
emphasise ‘the large scale of adverse effect on the system’. But in the post-crisis
era, the term ‘systemic risk’ is more connected to the concept of ‘contagion’. In fact,
both of them are noticeable features that distinguish financial crises from crises in other
sectors.
Canedo and Jaramillo [2009] quote the definition of systemic risk by Bank of
International Settlement (BIS), “the risk that the failure of a participant to meet its
contractual obligations may in turn cause other participants to default, with the chain
reaction leading to broader financial difficulties”, while they add that systemic risk is
“mostly agreed as manifesting itself by an initial shock that results in the failure of
one or more banks”. Brunnermeier and Oehmke [2012] refine the above statement
with clearer points and back them up by historical examples: a crisis always has a
trigger which might seem small or even unrelated, while the ‘candidates’ of the trigger
should also be under debate. They employ the example of the burst of internet bubble,
which is attributed to “the announcement that the human genome project could not be
patented”, or to “the enormous rate at which some internet companies were burning
cash”. In studying the recent financial crisis, the authors also reveal that the publicly-
recognised trigger, i.e. the failure in subprime mortgage, only contributes 4% of the
overall mortgage market. From that the authors propose a term ‘amplification’ to
describe the phenomenon of systemic risk getting enhanced through contagion via
direct and indirect channels.
There are various arguments in the literature regarding to the issue: in general,
what triggers systemic crisis? Gropp et al. [2006] define systemic risk as the result
of contagion or a common shock affecting all banks simultaneously, although nowaday
the former is essential and the latter is not always true in a systemic crisis. Kaufman
[2000] studies both currency crises and banking crises, and consider the crises to be
triggered by the economic insolvency of one or more large financial institutions, or by
widespread depositor runs on large financial institutions that perceived to be insolvent
and unable to repay their deposits or other debt claims on time and at par value. In
Kaufman and Bank [2000], currency/banking crises are also distinguished from crises
in other sectors due to contagion effect and being relatively intransparent. Kaufman
and Scott [2003] assert that the triggering event of systemic risk could be a big or
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macro shock that produces nearly simultaneous large adverse effects on many financial
institutions. Furfine [2003] states that systemic risk may start with a set of markets
or institutions fail to function efficiently by financial shocks, which is interpreted as a
rational market response to new information rather than a contagion effect; yet it is
still followed by transmission of failures. In the Global Financial Stability Report by
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in April 2009, ‘Systemic Risk’ is defined to reflect “a
sense of a broad-based breakdown in the functioning of the financial system, which is
normally realised, ex post, by a large number of failures of financial institutions”. IMF
also mention the feature of contagious systemic risk in this report, by throwing light on
the direct and indirect financial linkages (especially via those new, complex financial
instruments such as structured investment vehicles). These linkages provide the banks
with better risk-sharing, but in the meanwhile they also imply stronger risk-spreading
channels which may cause an individual failure to become systemic.
Besides the general and descriptive definitions above, some literature also specify
‘systemic risk’ by contagion channels. Cont et al. [2010] argue that insolvency can
also lead to illiquidity, which directly causes bank defaults. Acharya and Yorulmazer
[2003] mention the increase in joint default probabilities through the endogenously
held correlated portfolios caused by other banks’ failures. De Nicolo and Kwast
[2002] list several potential interdependencies that are either direct (inter-firm on-
balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet exposures, including linkages through payment
and settlement systems) or indirect (correlated exposures to nonfinancial sectors and
financial markets). Kaufman and Scott [2003] emphasise correlation and causation
through ‘failure chains’, following the definition by BIS that ‘failure of a participant to
meet its contractual obligations may in turn cause other participants to default with
a chain reaction leading to broader financial difficulties’. They also suggest another
similarity among systemic risk: ‘reassessment failure’, the situation that banks holding
similar risk profiles are hit by common shocks, leading market participants to reassess
the banks’ capability of surviving the risk. When the depositors lose confidence to
the uncertainty, they may withdraw funds from these banks, causing illiquidity or,
even more fundamentally, insolvency problems. Furthermore, Cifuentes et al. [2005]
suggest marking-to-market effect on changes in asset prices as a potential channel of
contagion. They comment that systemic risk is an interaction of credit risk and market
risk, which could be exacerbated by counterparty risk.
For my own research, as I apply network model and liquidity dry-up model in
studying the stability of financial networks, I define ‘systemic risk’ as “the failure in
finanical networks by illiquidity spread from one financial institution to another via direct
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credit linkages, or by insolvency incurred by liquidity freezes and fire-sales”. I restrict my
research within the scope of contagious properties of banking failues, assessing the risk
of a system via the volume affected by potential failures (which might eventually become
a crisis). Balance sheet figures of banks are encoded into the information borne by the
nodes in a banking network, hence those activities that identifiably affect the banks
(e.g. processes of contagion, and negative shocks including triggering events) can be
modelled as changes in balance sheet figures.
There are various methodologies for learning about systemic crisis. For instance,
literature has mentioned almost all potential systemic risk models, including correlation
risk, liquidity and market risk, information risk, and credit risks. However, the recent
Subprime mortgage crisis has shown its contagion across sectors: from real estate to
mortgage market, then the whole financial sector, and finally hit the real economy via a
credit crunch. Lessons of historical financial crises will be reviewed in the next section,
followed by the discussion of risk models in Section 2.3.
2.2 Historical Examples
This section reviews four examples of financial crises in history: 1931 German crisis,
US S&L crisis, Scandinavian crisis, and the recent subprime mortgage crisis. German
crisis was an example of twin crises that involve currency crisis and banking crisis,
which reinforce each other. S&L crisis was a financial crisis with no contagion.
Scandinavian banking crisis had some similarities with Subprime mortgage crisis in
the exploitation of short-term liquid assets, while part of this crisis showed features in
twin crises as the German one did. These lessons showed how a financial crisis is
‘systemic’ in an old-fashioned definition, i.e. in the size of losses on economy, since
the S&L crisis and part of the Scandinavian banking crisis were not contagious, while
subprime mortgage crisis was not only large in size but also contagious.
2.2.1 1931 German Crisis
The most striking feature of the 1931 German crisis is the simultaneous occurrence of
a banking crisis and a currency crisis, which are regarded as ‘twin crises’ by Schnabel
[2004], who asserts that most literature on German crisis have paid little attention to
the ‘twin’ aspect. For instance, Born [1967] is a classic study that thoroughly accounts
the crisis as a banking crisis. Hardach [1976] is referred to as a representative study on
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the crisis as currency crisis, who asserts that the currency problem is related to political
issues but not banking problems. Balderston [1994] is one of the earliest papers that
examine the German crisis from the perspective of the relationship between the both
types of crises, but provides a similar conclusion as Hardach [1976] does: “the crisis
was primarily an exchange rate and foreign liability crisis, which would have occurred,
because of the reparations and fiscal crises, even if the banks had acted with exemplary
caution in the 1920s”. Recent studies have witnessed debate between Schnabel [2004]
and Ferguson and Temin [2004] about whether the crisis is a twin crisis or a currency
crisis, as the former criticises Ferguson and Temin [2003] as a disregard of currency
crisis by regarding the Reichsbank’s (the central bank of Germany from 1876 until 1945)
fiscal problem as the major cause.
Schnabel [2004] summarises the causes of the German crisis in two parts. Firstly,
the currency crisis that “the political shocks and the loss in investors’ confidence in
Germany’s ability and willingness to service its foreign debt and in its commitment to
the gold standards”, contributed to the run on Reichsmark (the German currency). The
earlier study by Balderston [1994] also attributes the malfunctioning of German banking
system to the collapse of conditions of Reichsmark convertibility, and stresses that
Germany’s adherence to the gold standard threatened by its large short obligations
to abroad was the main problem rather than the non-regulation of banking system.
Deposits were dominated by foreign currencies, since foreign deposits at the great
branch banks exceeded the Reichsbank’s reserves by 70% at the end of 1929, and
were almost seven times as high as the free reserves above the statutory 40% gold
cover.
Secondly, the banking crisis that the failure of regulation on German banks
(especially those ‘too-big-to-fail’ large banks) led to a moral hazard problem
that excessively employed risky policies, which thus induced large-scale deposit
withdrawals that were independent of the currency situation. Adalet [2005] suggests
that the 1931 German crisis was partly due to the poorly regulated banking system
which was destabilised by excess inflow and outflow of foreign capital.
Schnabel [2004] uses Danatbank (short for ‘Darmsta¨dter und Nationalbank’, the
then second largest bank in size) as an example of failures of the great banks
(with great branches), regarding to the failure of Nordwolle and the heavy buy-up
of its own shares (over 50% in 1931) by Danatbank. Temin [2008] argues that the
default of the textile company Nordwolle, which speculated on the price of wool, might
have been due to Reichsbank’s actions to preserve the currency. Schnabel [2004]
claims that the Reichsmark loan of Danatbank to Nordwolle corresponded to 40%
9
of Danatbank’s equity, and the scandal of Nordwolle led to withdrawals at its main
creditors including Danatbank, whose instability further deteriorated. Moreover, in her
later study, Schnabel [2009] suggests that the breakdown of Danatbank was triggered
by the tightening of liquidity provision by Reichsbank while reserves losses continued.
This failure might contribute to Danatbank’s failure as Nordwolle being heavily in debt to
it, but Temin [2008] questions if that could further cause the failure of the whole financial
system.
German banks experienced heavy deposit withdrawals which impaired their
liquidity positions, while at the same time, the Reichsbank failed to act as the ‘lender
of last resort’ while other banks turned to it for liquidity during the banking crisis, since
it suffered from reserve losses due to a run on the German currency. Schnabel [2004]
argues that great branch banks used Reichsbank as the lender of first resort, instead,
for its liquidity in the form of foreign currency, exerting external effect on all other banks.
Investors lost confidence in Germany’s ability to repay the foreign debt due to political
and fiscal issues. The banking crisis and the currency crisis became increasingly
intertwined as the crises went on.
The twin crises imposed severe adverse effects on German economy. In 1932,
Germany defaulted on most of its foreign debt; unemployment soared up to 4 million;
capital flows remained restricted for years; and the full convertibility of the currency was
not reached until long after World War II (Schnabel [2004]). Additionally, both Kaufman
[2000] and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache [2005] argue that currency crises are more
frequent than banking crises, while both can ignite each other, however, banking crises
seem to be “an important cause of currency crises, but not vice versa”.
2.2.2 Savings and Loan Crisis
Not all the banking crises are systemic - the US Savings and Loan crisis in 1980s
and 1990s is one example. Savings and loan associations (S&Ls for short hereafter)
share several similarities with commercial banks: they take deposits, make loans and
conduct some other financial activities. Similar institutions in UK are known as ‘building
societies’.
The root of this crisis was the interest mismatch between what the S&Ls must pay
for their money and what they may earn on that money (Felsenfeld [1990]). According to
Hellwig [2009], about two thirds of these S&Ls were technically insolvent around 1980.
They held large amounts of mortgages that they had provided to homeowners in 1960s
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with maturities of some 40 years, at fixed rates of interest, typically around 6%, while the
interest rates that they should pay to keep their depositors were well above 10% (due
to the inflation and the rise in interest rate in late 1970s). This discrepancy affected
their annual statements of profits and losses, but was not reflected in their balance
sheets. This fraud by the Regulatory Accounting Principles made insolvent S&Ls not
only imprudent in real estate lending (to pretend a high profitability on their balance
sheets), but also vulnerable to defaults and bankruptcies of their customers. The
authorisation of Regulatory Accounting Principles (RAP), which was different from the
General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), obscured the true financial condition
of the industry, commented by Margavio [1993]. In his work, Margavio [1993] asserts
that the S&L crisis was not simply a result of audit irregularities, forbearance in closing
troubled institutions by Federal Home Loan Bank Board (via Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation), or managerial fraud and mismanagement, but was due to the
historical regulation of the industry.
The US banking system consisted of two major parts at the time of the crisis:
S&Ls and commercial banks. Similar to commercial bank deposit being insured by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC for short, hereafter), the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC for short, hereafter) provided deposit
insurance for S&Ls, until itself became insolvent as a result of the S&L crisis and
was then abolished by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989. The services of S&L deposit insurance was transferred to the FDIC.
Unlike the FDIC which was established as an independent agency, the FSLIC was
under the authority of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, under which the Federal
Home Loan Bank System that provide liquidity and low-cost financing for S&Ls was
supervised (Acharya, Cooley, Richardson and Walter [2011]). Both FDIC and FSLIC
were developed right after the Great Depression.
Acharya, Cooley, Richardson and Walter [2011] argue that, with the accelerating
inflation and the soaring interest rate in 1970s, S&L deposits began to flee in pursuit of
higher returns, while suffering in holding portfolios of thirty-year fixed-rate mortgages
even though the deposit rate ceilings were lifted. This formed a classical maturity
mismatch that urged S&Ls to pursue income. Accordingly, the enactment of Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980, and the Garn-
St. Germain Depository Institutions Act (DIA) of 1982, deregulated the S&Ls. These
acts allowed S&Ls to issue credit cards, to offer trust services, and to have up to 20%
of assets in consumer loans, commercial paper, commercial real estate loans and
corporate bonds (Felsenfeld [1990]). The DIA even eliminated deposit rate ceilings
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and loosened restrictions on allowable business activities for S&Ls. Additionally, both
federal and state regulators released restrictions on S&Ls’ asset allocation options,
lowered capital requirements, and applied different accounting rules (GAAP versus
RAP as stated on last page) to allow S&Ls to meet their net worth requirements more
easily (Acharya, Cooley, Richardson and Walter [2011]).
The expansion in power of S&Ls allowed them to hold large amounts of real estate
paper (Felsenfeld [1990]), and the S&Ls were able to adjust their cost structure, to
have multi-products, and to take advantage of economies of scope (Mester [1987]).
On one hand, this encouraged diversification, but on the other hand the S&Ls’ already
volatile earning situations could have been exacerbated (Margavio [1993]). Felsenfeld
[1990] comments that congress gave the federal S&Ls powers enabling them to engage
in activities well beyond their basic and traditional business of making residential real
estate mortgage loans. Essentially, they were becoming more like banks, however,
S&Ls were not regulated as strictly as commercial banks were.
Acharya, Cooley, Richardson and Walter [2011] argue that “the lax regulatory
environment was conducive to widespread fraud and insider abuse, as S&L managers
were incentivised to engage in imprudent, often reckless, and even criminal business
practices.” Their paper also report that insiders’ fraudulent activity occurred in an
estimated 70% of failed S&Ls. Mester [1991] and Mester [1993] present studies on
agency problems that involved in S&Ls, including perk-taking and excessive risk-taking,
with analyses of effect of transfer from mutual S&Ls to stock-chartered S&Ls.
The FSLIC adopted regulatory forbearance against insolvent S&Ls, i.e. allowing
those troubled S&Ls to continue operation, as the FSLIC could not afford the cost of
closing them down or resolving them with paying the losses that borne by depositors;
otherwise FSLIC itself might be bankrupt. Cordell and King [1995] mention not only
the loss of customer relationships, or valued personnel that frequently occurs after a
government seizure, but also the loss in franchise value, while regulators might have
chosen to delay closures in the hope of a merger that could preserve it. Felsenfeld
[1990] provides evidence that the cost of funds exceeded return on mortgages for
the first time in 1981, while this insufficiency had lasted for two years. Cebenoyan
et al. [1993] state that the forbearance was put to an end by President Bush’s informal
policy of closing S&Ls that had negative tangible capital in 1988, and formally by the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, that imposed
higher capital requirements on S&Ls and gave an official mandate to regulators to close
capital-deficient S&Ls. Nakamura [1990] comments that general forbearance raises the
monetary losses of the insurer which could accumulate by time, as insolvent institutions
12
might be induced to make risky decisions once temporarily exempted from closures.
Nevertheless, he still suggests efficient regulatory closures rather than quick closures
to promote efficiency in the banking industry and avoid mistakenly closing down banks
that are temporarily in trouble.
As per Curry and Shibut [2000], the crisis ended up with the decline in the number
of federally ensued S&Ls from 3,234 to 1,645, and the bailout for these insolvencies
contributed to the large budget deficits of US in the early 1990s, which accumulated
to approximately 124 billion dollars as a net loss to taxpayers by the end of 1999
(through various procedures). Summarised by Acharya, Cooley, Richardson and
Walter [2011], the S&L crisis has shown that moral hazard is still “an important and
ever-present issue”, considering the fraud in operation of insolvent S&Ls that under
forbearance. Moreover, the crisis should be partly attributed to regulation failures such
as inconsistence in regulatory and auditing policies.
This crisis imposed adverse effects on the S&L system, however it was not
systemic in terms of contagion. Each individual S&L failure was due to regulation fraud
and moral hazard, but ended within the firm itself without destabilising others. Also, the
crisis did not spread to other sectors. The deregulation of S&Ls in 1980s gave them
some capabilities of banks, although it was hard to identify the control fraud. The fact
that banks were better regulated than S&Ls, might have explained why the failures in
the banking system during that period did not turn into a crisis.
2.2.3 Scandinavian Banking Crisis
The Scandinavian banking crisis was a series of crises happened in Norway, Sweden
and Finland in the late 1980s and early 1990s. According to Englund [1999], Schwierz
[2004], Steigum [2004] and Sandal [2004], these crises shared some similarities that
could be described within the framework of a boom-bust cycle: they were initiated
by deregulatory measures, which led to overly rapid credit expansion, followed by a
sustained increase in asset prices that unwarranted by fundamentals, and by significant
increases in investment and consumption, i.e. a ‘bubble’. The bubble burst with a
decline in prices and disruption of asset markets (in particular for real estate) and
widespread bankruptcies, accompanied by non-performing loans and credit losses.
The banking sector was then struck by a banking crisis (that intertwined with a currency
crisis, except for Norway).
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In the 1980s, the three Nordic countries had experienced credit booms due to credit
rationing by regulation on bank lending and on the foreign funding of banks. Steigum
[2004] asserts that the credit demand at that time was very high because of this credit
rationing, especially when regulation was lifted, and in the meanwhile borrowing was
encouraged by deduction of interest expense from taxable income and inflation being
allowed, which led to very low or even negative cost in borrowing. A spiral of higher
collateral values and more borrowing resulted in soaring property prices.
During the credit boom, non-financial sectors in these countries were too high in
leverage to be resistant to exogenous shocks. The shocks that hit the three countries
were slightly different. By Steigum [2004], the three countries experienced higher
interest rates influenced by higher German rates, while Norway as an oil-exporting
country was hit by the fall in oil prices in 1986, and Finland lost in export to its major
trading partner USSR because of the collapse of the Soviet Union around 1990.
Moreover, both Finland and Sweden even suffered from a currency crisis in 1992.
Englund [1999] examines the impact of the currency crisis upon the yet-developing
banking crises at that time, and finds evidence that both crises enhanced each other.
Take Sweden as an example. As reported by Englund [1999], the private sector outside
the banks had a debt of 541 billion SEK in September 1992, which was accounted for
35% of the GDP. As most of these borrowings were intermediated by banks that had
balanced positions in foreign currency balanced, the private sector was then heavily in
debt in foreign currency. When the currency depreciated after the abandon of the fixed
rate regime, these companies suffered losses because of their heavy dependency on
foreign currency funding (Sandal [2004]). Englund [1999] asserts that this risk had
transferred into loan losses for their creditors, while those banks might face liquidity
problems as foreign lenders might refuse to roll over short-term credit lines3. Although
the Riksbank (the central bank of Sweden) provided liquidity to these banks to avoid the
liquidity risk, the defence of krona by high interest rates still cause credit losses through
the currency crisis and hence reinforced the banking crisis. The incapability of Swedish
banks and their customers to survive a long period of high interest rates exacerbated
the speculation against SEK, which led to further increases in interest rate. Commented
by Englund [1999], these two channels formed a spiral of twin crises.
Moe et al. [2004] regards the Norwegian crisis as ‘systemic’, since the second
largest bank had lost all its equity capital and the fourth largest bank had lost all its
original shareholder capital. In addition, it was evident that the largest bank also had lost
3In fact, this type of risk contagion is transmitted through the network structure of a system that consists
of banks (as intermediaries) and firms, similar to a financial network which is the focus of this thesis.
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a substantial portion of its capital. The identification of systemic crisis at that time was
still following the criterion of ‘scale’ but not ‘contagion’, and it applied the term ‘systemic
proportion’ to distinguish between ‘systemic crisis’ and ‘non-systemic crisis’. Although
the authors did not provide an explicit definition to ‘systemic proportion’, they mentioned
that the crisis involved the major big banks which accounted for half of the market for
bank credit to the domestic non-financial sector. Sandal [2004] agrees with Moe et al.’s
view by emphasising that the three major failed Norwegian banks represented 54% of
total assets in the banking sector in 1991. In that paper, the systemic banking failures
in Sweden and Finland are also reviewed. The Sweden crisis became systemic since
the interest rate and currency turmoil induced foreign creditors to withdraw their foreign
currency funding, eventually leading the seven largest banks that represented 90% of
total banking assets to bear heavy credit losses. The Finnish banking system was also
struck by a banking crisis in a systemic scale as its five largest banks experienced
solvency problems and received government capital support.
One question is whether there was a credit crunch in the Scandinavian crisis. For
Norway, Steigum [2004] argues that the quantitative importance of a credit crunch was
not great by examining the positive and increasing growth rate of Mainland GDP, which
was the evidence of fast recovery of Norwegian banking system. Schwierz [2004] states
that the recovery of the banking sector in Finland and Sweden took longer than in
Norway, and bank lending in nominal terms decreased considerably in Finland and
Sweden and did not reach pre-crisis levels before 2002, while Norway did it in 1995.
The slow recovery in bank lending in Finland and Sweden can be an indication of credit
crunches. Englund [1999] argues that although the lending of Swedish bank decreased
by 21% in current prices between 1990 and 1993, and the margin between the money
market rate and the average bank lending rate reached a high level of more than 5%
in 1992, showing evidence for a credit crunch, the crisis was rather suggested to be a
collateral squeeze by Holmstro¨m-Tirole model. In the case of Finland, Pazarbas¸iog˘lu
[1997] and Vihria¨la¨ [1997] come to similar conclusions as Englund [1999] does for
Sweden. The former argues that “the marked reduction in bank lending was mainly
in reaction to a cyclical decline in credit demand”, while the latter asserts that “the issue
of the early 1990s seemed to be more a ‘collateral squeeze’ than credit crunch”.
2.2.4 Subprime Mortgage Crisis from 2007
From the past financial crises, we learn that financial institutions should be properly
regulated to be stopped from being too exposed to distress: not only management
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fraud should be detected and prevented to maintain the strength of balance sheets, but
also a stricter requirement of capital buffer (or other regulatory measures) is required to
ensure their solvency. Moreover, the liquidity risk that arises from the difficulty in rolling
over short-term financial instruments, which have maturity mismatch with long-term
loans, also exacerbates the vulnerability of financial institutions.
Even though these lessons are learned, financial crises still take place. The
recent Subprime mortgage crisis, which started from 2007, had a similar cause as the
Scandinavian crisis did: the boom and bust of the housing bubble. Brunnermeier [2008]
summarises and explains the main events of the crisis, with four different mechanism
that amplified and transmitted losses in the mortgage market into financial market. He
comments that the 2007 crisis appeared to be the most severe one since the Great
Depression and the most threatening one to the real economy.
2.2.4.1 Shadow Banking System and Housing Bubble
Starting with analysing the origin of the housing bubble, Brunnermeier [2008]
mentions some key factors. Firstly, the banking system was under an important
transformation, from the ‘traditional banking model’, to the ‘originate and distribute
banking model’ in shadow-banking system. The former means that banks hold the
loans they issue until repaid, while the latter means that loans are pooled and divided
into tranches, and then resold via securitisation.
Cetorelli et al. [2012] assert that the crisis originated as a run on the liabilities
side of issuers of asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), a short-term funding
instrument for financing asset portfolios of long-term maturities. Thus the non-bank
issuers provide typical financial intermediation, shifting the financial intermediation
away from banks’ own balance sheets. This gives an example of the functioning of
shadow-banking system, which intermediate credit through securitisation and secured
funding techniques such as ABCP, asset-backed securities (ABS), collateralised debt
obligations (CDO), and repo (Pozsar et al. [2010]). The development of shadow
banking facilitates a decentralised financial intermediation via credit chains, compared
with centralised intermediation by banks, as described in Pozsar et al. [2010], “in
essence, the shadow banking system decomposes the simple process of deposit-
funded, hold-to-maturity lending conducted by banks into a more complex, wholesale-
funded, securitization-based lending process that involves a range of shadow banks”.
The market witnessed “runs” on the ABCP market, by the fact that steep contraction
took place between August 2007 and December 2007, with a volume of $350 billion,
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compared to the $1.16 trillion before the period, which played a key role in transforming
concerns about the credit quality of mortgage-related assets into a global financial crisis
(Covitz et al. [2009]). The shift of banking model had lowered the lending standard,
as Bord and Santos [2012] find that banks have been contributing largely to the rise
of shadow banking system, for example, in 1993, of the $22.7 billion in term loans
originated, banks sold $2.2 billion to the shadow banking system. By comparison, in
2007, of the $315 billion in term loans originated, they sold $125 billion to the shadow
banking system” , the proportion of loans that banks sell to the shadow banking system
rose from 10% to 40% in fifteen years.
Besides the case of ABCP, investment banks and hedge funds, also known as
the main contributor of the so-called ‘shadow-banking system’, issued large amount
of debt and invested the proceeds in mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), before the
crisis while the housing market was still booming.
Homeowners were stimulated to purchase houses on mortgages in the boom of
housing bubble, and they became speculative by obtaining subprime mortgages as
they were confident that houses would continue to appreciate. Mortgages are issued
by ‘originating institutions’ (usually banks or savings institutions), titled ‘special-purpose
vehicles (SPV)’ and put into a package by specialised institutions. This package is
refinanced by a relative MBS. The risk of mortgage finance are thus transferred from the
originating institution to the SPV, and then to the holders of the MBS (Hellwig [2009]).
While the housing bubble started to burst, borrowers found it more difficult to refinance
their periodic payments for mortgages. The decline in mortgage payments then led to
reduction in the value of MBS. However, the MBS holders did not know how risky the
securities were, as during the securitisation, risk profiles of various mortgages were
mixed and risk assessment became difficult.
The shadow-banking system hoped the house prices to rise to keep their high
profitability on balance sheets. However, this turned into great losses when the house
prices began to fall. The rise and fall of the shadow-banking system might be due to
being largely unregulated (Gorton et al. [2010]), and the ever-increasing complexity of
financial derivatives that functions the system, preventing effective risk assessment and
regulation.
The rise of shadow-banking system and the financial derivatives that related to
real estate finance encouraged capital inflow from abroad, especially facilitating Asian
countries’ purchase of US securities to hedge their own against dollar by purchasing US
securities, after the lesson from later 1990s Asian crisis. This led to a low interest rate
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environment in US economy, and was protected by the lax interest rate policy adopted
by the Federal Reserve, as the Federal Reserve Bank did not restrain the growth of the
housing bubble in fear of a deflationary period after the burst of the Internet bubble.
Taylor [2007] relates the failure in the subprime mortgage market with the burst of
housing inflation. In that paper, Taylor examines the Federal Reserve’s policy decisions
from 2000 to 2006. He suggests that the low interest rate encouraged funds into
mortgage market, while the high housing price inflation rate, which reached 10% under
the measure of Federal Housing Finance Agency (formerly known as Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight) price index between 2004 and 2006, led to reduction
in delinquency and foreclosure rates on subprime mortgages. As the short term
interest rate returned to normal levels 4, housing demand rapidly fell to bring down both
construction and housing price inflation. This then incurred a rapid rise of delinquency
and foreclosure rates, “ultimately leading to the meltdown in the subprime market and
on all securities that were derivative from the subprimes”. (Taylor [2007])
Brunnermeier [2008] asserts that the shift of banking model and the increasing
trend of banks’ short-maturity financing left banks exposed to liquidity dry-up. The
latter involved an increase in maturity mismatch on balance sheets of investment banks,
which was a result of the exploitation of ‘repo’, i.e. short-term repurchase agreements.
As per Brunnermeier [2008], “the fraction of total investment bank assets were financed
by overnight repos roughly doubled from 2000 to 2007”. Gorton and Metrick [2012]
provide some institutional background of the repo market prior and post the crisis.
Quoting the finding of Ho¨rdahl and King [2008], the authors describe that the repo
markets have doubled since 2002, “with gross amounts outstanding at year-end 2007
of roughly $10 trillion in each of the US and Euro markets, and another $1 trillion in
the UK repo market”. The authors depict the run of repo during the crisis by a graph
of repo-haircut index, which is the equally weighted index of average haircut on nine
classes of assets, while a 100% of the index means that all the classes disappear from
the market (as 100% haircut implies no trade). In the first half of 2007, the index stayed
around 12%, but between September 2007 and late 2008, the index gradually rose up
to 45%, implying that nearly half of the repos “were stopped entirely from being used
as collateral”. The exhaustion of liquidity in financing made liquidity crunch that might
be incurred by any stress in the liquidity market become possible.
4The level prescribed by the author’s Taylor rule, which was proposed in Taylor [1993] as a US monetary-
policy rule for adjusting interest rate target in response to economic factors, such as inflation rate,
potential output and real GDP
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2.2.4.2 Amplification Mechanisms of Systemic Risk
Brunnermeier [2008] suggests four economic mechanisms through which the
Subprime mortgage crisis was amplified into a severe financial crisis.
Liquidity Spiral
The first one is liquidity spiral, which appears as the erosion of a financial
institution’s capital while asset prices drop (called ‘loss spiral’), and at the same
time lending standards and margins are tighten (called ‘margin spiral’), caused by
borrowers’ balance sheet effects. These effects are examples of liquidity and market
risk mentioned above that cause fire-sales, pushing down prices and tightening funding
even further. Brunnermeier [2008] proposes a simple example of loss spiral that
“decline in asset value erodes their net worth much faster than their gross worth
(because of their leverage)”. Suppose that an investor buys an X worth of asset on
α (in the scale of percentage) margin, then αX (α < 1) is financed by his capital and
(1−α)X by borrowing. While the value of asset temporarily declines to X0 (< X), the
part that financed by capital might deteriorate to X0− (1−α)X which is smaller than
X − (1−α)X = αX . As the leverage ratio is held constant, the investor will be forced
to lower his position to 1α (X0− (1−α)X) = X − 1α (X − X0). The investor suffers loss
of 1α (X −X0) when he sells the asset, which is bigger than the loss on the asset value
X−X0 as α < 1. The author comments that “loss spiral arises as an equilibrium because
some other potential buyers with expertise may face similar constraints at the time”,
which is pointed out by Shleifer and Vishny [1992].
The upward spiral of margin/haircut reinforces the loss spiral, as the investor has to
sell even more because the investor needs to reduce its leverage ratio that held constant
in the loss spiral (Brunnermeier [2008]). Margins and haircuts spike in times of large
price drops leading to a general tightening of lending. Brunnermeier and Pedersen
[2009] find that margins could be destabilising as they can increase illiquidity, and if at
the time that speculators have large existing positions, there could be multiple equilibria
and liquidity could be fragile (a small change in fundamentals can lead to a large jump
in illiquidity, i.e. a sudden liquidity dry-up). The authors mention that the Subprime
mortgage crisis was amplified through the liquidity spiral mechanism, as the losses on
subprime market was merely 5% of the overall stock market (with a volume of hundreds
of billion dollars), but finally aggregated to more than 8 trillion dollars as they were borne
by leveraged financial institutions with significant maturity mismatch.
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Brunnermeier and Adrian [2009] suggest that the extensively adopted risk
measure, Value-at-Risk (VaR), fails to capture the effect of margin spiral, and hence
they propose CoVaR which could be a remedy (which soon becomes popular) in risk
assessment. See Section 4.2.1 for further discussion.
Dry-up in Lending
The second mechanism is the dry-up of lending channel when banks become
concerned about their future access to capital markets and start hoarding funds
(even if the credit worthiness of borrowers does not change). Brunnermeier [2008]
distinguishes two main mechanisms for this channel: moral hazard in banks’ monitoring
against borrowers, and precautionary hoarding for liquidity.
Holmstrom and Tirole [1997] suggest that intermediaries face a potential moral
hazard problem in monitoring, that a limit is put on the actual amount of monitoring
which is assumed to be privately costly. If intermediaries loosen their monitoring, the
interbank lending market may become more risky: there could be more direct lending
without monitoring, and liquidity is more likely to be exhausted.
Brunnermeier [2008] asserts that “precautionary boarding arises if lenders are
afraid that they might suffer from interim shocks and that they will need funds for their
own projects and trading strategies”. This might be caused by the increase in the
likelihood of interim shocks, and then external financing might become less available.
The author depicts the trouble that interbank market faced in the crisis as a “textbook
example of precautionary hoarding by individual banks”. Heider et al. [2009] state that
the functioning of interbank markets, which are supposed to be among the most liquid in
the financial sector, has become severely impaired since late 2007, and in late 2008 the
liquidity in the interbank market has dried up as banks preferred hoarding cash instead
of providing loans. Finally, even the massive liquidity injection from central banks failed
to stimulate interbank lending.
The US government has taken some policy actions to improve the liquidity situation
in the financial market during the crisis time, such as asset purchase and equity
injections (House and Masatlioglu [2010]). The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP),
launched in late 2008, was originally aimed at purchasing the distressed assets to
restore the frozen trading in interbank markets, but the first allocation of TARP funds
was spent on injecting equity. House and Masatlioglu [2010] comments that calculating
the ‘correct’ price of troubled assets is difficult, while equity injection, which had some
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successful tries in the UK and gained academic support at that time, might be an easier
solution. Yet this policy is found to have several side-effects: (1) it allows banks to
have direct access to cash and hence endogenously reduces liquidity in the interbank
market; (2) banks have greater access to internal funds and sell fewer high-quality
assets; and (3) prices and liquidity are reduced in the interbank market. Later, the
Public-Private Investment Program (P-PIP) was proposed in early 2009 to purchase
toxic assets. Unlike TARP, the prices of the assets that purchased by P-PIP are
determined by private auctions.
Runs on Financial Institutions
The third mechanism focuses on runs on financial institutions, which can cause a
sudden erosion of bank capital like those happened to Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers,
and Washington Mutual. Since the introduction and establishment of deposit insurance,
traditional bank runs had become old-fashioned unless the sector was badly regulated.
However, the rise of shadow-banking systems, which are typically unregulated, allows
runs on financial instruments which are exploited for liquidity, such as ABCP, among
non-bank financial institutions. The crisis was not much different from a classic bank
panic, as asserted by Gorton [2008] with an example that, holders of short term
liabilities (commercial paper and repo) refused to fund ‘banks’ (the shadow-banking
system that issued and traded these liquidity), as they feared expected losses on
subprime and similar securities. The run then “started on off-balance-sheet vehicles
and led to a general sudden drying up of liquidity in the repo market, and a scramble
for cash, as counterparties called collateral and refused to lend”. The case of AIG was
used as an example of ‘margin run’, as counterparties requested additional collateral
from AIG for its CDS positions.
Counterparty Risk via Network
The fourth is the counterparty credit risk and gridlock risk through network effects
(to be discussed in Section 2.4.4.2), which can arise when financial institutions are
lenders and borrowers at the same time. Brunnermeier [2008] employs the example
of the Bear Stearns crisis in March 2008 for network risk: suppose there was an entity
had swap agreements with Goldman and Bear at the same time, and the entity decided
to offset the positions, then in the case of no counterparty risk involved, the two swap
agreements could be considered as a single one between Goldman and Bear. However,
Goldman’s delay (for merely one day) in renewing its direct exposure to Bear was
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interpreted as a hesitation, and as a sign that Goldman feared that Bear Stearns might
be in trouble. The author comments that this misinterpretation might have contributed
to the run on Bear Stearns. In addition, gridlock risk is mentioned as a case “in which
multiple trading parties fail to cancel out offsetting positions because of concerns about
counterparty credit risk”. The author suggests that each party holds additional funds to
protect themselves against the risks that are not netted out, also a clearing system that
can overcome the counterparty credit risk or can allow the regulator to know who lends
what to whom. Yet, the final comment made by Brunnermeier [2008] still emphasises
on the complexity of structured over-the-counter vehicles. That paper only mentions
the existence of a banking network for risk sharing, which provides channels for risk
to transfer, but does not focus on the amplification of systemic risk due to the network
structure, or more specifically, the stability affected by the network topology. This will
be discussed in Chapter 3.
One can summarise the reasons that how the crisis in housing market and
subprime mortgage market turned into a systemic crisis in the financial sector, and
even threatening the real economy, with a sign of fall in GDP growth (or even decrease
in GDP; Gros and Alcidi [2010] provide an example of study on the real effect of the
recent crisis). On one hand, the marking-to-market effect, i.e. the fair-value accounting,
required asset prices to be adjusted to market price. Since financial institutions might
hold similar assets or had mutual exposure in portfolio selections, the risk from asset
prices affected all the market participants, making the crisis systemic. On the other
hand, networks among financial institutions that formed by various financial instruments
were rather intuitive to make individual failures contagious, given the complexity of both
the network structure and the financial instruments.
2.3 Bank Run
A bank run mostly appears as a phenomenon that depositors withdraw their funds
under the suspicion of their banks being incapable to repay their deposits. There are
mainly two competing hypotheses for bank runs: some regard it as ‘pure panic’, a
result of multiple equilibria or random withdrawal (“purely non-informational” as stated
by Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh [2003], in the form of behavioural herding), some argue
that it could be a type of information-based contagious banking crisis (caused by shifts
in perception of risk that due to panics incurred by other events (Gorton [1988]), while in
both cases it is generally accepted as being fuelled by loss of confidence of depositors.
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The features of bank run have been argued and have changed in last century. In
the early study by Fisher [2006] (the first edition was in 1914), the author proposes a
model of the cycle of “expansion of deposit currency and rise in prices”. During this
cycle, profit increases and hence firms become more ambitious to expand their loans.
However, interest rate may not rise to a proper level or rise at a sufficiently quick pace,
affecting the firms’ borrowing behaviour. The value of collateral securities begins to
fall, and firms may no longer be able to use these collateral with values as large as
before, or to renew loans with the previous amount at the previous rate. Those failing
firms might induce fear on depositors that banks will not be able to cover the loans.
Therefore banks are under suspicion and, due to the loss of confidence, depositors
may withdraw cash before the banks cannot afford their deposits.
In Fisher’s model, economic losses from bank runs via the depreciation of collateral
are indirect. Later, Diamond and Dybvig [1983] argue that this contrasts with their
model, which suggests that damage from bank runs “is primarily from the direct damage
occurring when recalling loans interrupts production”. By their description of bank run,
under the situation that agents panic, a bank run will take place and everyone will
rush to withdraw their deposits before the bank gives out all of its deposits. This is
consistent with the study by Friedman and Schwartz [2008] that looks into the bank
runs in US between 1867 and 1960, and is extensively cited by literature after Diamond
and Dybvig’s work.
Diamond and Dybvig [1983] emphasise the banks’ transformation of illiquid assets
into liquid liabilities, and the efficient risk-sharing that banks can provide by issuing
demand deposits, in the context of a competitive market where a withdrawal is assumed
to be under optimal risk-sharing. This explanation for banks’ economic role is firstly
provided by Diamond-Dybvig model. This model propose a framework of studying bank
market with demand deposit contracts, which typically consists of three dates and two
periods, by examining two types of equilibria, ‘being stable’ and ‘bank run taking place’,
among two types of depositors: one cares about the deposit only before anticipated
bank run happens, the other cares about only the state after. The model examines the
multiple equilibria among demand deposit contracts and assess the two possibilities as
stated above, involving two time periods that divided by time t = 0,1,2, while in period 1
between time t = 0 and t = 1 all depositors are informed of their types. Time t = 1 is the
spot at which bank run is anticipated to happen and the former type of depositors make
withdrawals. The former type of depositors are more likely to withdraw at time t = 1
than the latter depositors under the equilibrium of optimal risk-sharing, thus triggering
a bank run, while the latter would rather wait for the outcome at time t = 2. But with
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the introduction of deposit insurance (as a condition affecting the equilibrium at time
t = 1), the former may choose to wait rather than withdraw immediately: therefore a
bank run might be prevented. A bank run is modelled as a bad equilibrium among
uninformed depositors, via withdrawal under their optimal risk-sharing (especially while
demand deposit contracts are uninsured), while withdrawals by other banks incur their
anticipation for bank runs to happen. A good equilibrium is the stable state, in which all
depositors are well-informed and the optimal risk-sharing is achieved (also via demand
deposit). Gorton [1988] comments this model as a modern version of the theory of
‘mob psychology’ or ‘mass hysteria’ rooted in individual and collective psyches.
Various conditions and limitations could be added into or released from Diamond-
Dybvig model for extension. Gu [2011] gives an example of incorporating ‘herding’
into Diamond-Dybvig model, in which all withdrawal decisions are simultaneous but not
allowing for herding effects. The herding effect is modelled by allowing depositors to
choose their own withdrawal time (but with a common deadline, which is still the time
t = 1 in the original setting). For an arbitrary small number N 5, there are N depositors
to be informed consecutively in N stages for their types and the outcome, while at stage
N+1 all the rest will be informed of their types but not the outcome. All depositors have
their chances to withdraw at any stage, in other word behavioural herding of withdrawal
is possible.
Other extensions on the Diamond-Dybvig 2-period model are also applied. Jacklin
[1987] incorporate dividend-paying equity shares into the model, showing that the same
risk-sharing opportunities are provided by demand deposits but without introduction
of chances for bank runs. Haubrich [1988] incorporates time and uncertainty into
the model in order to release the restrictions on investors’ options and opportunities,
functioning the model in the context that close to real financial markets. Diamond and
Rajan [1999] consider illiquidity of financial assets that caused by a lender’s skill of
identifying liquidation values of loans, in the context of narrow banking. Chang and
Velasco [2001] embed their variation of Diamond-Dybvig model on banks in a small
open economy rather than the microeconomics of banking that the original focuses on,
and find that domestic bank runs may interact with panics by foreign creditors. Diamond
[2007] provides an example of incorporating the effect of convertibility suspension into
the model without deposit insurance to examine whether the suspension should be
carried out and whether a bank run would be prevented.
5Small enough compared to the number of depositors such that the probability of a specific depositor
being informed in the first N stages is close to zero.
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Bhattacharya et al. [1998] comment that Diamond-Dybvig model lacks a trigger
mechanism, i.e. bank runs are uncorrelated with other economic variable. Moreover,
the hypothesis of information-based contagion is evidenced by early studies such as
Docking et al. [1997] and Aharony and Swary [1996]. Furfine [2003] suggests modern
bank runs to be interpreted as a rational market response to new information rather
than contagion effect. Similar statements of ‘information-based contagious bank run’
come from literature such as Aghion et al. [2000], and Iyer and Peydro´-Alcalde [2005].
Diamond and Dybvig [1983] also mention that bank runs can cause ‘healthy’ banks
to fail, typically in the sense of informational contagion. This agrees with Bryant [1980]
who raises a question on the asymmetric information about whether a bank is failing
or safe when others fail. When the confidence is maintained, everything goes well, but
loss in confidence will lead to depositor runs, affecting the stability of healthy banks or
even forcing them to fail. Kaufman [2000] hols a similar argument in distinguishing
between ‘innocent banks’, which are honest in reporting capital and reserves, and
‘guilty banks’ which are dishonest. Those ‘guilty banks’ might have great figures on
reports, pretending to be liquid and solvent, but are actually vulnerable when common
shocks occur. The information crisis raised by the misrecognition of ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent’
might bring down those ‘innocent banks’ via other channels such as fire-sales in mutual
exposures.
An earlier work by Benston and Kaufman [1988] states that runs on financially-sick
individual banks will result ultimately in shifts of deposits from themselves to those
banks that perceived to be safe. However, Kaufman [2000] considers widespread
depositor runs may not only be the propagation channel, but also the triggering event of
a banking crisis. They mention the spread of public panic, which can be interpreted as
a rational market response to new information because of the existence of asymmetric
information between market and public (Furfine [2003]). Kaufman and Bank [2000]
asserts that “bank run is not frequently the cause of the insolvency, but the symptom”,
with a quotation of O’Connor [1938] who shows that in 1930s, bank runs were merely
the primary cause of a few bank failures, while most financially-sick banks just shifted
suspicion to the entire banking system.
Even though there may be some conflicts between Kaufman’s own works, the fact
is that bank runs have been rare in US since the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) started to back the deposit after the Great Depression in 1930s. With
development and application of technologies in banking service (especially internet
banking nowadays), on one hand, depositors do not have to rush to their banks, queue
in lines to withdraw their money, but just sitting in front of screens to help themselves
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on computers; on the other hand, technologies have also speeded up the spread of
information. Banks are then likely to employ prudent but less risky policies to prevent
runs that might be easily and quickly incurred by massive withdrawals of demand
deposit (Calomiris and Kahn [1991]). A recent example of ‘bank run’ is the case of
Northern Rock in 2007. However, this was not an old-fashioned bank run as it seemed
to be, but rather due to a sudden dry-up in its short-term liquidity, which was part of
the Credit Crunch events in the recent global financial crisis (Shin [2009]). Additionally,
Perotti and Suarez [2002] suggest that bank runs may in turn cause risk of short-term
illiquidity.
Bank run is seldom considered to be systemic banking crisis, while an exception
of Uhlig [2010] argues that the recent systemic financial crisis includes a ‘systemic
bank run’, which is not a run by depositors in their banks, but by failing banks in core
intermediaries, from which other banks receive interbank loans. That paper attempts
to fill the gap between Diamond-Dybvig model and the recent crisis which the model
fails to describe. However, the introduction of fire sale of assets for liquidity, makes
the model no longer different from contagion via market risk. Additionally, the Global
Financial Stability Report from IMF [2009] emphasises the financial complexity due to
interbank linkages, which not only contribute to economic growth by smoothing credit
allocation and allowing greater risk diversification, but also increase the potential for
disruptions to spread swiftly across markets and borders.
2.4 Risk Models for Interbank Systemic Risk
Extant literature has proposed and tested potential propagation mechanisms for
systemic risk. Haldane and May [2011] point out that systemic risk could propagate
via (1) loss in interbank borrowings/lendings (credit risk); (2) market price crash due
to fire sale and marking-to-market effect (market risk); and (3) funding liquidity shock
from ‘liquidity crunch’ that caused by banks’ liquidity hoarding behaviour (liquidity risk).
Acharya [2009] mentions the joint failure risk arising from the correlation of returns as
one source of systemic risk (correlation risk). Hellwig [2009] adds that the contagion of
information may spread public panic, resulting in sudden supply of assets, decrease in
price, or massive depositor runs. Besides credit risk that propagate via direct balance-
sheet linkages, the other three are recognised as indirect contagion.
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2.4.1 Correlation Risk
Some literature measures systemic risk by the joint failure risk arising from correlated
returns/prices (Acharya [2009]; De Nicolo and Kwast [2002]) or mutual exposure
in portfolio selection (Rochet and Tirole [1996]; Cont et al. [2010]). This risk is
distinguished from the risk that borne by direct linkages between firms, as Corsetti
et al. [2005] show that correlation and covariance between banks could increase even
without linkages between them.
Bivariate correlation risk is probably not contagious as it is only related to two
parties, but the complexity in portfolio selection of all the market participants may
bring difficulties into the analysis of correlation risk, giving rise to contagion via mutual
exposure in portfolio selection. Acharya and Yorulmazer [2003] mention that banks’
failures increase the joint default probabilities through the endogenously held correlated
portfolios. Elsinger et al. [2006] hold a similar statement that correlation in exposure is
far more important than financial linkages.
2.4.2 Information Risk
Information risk mainly arises in two forms.
The first one is the so-called ‘moral hazard’ effect: one party takes an action
knowing that potential risk will be borne by the others. Thakor [2014] asserts that
Jensen and Meckling [1976] have given an insight into the moral hazard prolem in
banking, with their model of equity representing a call option on the bank’s total assets.
The author also applies Merton [1977] model to state that bank’s equity value can be
increased by investing in riskier assets. Hellwig [2009] uses the tranching in subprime
mortgages as an example of ‘moral hazard’, regarding the ‘moral hazard in mortgage
securitisation’ as the origin of the 2007 crisis. That paper argues that if the originating
institutions were holding the equity tranche (i.e. the unsecured tranche) and if, due to
packaging and diversification, the probabilities of default of the senior and mezzanine
tranches (which are better secured than ‘equity tranche’) were zero, the moral hazard in
banking is then negligible. However, in practice, the originating institutions did not hold
the equity tranche they generated, but sold them to external investors as time went
on. Moreover, the packaging did not provide sufficient diversification of returns on the
assets in mortgage-backed portfolios, leading to high default probabilities for senior and
mezzanine tranches, which were assumed to be secured.
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Acharya [2009] assesses the effect of regulation policy considering the ‘moral
hazard’ between regulatory bodies and market participants. Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and
Detragiache [2005] argue that moral hazard is a greater problem in liberalised financial
systems where greater risk-taking opportunities are available. Additionally, Acharya
and Viswanathan [2011] address the agency problem of risk-shifting by the measure
‘spare debt capacity’, whose distribution affects the market price while a large number
of firms are liquidating assets. They conclude that while the intensity of ‘moral hazard’
increases, the equilibrium level of ‘spare debt capacity’ declines.
Another form of information risk is bank run, although bank run is not necessarily
caused by information contagion. As stated in Section 2.3, bank runs appear as
depositors rushing to banks and withdrawing funds, which deteriorates the banks’
instability. Chen [1999] states that bank runs can be contagious while those informed
depositors (who are better informed than others about the value of bank assets) choose
to withdraw but not to wait for the soon information which is more precise. This
model follows but also varies from the information-based explanation to bank panics
by Chari and Jagannathan [1988], who regard a bank run as a “phenomenon that
uninformed depositors misinterpret liquidity withdrawal shocks as withdrawals caused
by pessimistic information about bank asset”. Kaufman [2000] relates widespread
depositor runs to the spread of public panic, while Furfine [2003] interprets it as a
rational market response to new information due to asymmetric information between
market and public. Iyer and Peydro´-Alcalde [2005] present a study for a real bank failure
in India, assessing the contagion effect from balance sheet connections, via depositor
runs but not interbank linkages. They also explore the role of media in provision of public
information, and show that information that spread during the crisis has destabilising
effect.
2.4.3 Liquidity and Market Risk
As per Tirole [2010], the recent financial crisis was characterised by massive illiquidity
in several different forms such as market freezes and fire sales. The author analyses
the market breakdowns that due to either adverse selection (doubts about the quality
of the assets) or shortages of liquidity. This section introduces the liquidity issues with
fire-sales, liquidity freeze that due to adverse selection (when fire sales are anticipated),
and some other types of illiquidity.
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2.4.3.1 Fire Sales
Market risk, presented as fire sales and changes in market prices of assets, has
only received scant attention comparing to direct balance sheet linkages (Cifuentes
et al. [2005]), yet Malherbe [2014] comments that “the regulatory response to the recent
crisis suggests that fire sales are indeed seen as most relevant.” A fire sale happens
while a firm faces bankruptcy or other distress, then the firm is forced to sell its assets,
usually at very low prices, to meet the calls from its creditors and restore its balance
sheet identity (IMF [2009]). As per Shleifer and Vishny [2010], the price is dislocated
because “the highest potential bidders are typically involved in a similar activity as the
seller, and are therefore themselves indebted and cannot borrow more to buy the asset”.
They argue that assets are then bought by someone with little knowledge about the
assets, who is only willing to buy at a much lower valuation.
Acharya and Viswanathan [2011] comment fire sales as ‘liquidity discounts in asset
prices’. They argue that when there is limited funding in the system as a whole, the
funding illiquidity will persist as the moral-hazard intensity is sufficiently severe, and
asset acquirers will only be willing to provide financing at rates that ensure them the
same return with the purchase of assets at fire sale prices. They use the fire sale
prices as a proxy for market illiquidity.
The marking-to-market effect, in the context of fire sales, may also be a potential
channel of contagion: the reduction in market value of assets that caused by a shock
may elicit the disposal of assets, then short-run changes in prices will happen due to
the market’s inability to absorb the disposal, resulting in both solvency constraints and
risk controls imposed on firms, which in turn leads to further disposals. Therefore the
overall impact far outweighs the initial shock (Cifuentes et al. [2005]).
The model ‘collateral spiral’ by Benmelech and Bergman [2011] is an example
of how fire sale works: bankruptcies reduce demand for industry assets and put
downward pressure onto the value of collateral; therefore the likelihood of fire sales
increases, and the increased supply and decreased demand reduces the collateral
values industry-widely, weakening the balance sheet of nonbankruptcy firms, and finally
the increased cost of debt capital leads to further bankruptcies. Firms such as hedge
funds, investment banks and insurance companies have mainly marketable assets,
while for commercial banks, collateral assets (backing the loans) are also marked to
market (Cifuentes et al. [2005]). In fact, collateral plays an important role in raising debt
finance (Benmelech and Bergman [2011]). For investment banks, assets such as short-
term collateralised lending are very short-term and liquid (Shin [2009]). Additionally,
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Figure 1: The illustration of how a self-fulfulling fire-sale is fuelled (Kuong [2014]).
Kuong [2014] explores the self-fulfilling fire-sale mechanism that the anticipation of fire-
sale can cause a fire-sale, which is shown by Figure 1.
2.4.3.2 Adverse Selection
Malherbe [2014] proposes a model of self-fulfilling liquidity dry-up while a bank
may need to liquidate its assets in a lemons market in the next period due to some
liquidity shock to its depositor. Dow and Han [2015] assert that the market is frozen
since the well-capitalised uninformed market participants are unwilling to absorb the
supply of lemons, while Malherbe [2014] suggests the anticipation of a market freeze
leads to a real market freeze since all the market participants choose to hoard their
liquidity, although they know that a high-liquidity equilibrium is achievable. Moore
[2013] asserts analogously that, if the market is not anticipated to break down, the
difference in payoff between a lemon and a good asset is small, therefore the market
is not likely to break down today. This illiquidity equilibirum is due to the difficulty
in accurate valuation for assets. House and Masatlioglu [2010] comment that “many
market observers emphasise the problem caused by having assets that buyers could
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not accurately value...it has been well understood since Akerlof [1970] that adverse
selection can cause significant market failures...”, while obtaining such information can
be costly and has an externality that producing private information on which adverse
selection can occur (Fishman and Parker [2015]). Dong et al. [2015] add from the
perspective of credit booms that, “a sufficiently large permanent credit boom can cause
a large competing effect so that no good assets will be traded due to adverse selection,
then the economy will enter a bubbly lemon equilibrium in which the intrinsically useless
lemon is traded as a bubble asset at a positive price – the market liquidity dries up and
a financial crisis may arise.”
Heider et al. [2015] assert that adverse selection changes the opportunity cost
of holding liquid assets, which endogenises the liquidity in the banking sector. They
develop a model of interbank lending and borrowing with counterparty risk6, deriving
three equilibria: (1) full participation, that all banks lend and borrow in the interbank
market7; (2) adverse selection, that only risky banks borrow while safe banks liquidate
their long-term assets; and (3) market breakdown/liquidity crunch, in which case no
interest rate is compatible, as safe banks (with liquidity surplus) are more willing to
reinvest in short-term assets rather than lending to adverse selection of risky banks.
In Malherbe [2014]’s model, liquidity hoarding is one possible choice for the market
participants that driven by the adverse selection with opacity of asset quality. The author
comments that hoarding behaviour may affect the efficiency of public intervention,
such as the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) launched by the US government
for strengthening financial institutions and enhancing market liquidity. Furthermore,
Malherbe [2014] shows that cash hoarding may impose a negative externality on
others by reducing the quality of long-term assets in the secondary market. Gale
and Yorulmazer [2013] comments that hoarding creates an inefficiency in the market
allocation (or aggregation) of liquidity. Boissay [2011] models financial fragility as the
coexistence of two self-fulfilling multiple equilibria on the wholesale financial maker: (1)
“normal time” equilibrium of a deep interbank market with low margin requirements,
highly leveraged banks and a large number of banks on the supply side of the
market; and (2) “crisis time” equilibrium that associated with high margin requirements,
deleveraging, liquidity hoarding, and a large number of banks on demand side. Bertsch
[2013] propose a model similar to the one by Malherbe [2014], but investors choose
deleveraging rather than liquidity hoarding.
6‘Counterparty risk’ is introduced briefly in the concluding part of this chapter.
7However, the ‘full participation’ equilibrium is not supported by the real data, from which we can only
see a few banks lend or borrow. See the data description of US interbank market in Section 6.1.1.
31

















Q1 2006 3.36×1011 4.03% 1.44×1011 1.73% 1.86×1012 22.33%
Q3 2006 3.62×1011 4.12% 1.22×1011 1.39% 1.97×1012 22.43%
Q1 2007 3.65×1011 4.04% 9.30×1010 1.03% 2.13×1012 23.54%
Q3 2007 4.08×1011 4.22% 7.73×1010 0.80% 2.18×1012 22.49%
Q1 2008 4.75×1011 4.55% 8.44×1010 0.81% 2.23×1012 21.33%
Q3 2008 6.62×1011 5.96% 7.75×1010 0.70% 2.27×1012 20.42%
Q1 2009 8.89×1011 8.19% 7.20×1010 0.66% 2.26×1012 20.83%
Q3 2009 9.02×1011 8.24% 1.00×1011 0.91% 2.29×1012 20.99%
Q1 2010 9.32×1011 8.46% 4.49×1010 0.41% 2.34×1012 21.23%
Q3 2010 8.61×1011 7.73% 4.87×1010 0.44% 2.40×1012 21.55%
2.4.3.3 Contagion Mechanism
This thesis adopts Malherbe [2014]’s liquidity dry-up model as a contagion channel
of liquidity risk. As per Malherbe [2014], when banks are facing liquidity shortage,
or anticipating the market to face liquidity shortage, the behaviour of the market
participants may be driven to cash hoarding. He proposes two stable equilibria in the
model: one is the high-liquidity equilibrium, that banks hold their investments in long-
term assets; another one is the self-fulfilling hoarding (fire-sale) equilibrium, that all the
banks recognise that their asset holdings are lemons, and they will choose fire-sale
because they expect all the others to sell. This may seem anti-intuitive, but from the
FDIC data, one can see that the total amount of cash holding and the ratio of ‘cash to
asset’ had been generally increasing during Q1 2006 to Q3 2010 (See Table 1), while
at the same time, the investment into interbank assets had been generally decreasing,
especially the distinct falls between Q1 2006−Q3 2006, Q3 2006−Q1 2007 and Q3
2009−Q1 2010. Furthermore, the investment into long-term assets had also increased
in amount, but slightly decreased during the crisis time Q3 2007−Q1 2010. These
phenomena shown by the real data support the propositions of fire-sale and liquidity
hoarding during the crisis.
Fire-sale will only be performed once, when (1) any banks are hit by liquidity shock
on their cash accounts, or (2) the anticipation of fire-sale of the market has dominated
the anticipation of a liquid market. If a bank decided to sell its long-term assets at a
fire-sale price, either to restore its liquidity position or simply out from the anticipation of
other market participants to sell theirs, the others will have chance to make they make
decision: believe that the market stays liquid and the fire-sale of a single bank is merely
32
a turbulence (the high-liquidity equilibrium), or oriented by the anticipation and perform
fire-sale of their long-term assets (the self-fulfilling hoarding/fire-sale equilibrium). The
decision making of the entire market (or most of the banks) may be affected by the cash
ratio and the interbank asset ratio of the market itself (which is public information once
disclosed by regulatory body). Once the first round of fire-sale is made, there will be
no chance left for the banks to start a second round, because in the model of liquidity
dry-up, all the assets are now lemons and the liquidity market is now frozen as no one
is willing to purchase others’ lemons.
Although banks do not know whether others are holding lemons or not, once the
fire-sale is performed, all those fire-sale banks are labelled as ‘low-quality’, and the
value of their interbank liabilities will seem questionable to the creditors. Moreover, at
this point, the fire-sale price is recognised, and all those banks that do not sell their
long-term assets will also suffer an asset write-down – in my model, a nominal loss
on their asset accounts that will not immediately bring them to insolvency, but they will
also be known as of ‘low-quality’ to others. The creditors of these low-quality banks will
withdraw their interbank loans, hence forcing some of these banks to fail by illiquidity.
For bank i (i= 1,2, . . . ,N) in a banking system with N banks, let LTi denote the long-
term asset, Cashi denote the cash, IBLi denote the interbank liabilities, Capitali denote
the capital. Then the whole contagion process can be modelled as below:
Initialising the triggering bank
(1) Bank i suffered a shock τ ∈ [0,1) as a fraction in its cash account Cashi. If it does
not receive any protection funding such as TARP, it has the chance to decide whether
to sell its long-term assets at a fire-sale price λ :
(1a) If 0 < τ < 1, the bank is then simply driven to fire-sale by short of liquidity.
In this case, the bank must consider whether it will be illiquid when all of its creditors
withdrawn interbank loans from it, i.e.:
(1− τ)Cashi < IBLi
If it cannot afford the run on its interbank liabilities account as above, it will choose
fire-sale, otherwise there will be no need for it to perform fire-sale that imposes losses
on capital. But the amount of long-term assets it sells should not exceed the level from
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which the losses on asset value leads to insolvency, i.e.:
(1−λ )∆LTi <Capitali
where ∆LTi ∈ (0,LTi] denote the amount of long-term asset to be sold. Satisfying this
condition, the cash account is now:
Cashi+λ∆LTi
(1b) If τ = 0, I call it ‘anticipation-oriented fire-sale’, i.e. bank i expects the fire-
sale to happen so that it sells its assets at λ to hoard cash. The rest follows point (1a)
determining the fire-sale amount ∆LTi and the cash.
Recognising the other fire-sale banks
(2) Some other banks follow bank i’s fire-sale, given that they believe the equilibrium of
self-fulfilling liquidity dry-up will be achieved. Here I propose two options of determining
the follow-up fire-sale banks:
(2a) Choosing the non-TARP potentially illiquid banks. A bank is called ‘potentially
illiquid’, if it will fail by illiquidity when all of its creditor banks withdraw from it. If it is also
not protected by the TARP, it will then choose fire-sale to restore its liquidity position.
The amount of fire-sale long-term assets is analogously restricted as in point (1a). Even
if its cash (after fire-sale) cannot afford a full withdrawal, i.e.:
(1− τ)Cashi+λ∆LTi < IBLi
it will not let itself fail by insolvency first, hoping that not all of its creditors will withdraw.
(2b) Choosing the banks that are in similar sizes and has similar Capital/Asset
ratio and Cash/Asset ratio to the triggering bank i, in other word, similarly solvent and
liquid. These banks are modelled to take the fire-sale action while they witness the fire-
sale of bank i. The asset sizes of these bank are restricted within a range of ±5% of
bank i’s, and the two ratios should be within the range Ri±0.5std({Rk}k=1,2,...,N), where
Ri denote the ratio of bank i and std({Rk}k=1,2,...,N) denote the standard deviation of the
ratio series of all the banks. The rest follows point (2a) determining the fire-sale amount
∆LTi and the cash.
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Modelling the withdrawal of interbank liabilities & Determining the failures
(3) The action of high-quality banks withdrawing their interbank loans from low-quality
banks varies by the alternatives of point (2a) and (2b).
(3a) Following (2a), each bank that performs fire-sales is recognised as ‘low-
quality’, while all the others are ‘high-quality’ banks. A low-quality bank k will face a
withdrawal as a fraction δk ∈ (0,1) of its total iinterbank liabilities by some of its creditors.
If it cannot afford these withdrawals, it fails by illiquidity, i.e.:
(1− τ)Cashk+λ∆LTk < δkIBLk
(3b) Following (2b), each bank that either performs fire-sales or is potentially
insolvent, in the case that the nominal loss on their long-term asset due to the marking-
to-market effect at fire-sale price exceeds their absorbent capital, is recognised as ‘low-
quality’, while all the others are ‘high-quality’ banks. A low-quality bank k will face a full
withdrawal from all its creditors. If it cannot afford these withdrawals, it fails by illiquidity,
i.e.:
(1− τ)Cashk+λ∆LTk < IBLk
The contagion process ends here. In Chapter 7, I will conduct the contagion
simulations on two alternative mechanisms: (1) the shock-driven mechanism, which
is the combination of (1a), (2a) and (3a) as stated previously, and (2) the anticipation-
oriented mechanism, which follows the steps of (1b), (2b), and (3b). One can also
record those banks that suffers insolvency by marking-to-market effect and asset write-
down – they will also fail if they are unable to raise their capital, although this is a much
expensive way to maintain their leverage and solvency.
2.4.3.4 Other Types of Illiquidity
Jang et al. [2014] proposes ‘ambiguity aversion’ as one possible cause of liquidity
crashes. In decision theory, ambiguity aversion refers an attitude of preference for
known risks over unknown risks. The authors show that during crisis time, managers
are reluctant to trade unless they obtain significant compensations to trade in exchange
for the cost of having no transaction, which could be an explanation for why liquidity was
greatly reduced in the financial market. They also propose that transaction costs might
have a significant effect on liquidity premium, preventing ambiguity-averse managers
from trading, hence causing liquidity crash or liquidity dry-up.
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Debt rollover also interacts with liquidity risk. A firm rolls its maturing bonds over,
i.e. replace it by issuing new bonds, then the rollover risk originates from the difference
(in the form of gain or loss) between the principal of the maturing bonds and the market
price at which the new bonds are issued (He and Xiong [2012]). This rollover risk affects
the credit risk, and it is covered by the firm’s equity.
Subprime mortgage is one type of ‘asset-backed financing’, i.e. the debt is backed
by a certain type of collateral. The recent crisis has witnessed not only the effect of
market risk on collateral, but also the freeze of liquidity that caused by overuse and
rollover of both short-term debts and overnight borrowings to match against high quality
long-term assets, which turned to be a market failure (Acharya, Gale and Yorulmazer
[2011]). Gai and Kapadia [2010b] describe the market dry-up across the entire financial
system as ‘interbank freeze’ (or ‘liquidity evaporation’).
Moreover, Haldane and May [2011] distinguish between ‘strong’ liquidity shocks
and ‘weak’ liquidity shocks. The former is associated with discounting specific asset
classes, i.e. the market risk, while the latter results from the expectation of further
defaults or a more general loss of confidence, which is related to the risk of information
contagion.
2.4.4 Credit Risk and the Interbank Model
Credit risk is the focus of the network model for banking system. A financial network
is ‘directed’ as its links have directions and show the flows of transactions between
financial institutions. Below I briefly define the network model, and then explain the
contagion mechanisms of credit risk among interbank networks.
2.4.4.1 Network Model for Financial Systems
A network model consists of nodes and links8. The former represents the
participants in the system while the latter stands for the interactions between the
participants.
Links can be either directed or undirected. For instance, in a citation network, links
stand for the citation relationships, while a link from node A to node B means that B
cites A. Links in a citation network are directed as a paper can only cite the papers that
8Also called ‘vertices’ and ‘edges’ in Graph Theory, respectively.
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published earlier. For some social networks, links for relationship between people are
undirected based on the assumption ‘if A knows B, then B knows A’. There can also
be two links between two nodes in opposite directions in a directed financial network;
transactions between two financial institutions are usually not netted.
Nodes and links can have weights. In a network model for a financial system, nodes
denote financial institutions (hereafter including ‘banks’) with some properties, such as
balance sheet figures or the amount of information it carries, depending on the use
and the emphasis of the network. Links are direct linkages (distinguished from ‘indirect
linkages’) between financial institutions, with directions start from the creditors towards
the debtors. An institution with a larger asset size may have a bigger node for notation.
The weight of a link represents the amount of the transaction it bears. Figure 2 presents
an example of the network structure of the UK interbank market in the first quarter of
2008. In this figure, one can explicitly see the sizes and the connectedness of the
banks.
The influential work by Allen and Gale [2000] show that “complete claims structures
are shown to be more robust than incomplete structures”, although this statement has
been proved to be misleading as it follows only in the case of homogeneous graphs,
commented by Markose et al. [2010]. Banking systems with homogeneous banks,
assuming that banks have similar balance sheet structures and similar tendency to
trade with others, are studied by Iori et al. [2006], who show that an interbank market
unambiguously stabilises the system. They also state that the ‘knock-on effect’, i.e. the
‘domino effect’ of bank failures becomes possible while banks are not homogeneous,
but the stabilising role of interbank market remains. Allen and Gale [2000] hold a similar
proposition that the existence of interbank market (the collection of interbank credit
linkages of loans) allows for optimal risk-sharing between the banks, especially when
facing random liquidity shocks. However, besides the stabilising effect, interbank market
provides a channel for the contagion of default risk of banks, via which the loss incurred
on one bank’s balance sheet can impair the strength of the balance sheets of its debtors
and creditors (discussed later in this section). Battiston et al. [2012] comment this as
“the trade-off between individual risk and systemic risk”.
Another attempt is ‘mean-field approximation’ for homogeneous banking networks.
May and Arinaminpathy [2010] use this method to construct networks of banks with the
same balance sheet structure and connectivity. Commented by Battiston et al. [2007],
this method yields useful predictions when units are not too heterogeneous to interact
in an all-to-all fashion, though in a production network (a generic form of economic
organisations), interactions are local and units are highly heterogeneous.
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Figure 2: An example of real banking network from Gai and Kapadia [2010b]
Acemoglu et al. [2015] show that an interbank network may be robust-yet-fragile:
the network is very resilient while shocks are small, but can be extremely vulnerable
while struck by rare large shocks that among a certain threshold, and the dense
interconnections “act as a channel through which shocks to a single financial institution
transmit to the entire system”. They mention two types of financial externality in an
interbank network: (1) overlending, in the sense that banks lend to one another even
though “the social planner would have preferred that they hoarded cash to limi systemic
risk”, implying that in equilibrium, financial stability is a public good that is under-
provided, while this inefficiency can manifest itself in the form of overlending; and (2)
under-diversification, that “equilibrium financial networks may be insufficiently dense,
in the sense that – from a social planner’s point of view – banks may not spread out
their lending enough among all potential borrowers”. The authors show that banks
fail to internalise these externalities into their lending decisions, and this ignorance of
the social welfare may “pave the way for transforming rare, large shocks into systemic
crises in which a large number of banks default”, especially when no bank decides to
hoard cash and the complete financial network emerges. They prove in Acemoglu et al.
[2013] that how this type of complete network is “robust-yet-fragile”.
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In contrast with the assumption of ‘complete homogeneous interbank network’,
banks may not make loans with all the other participants in the market. Battiston
et al. [2012] suggest that, due to the non-negligible transaction costs in credit markets
(including time and effort to establish relationship between a borrower and a lender),
an agent is only willing to get into a credit contract with a few of other agents. In other
words, credit networks are therefore generally incomplete.
As one can see explicitly from Figure 2, banks are of different sizes and different
connectedness, and the network has a hierarchical structure. Large banks are tightly
connected with each other, while small banks tend to trade with large banks, but
not directly with other small banks. Some small banks have large connectivities and
therefore they may also play an important role in contagion. This motivates the study
in finding a sampling method with assumptions of hierarchical network structure and
heterogeneous banks.
A principal feature of interbank networks (or banking networks, both referring to
‘financial networks’, hereafter) is the ‘core-periphery pattern’. Craig and Von Peter
[2014] state that local large banks and central banks act as ‘money centre banks’ and
intermediate the trading between small banks. In other words, a small bank may choose
to trade with local large banks which are supposed to be of lower risk, rather than
trading directly with another local small bank. In this sense, an interbank network tends
to show a pattern of tiering and core-periphery. Banks are categorised by sizes into
tiers, since small banks tend to be peripheries that link to cores, i.e. large banks and
central banks, as explicitly shown in Figure 2. The tiering and core-periphery properties
of interbank networks will be further discussed in Chapter 3.
2.4.4.2 Contagion Mechanisms
The contagion of credit risk (i.e. default risk) of banks occurs via interbank loans, in
the form of damages on the balance sheets of its counterparties. Although bank failures
may be incurred by some other factors, such as liquidity situation, here the model only
focuses on the contagion via direct financial linkages.
There are mainly two classes of algorithms for simulating the default process
(during the contagion) that employed by the literature. One is the model by Furfine
[2003], which accounts the direct effect on balance sheet via bilateral financial linkages.
In that paper, two types of failure simulations are performed on both insolvency and
illiquidity. The impact from debtor to creditor is transmitted via the insolvency channel,
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such that a bank’s default may impose losses (depending on the loan volume as well as
the recovery rate) on both current and fixed assets of its creditors, which implying the
risk of insolvency (when tier-1 capital is not sufficient to absorb the loss). The contagion
process is split into rounds. Each round starts with the recognition of shocks, which
may initially be external shocks, or incurred by defaults on several bilateral contracts
between banks but not on an entire bank, or incurred by new defaults that happened in
the previous round; the round is then followed by the calculation of losses that banks
suffer from these shocks. When a bank have too little outstanding tier-1 capital to cover
the loss, it will be recognised as ‘defaulted’, and all its contract with others will default,
imposing damage on others’ balance sheets. Contagion keeps transmitting until no new
default is revealed at the end of a certain round.
The insolvency mechanism (or contagion algorithms which are in principle similar
to it) has been empirically studied and employed by literature, such as Hurd and
Gleeson [2011], Nier et al. [2007] and Krause and Giansante [2012] with randomly
simulated banking networks; Degryse and Nguyen [2007] for Belgian banking system;
Upper and Worms [2004] for Germany; Wells [2004] for the UK; Van Lelyveld and
Liedorp [2004] for Netherlands; Amundsen and Arnt [2005] for Denmark; Lublo´y
[2005] for Hungary; and Mistrulli [2011] for Italy. Upper [2011] provides a summary
of literature that apply this mechanism. The insolvency mechanism is referred to as
‘default mechanism’ by Krause and Giansante [2012], who also apply another ‘failure
mechanism’ that works from creditor to debtor for illiquidity, which is also suggested by
Furfine [2003]: if a bank’s creditor defaults, loss takes place in its current liabilities, and
the risk of illiquidity arises if its liquid assets fail to cover the loss. Similar contagion
algorithms are supposed by Mu¨ller [2006] as ‘credit line contagion channel’ for illiquidity
and ‘exposure contagion channel’ for insolvency. However, Furfine [2003] comments
that “the illiquidity simulations likely generate too high a contagious impact” due to the
ignorance of two sources of liquidity. One is the existence of federal funds brokers,
which suggests those banks with excess liquidity to help those in need, even if no
prior relationship exists. The other is that the simulations define liquidity in terms of
‘net federal funds purchased’, while other assets such as government securities can
generally be converted into liquid reserves in short notice. The ignorance of these
sources of liquidity may lead to overestimation of the simulated impact of contagions.
According to the mechanisms stated above, regardless of the direction of links,
both the creditor and the debtor of a failed bank will suffer losses. One may use
only one of the two mechanisms or apply both in simulation. During a simulation the
losses on one bank will be accumulated, on the solvency side and on the liquidity side,
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respectively, which impair the strength of the bank’s balance sheet and make it more
vulnerable to any further random ill-functioning of the whole banking system.
Contagion of credit risk runs and aggregates in rounds. A bank may not default
in the first few rounds, but once the adverse effect from its failed counterparties
aggregates, its strength in balance sheet will be weakened, making it vulnerable to
either exogenous shocks such as market price crash in its asset holdings, or an
endogenous failure due to its illiquidity. The phenomenon that the failure of an institution
leads to failures of others by contagion of credit risk is also called ‘domino effect’ in
literature (see Upper and Worms [2004] for example).
Another class of contagion mechanism is proposed by Eisenberg and Noe [2001],
which is called ‘clearing payment vector’. This mechanism models the clearing system
for a banking network, which helps clearing the obligations of all the members, for
example, CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payments System) and Fedwire for US,
and the Abrechnung and the EAF (Elektronische Ai rechnung mit Filetransfer) for
Germany. The authors prove that under mild regulations, the clearing vector has a
unique solution for given initial conditions, which consist of initial shocks and other
features that the banks bear.
This allows for simulating contagion in consecutive steps as Furfine’s algorithm
does, while providing a different solution (of clearing vector) that contains information
of remaining equity value, with losses being imposed on banks in each round. The
latest defaults will be treated as sources of shocks and will be incorporated into the
next round of solving the clearing vector. In other words, in each round, shocks (either
initially set or incurred by defaults from the previous step) and figures of banks’ current
financial situation are adopted for solving the clearing vector, which then determines
the new defaults. The process ends while no new default occurs.
This algorithm has an advantage over Furfine’s algorithm: it considers the effect of
cyclical interdependence. As per Furfine [2003], the problem of ‘bilateral clearing with a
perfectly efficient contracting technology’ is trivial, yet the clearing problem is non-trivial
in the case of multilateral network with cyclical liabilities. Suppose that bank A defaults
a loan contract with bank B, imposing loss on bank B’s liquid asset side. If bank B
becomes insolvent due to this default, then one of its creditor, bank C, may also fail to
cover the loss from the default of contract between bank B and itself. If bankC even has
a contract with bank A, then a further repercussion will be imposed on bank A by that
initially defaulted contract between A and B. The transmission route is A→ B→C→ A.
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Furfine’s algorithm consider this whole transmission in three rounds: in the first
round, the default of loan contract from B to A makes bank B insolvent; in the second
round, the failure spreads from B to C also via a direct financial linkage between them;
finally in the third round, the failure ofC deteriorates A’s solvency, making it default. The
three banks default in three consecutive rounds, respectively.
Suppose there are N banks in the system, Lti, j(i, j= 1,2, . . . ,N) is the loan that bank
j holds from bank i in round t, Ri,t denotes the resource (tier-1 capital for insolvency
channel, and cash for illiquidity channel) for bank i to cover the loss that characterised
by Lti, j (on insolvency, or L
t
j,i on illiquidity, depending on the channel), Di,t indicates
whether bank i has defaulted or not at round t (1 for default, 0 for survival). Below,
insolvency is taken as the contagion channel.




is calculated. If the above amount becomes non-positive, then bank i defaults. The
status of banks being default or not are updated, and hence are the Di,t and Lt+1i, j .




represents the total nominal obligation of bank i to all the others, with a matrixΠt defined
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Πti, jp j,t , p¯i,t
]
where ei refers to the ‘operating cash flow’ of bank i. This equation can be solved
by iteration on t. The equation not only implies that the liability is limitied by the total
nominal obligations as an upper bound, but also implies the absolute priority of payment
to all the others if the former upper bound allows. The actual payment is allocated
proportionately by the matrix Πt at each round t for the corresponding counterparties.
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After each round, if the following equation holds:
ei+∑
j
Πti, jp j,t− pi,t = 0
then bank i defaults. The total nominal obligations ~¯pt , and the bilateral exposure matrix
Lt are updated before the start of next round.
In Eisenberg-Noe’s case, the clearing vector does not show the exact loss that
incurred by the full amount of the loans bear, but takes into account the cash flow that
each bank must pay into the clearing system for multilateral clearing (including cyclical
paths as stated above). The money paid to each creditor is proportional to their asset
sizes, while satisfying the limit of absolute priority9. The clearing vector is eventually
calculated through a cyclical iteration for finding a fixed point. Unlike Furfine’s algorithm,
Eisenberg-Noe’s algorithm does not directly employ the bilateral exposure matrix for
contagion process, yet it still requires these information to determine the proportion
of payment of a certain bank that allocated to the creditors by the clearing system.
However, Gai and Kapadia [2010a] assert that Eisenberg-Noe’s model “do not analyse
the effects of network structure on the dynamics of contagion”. Eisenberg-Noe’s model
gives a natural metric for systemic risk, as the clearing vector presents the outstanding
equity of each bank after a contagion round. Cifuentes et al. [2005] apply a similar
model to Eisenberg-Noe’s with a hypothetical banking system that consists of ten ex
ante identical banks. Acemoglu et al. [2013] also present an application of this model.
My thesis adopts Furfine’s mechanism to assess the systemic risk of the period
prior and post the recent financial crisis. This mechanism requires concrete data
for bilateral exposure, which is a major problem while dealing with systemic risk
assessment, as these data are usually confidential and can only be obtained by
regulatory bodies for regulation. Various remedies to the problem of data limitation
will be introduced in Chapter 5.
Moreover, counterparty risk, as a larger category than bilateral credit risk, does not
only include risk that incurred by financial products. Turnbull [2014] reviews literature
on counterparty risk (mainly on financial contracts), and discusses the use of collateral
for risk mitigation and its effect on credit value adjustment10. The author suggests that
the recent crisis urges the explicit recognition of the effects of counterparty risk.
9‘Absolute priority’ is a rule stated by Eisenberg and Noe [2001], that the payment must be paid to fulfil
the obligation by all the other banks, even though that will make the bank unable to afford the obligations.
10‘Credit calue adjustment’ is defined as the price of counterparty risk, measured by the value of a
contract being affected.
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Although the network approach is mainly applied to assess contagion of credit risk
via direct linkages between financial institutions, other risks may also be incorporated
into the methodology in the form of systemic influence on the stability of all the
nodes and links. For instance, liquidity and market risk damage the balance sheets
and exacerbate the credit risk of individuals; correlation risk affects the joint default
probabilities; and information risk makes financial institutions more vulnerable to shocks
(either liquidity shocks or direct shocks via linkages). All of these may give rise to
stochastic defaults that are not directly triggered by contagion effect.
Table 2: Crises and their key characteristics related to risk models in Section 2.4
Crises Corresponding risk models
1931 German Crisis liquidity risk, information risk
Savings and loan crisis moral hazard
Scandinavian banking crisis liquidity risk, market risk
Subprime mortgage crisis liquidity risk, market risk, correlation risk,
credit risk, moral hazard
As one can see from Table 2, the recent crisis was fuelled by all the types of risks
that listed in Section 2.4. Correlation risk in similar portfolio selections and credit risk via
direct loans and derivative tradings provided transmission channels for the contagion
effect. Liquidity risk was incurred by hoarding and exploiting short-term liquidity. Market
risk contributed to the liquidity spiral that exacerbated the liquidity crunch. Moral hazard
played an important role in the securitisation of subprime mortgage. Large financial
institutions (that formed the main body of shadow-banking system) suffered runs in
terms of short-term liquidity financial instruments. Besides the reasons above, this
crisis was due to some other factors. The fraud in regulating the shadow-banking
system hid the risks that those securities bore, since components of low quality would
still have some part with high rating after securitisation and tranching. This nature
allowed the shadow-banking system to grow until the crisis. Moreover, regulatory
measures like VaR (value-at-risk), which helped determining the capital requirement
for institutions and firms to be safe, turned to be a failure and misled the regulatory
bodies in risk assessment.
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3 Interbank Market
As inspired by IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report on April 2009, studies on network
models of interbank markets became a new trend in this field. This section reviews
literature on network model for interbank market, including research on the shape of
interbank networks as well as network measures that help assessing network stability
or indicating banks’ systemic importance (i.e. how much can its activities or failure
affect others or even the whole system). Examinations on networks that formed
from real data in different countries are also discussed and compared. This chapter
also mentions some other types of network (besides interbank loan networks) among
banking systems, and the differences in network properties between interbank networks
and these types of network.
3.1 Interbank Network
A network consists of nodes and links. For a banking network, each node stands for
a bank, and each link connecting two nodes bears a certain type of relation between
the two corresponding banks. Generally speaking, a network can be either directed or
undirected, and for banking networks the directed model is preferred since transactions
have directions. For example, if the links represent the flow of interbank loans, then the
network is usually categorised as ‘interbank network’; if the links show the interbank
payment flow via the payment system, then the network is called ‘payment network’.
As mentioned in Section 2.4.4, interbank networks are directed: the ‘direction’ of a link
between bank A and bank B is determined by which is the creditor and which is the
debtor. Suppose bank A holds interbank deposits for bank B, then there is a directed
link from bank B to bank A indicating the transaction that recorded in bank A’s liabilities
and in bank B’s assets. If in the meanwhile, bank B has required a payment from bank
A via the payment system, then as the payment is processed, the transaction will be
indicated by a directed link from bank A to bank B.
The simplest model of banking network might only contain one layer, yet a model
of multilayer network of banks is studied by Bargigli et al. [2015]. As stated above, an
interbank system might have several types of transactions being processed, while each
type of transaction forms an independent ‘layer’, which can be viewed as a network,
while a complete structure of interbank network system might be of multiple layers.
Bargigli et al. [2015] show an example of multilayer network, employing a unique
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database of supervisory reports of Italian banks that required by the Banca d’Italia,
including all bilateral exposures broken down into five layers by maturity and by the
secured and unsecured nature of the contract: unsecured overnight, unsecured short-
term, secured short-term, unsecured long-term, and secured long-term. In other words,
the interbank network system in their studies has five networks that established on the
same collection of nodes, but with different network topologies in terms of links. They
then examine the topological and metric properties across the layers, and find that
some of these properties are layer-specific, while some node-wise properties of the
same node are different among layers. They also assert that the total interbank market
is closely reflected by the overnight layer, but both are little informative about others.
Following the definition of network model in Section 2.4.4, I define L = {Li, j} as
the matrix representation of an interbank network for N banks: the matrix should have
N rows and N columns, with each row representing the volume of lendings from one
bank to all the others; likewise, each column stands for the borrowings of one ban
from all the others. A ‘cell’ in the matrix representation of a network stands for the link
which starts from node i and ends at node j, if the cell lies at the cross of the i-th row
and the j-th column. In this thesis, ‘cell (i, j)’ refers to a link described as above, in
order to locate a cell in a matrix with no specific notation of its cells for convenience.
For an interbank network L, the cell Li, j (in a similar notation in Section 2.4.4.2 while
explaining the contagion mechanisms; the notation of time is excluded), is then the
amount that bank i lends to bank j. Of course no banks should lend to itself, so that
the main diagonal must be full of zeroes. An adjacency matrix A = {ai, j} contains
only zeros and ones, and the cell at the cross of the i-th row and the j-th column is
denoted as ai, j, showing that whether there is a link from bank i to bank j, with 1
for ‘yes’ and 0 for ‘no’. Transforming a network into its matrix expression makes it
more convenient to calculate network measures, especially node-wise measures such
as degree centrality11, clustering coefficients, betweenness or eigenvalue, since the
techniques in Matrix Algebra can be applied.
3.2 Network Measures
Network topologies means the topological structure of a network, in terms of the
arrangement of the nodes and links (Groth and Skandier [2005]). There is no
11The term ‘degree centrality’ is especially used in social science, in the same meaning as ‘degree’
(Newman [2010]), to show the importance of a node with its simplest nature, which is how many links
come from it or go into it. In this thesis, the term ‘degree centrality’ will also be referring to this concept.
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rigorous definition in academics for some special shapes that real networks display,
but computer network engineers or scholars may name them vividly for convenience.
For instance, a ‘star-shaped network’ means a network with one central node with all
the other nodes connected to it. An interbank network is similar to a collection of star-
shaped networks, yet more complex in reality, out of their nature: the existence of
intermediaries that acted by local large banks or the central bank, and the existence of
tiering structure (Craig and Von Peter [2014]). Figure 2 show how a typical interbank
network looks like, with the biggest node acting as the centre of a star-shaped network
of small nodes and other big nodes, and with those slightly smaller nodes (but still
sufficiently big to be distinguished from the most outside ones) forming a tier that all
those nodes in the outer circle are connected to at least one of these big nodes. One
can see several typical star-shaped sub-networks in the whole network: measures for
centrality can indicate the importance of those ‘centres’ in the network.
The terms that people colloquially describe networks can only qualitatively give
an image of the shape of the networks, but cannot reflect the network properties
quantitatively. Network measures can help indicating the network topologies and the
importance of nodes and links. Network robustness, assortativity and centralities are
what the literature has focused on. The network topology for real banking networks
has been studied by empirical studies that employing percolation, assortativity and
centralities measures in network analysis. Percolation and assortativity can give
implication of network robustness, though they are more applied in random networks
while banking networks are non-random; some centrality measures for global (but not
merely local) properties can indicate the importance of nodes in a network which may
give implication on developing new risk measures particularly for financial networks.
3.2.1 Network Robustness
Network robustness is studied by using ‘Percolation Theory’, which deals with random
graphs. A network is called ‘percolates’ if there exists a giant component12, which is a
prominent feature of the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random model that contains a constant fraction
12As per Newman [2010], a component is “a subset of the vertices of a network such that there exists at
least one path from each member of that subset to each other member, and such that no other vertex
in the network can be added to the subset while preserving this property”. In the definition given by
Erdo¨s and Re´nyi [1960], for a network with n vertices and N(n) edges (where N(n)∼ cn with c> 12 ), the
size of the giant component of this network is G(c)n with
G(c) = 1− x(c)
2c
while x(c) is the unique solution for xe−x = 2ce2c,0< x< 1.
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of the entire graph’s edges (Newman [2010]). The percolation theory aims at finding
whether removing such a critical fraction of nodes or links will lead to the collapse of the
network structure, splitting it into small disconnected components. This phenomenon
is also called ‘Phase Transition’, regarded as “the threshold for extensive contagious
outbreaks can then be identified” by Gai and Kapadia [2010a].
The network robustness in this context is measured by the percolation threshold
(a threshold for a probability that a vertex is present in the network, parametrising
the percolation process, i.e. the formation of giant component during the formation
of a network) and the size of giant component (Newman [2010]). Hurd and Gleeson
[2011] present a study of banking network stability by simulating contagion via links
and see if the removals of some principal banks will cause the network to fall apart into
small disconnected clusters. However, this theory is mainly applied on random graphs,
while banking networks have been proved to be non-random (by analysing the degree
distribution of nodes, and the disassortativity of real banking networks, which will be
stated below). Therefore this method may not be proper for assessing the stability of
real banking networks.
3.2.2 Assortativity
Assortativity measures the correlation between degree centralities of nodes at the both
ends of links, and is associated with ‘cluster analysis’ for networks. Newman [2003]
study the mixing pattern, which is the tendency for nodes to be connected to other
nodes in a network. The author describes an assortative network “to show assortative
mixing if the nodes in the network that have many connections tend to be connected
to other nodes with many connections”. In other words, an assortative network has an
‘assortative mixing pattern’, which means that nodes tend to make connections with
other nodes with similar features (for instance, degree centrality), while ‘disassortative
mixing’ means the opposite, in the case of degree that is nodes with high degree tends
to be connected to nodes with low degree. Commented by May et al. [2008], banking
networks are strongly non-random and disassortative. Here ‘disassortative’ means that
large banks are disproportionately connected to small banks, i.e. large banks with high
degrees tend to attach to small banks with low degrees. Newman [2003] adds that an
assortative network tends to percolate (i.e. to have a giant component) more easily
than a disassortative one, and is also more robust to node removal. In this context,
assortativity is associated with network robustness.
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Foster et al. [2010] propose the general definition of ‘assortativity’ for directed
network in terms of Pearson correlation, which will be used in this thesis. Unlike
the assortativity for undirected network that only measures the correlation of degree
centralities between nodes, the assortativity measures proposed by Foster et al. [2010]
examine the correlation between in-degree and/or out-degree: ‘in-in’ assortativity, ‘in-
out’ assortativity, ‘out-in’ assortativity and ‘out-out’ assortativity.
Let G = (V,E) denote the graph of the network, with V as the set of nodes (called
‘vertices’ in graph theory) and E as the set of links (‘edges’ in grapth theory). Let the
ordered pair (u,v) denote the directed link from node u to node v. Let doutu and dinu denote
the out-degree and in-degree of node u, respectively:
doutu = ∑
v∈V
au,v , dinu = ∑
v∈V
av,u
where au,v denotes the adjacency defined in Section 3.1. Let d
out and din denote the
mean value of the out-degrees and in-degrees of all the nodes in V . Thus the four types





















The ‘in-in’ assortativity and ‘out-out’ assortativity assess the similarity of attaching
preference among edges, which is similar to what ‘assortativity’ does for undirected
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networks. The ‘in-out’ assortativity and ‘out-in’ assortativity, however, do not assess
the similarity between the patterns that nodes choose to build up connections with
others: in the context of interbank networks, these two measures rather show the
tendency of big lenders choosing big borrowers as their debtors, or the other way round.
Moreover, the ‘in-out’ and the ‘out-in’ have different values, since (u,v) is an ordered
pair, i.e. the existence of link u→ v does not imply the existence of link v→ u. This
leads to the difference between ∑(u,v)∈E(doutu −dout)2 and ∑(u,v)∈E(doutv −dout)2, etc., and
hence the difference between both equations. Section 6.2.2 presents the empirical
experiment on these directed assortativities. By this extension of assortativity with
link directions, directed graphs can be shown to be either completely assortative or
disassortative – they may be assortative in some classes of degree Pearson correlation,
while disassortative in others, implying that a more complicated anaylsis is needed for
the structure of directed networks than for undirected networks.
Iori et al. [2008] employ the monotonicity of affinity Ki (with respect to node degree)
to identify assortative mixing/disassortative mixing. Note that the evaluation of this







hence di is the out-degree of node i. ν(i) stands for the set of the neighbours of node
i, such that Ki, which is in essence a variable determined not only by i but also by di,
gives the measure of how much is the total out-degree of all the out-neighbours of node
i (i.e. those nodes that receive a link from node i) relative to the out-degree of node i.
Iori et al. [2008] assert that if the series {Ki(di)} increases with di, then the network is
assortative mixing, implying that a node with a higher out-degree is more likely to be
connected with nodes with high out-degree.
Additionally, Moreno et al. [2003] examine assortativitive networks in epidemiology
studies, as if an epidemic network is assortative, an individual who is likely to be
infected will spread diseases to those people who are similarly vulnerable. However,
contagion in a financial system is not ‘pure epidemic’: the contagion that starts from one
institution’s failure does not necessarily cause an ‘affected’ victim to default, though
the victim’s ‘health’ is weakened (more vulnerable to exogenous shocks or default).
Although the knowledge in epidemic networks should not be directly applied in systemic
risk study, ideas such as monitoring the vulnerable nodes and evaluating the strength
of links can still be employed.
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3.2.3 Clustering Coefficient
Clustering coefficient shows how likely it is for two neighbours of a certain node to
connect with each other, i.e. the likelihood of existence of triangles out of connected
triplets (nodes u,v,w with at least edges (u,v) and (v,w)) in the network, which is also
an indicator of network topology. This definition is cited from Newman [2010], while one





where A = {ai, j} is the adjacency matrix (see definition in Section 3.1) for a banking
network with n banks, ~1 is a n× 1 vector filled with 1. The trace of a matrix, tr(·), is
the sum of the main diagonal. The numerator gives the number of triangles (loops
with length of 3) as u→ v→ w→ u (not necessarily directed in this case of undirected
network, though) with repeated counts. The denominator is the repeated count for all
links with length of 2, i.e. u→ v→ w, but excluding those loops with length of 2, such as
u→ v→ u. This is the clustering coefficient for the whole graph, while for a single node
i, there is ‘local clustering coefficient’ defined as the ratio of the number of triangles




∑ j ai, j∑ j a j,i− (A2)ii
where the numerator (A3)ii means the cell (i, i) of the matrix A3; similarly (A2)ii in the
denominator gives the cell (i, i) of the matrix A2. The denominator gives the number of
repeatedly counted pairs containing node i, excluding loops of 2 for i. These clustering
coefficients are for undirected networks.
Various results have been found for different types of banking networks. Boss,
Elsinger, Summer and Thurner [2004] examine the cluster coefficients of the Austrian
interbank network. Although they apply the clustering coefficient that is only well-
defined on undirected networks (while interbank networks are obviously directed), they
still find that the interbank network shares some similar properties with most real
networks: low levels of clustering, and low shortest path lengths. To explain this
phenomenon, the authors suggest that two small banks that have a large bank as
their common intermediary, might not be willing to open a link between themselves, as
keeping such a link is costly.
Fagiolo [2007] proposes the definition of directed clustering coefficients, which are
later applied by Tabak et al. [2014] on Brazilian financial system between 2004 and
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2007. The local directed clustering coefficient for node i is defined as the ratio between
the number of all directed triangles actually formed by i and the number of all triplets
containing i. Here and below the index D forCDi and C˜
D
i means ‘directed’, distinguishing






where dtoti gives the sum of in-degree and out-degree of node i:
dtoti =∑(a j,i+ai, j)
and (A+AT )3ii gives the cell (i, i) of the matrix (A+A
T )3.
For an interbank network, the matrix L = {Li, j} has weights for all of its cells
(i.e. links in the network). Although one can perform analysis on the corresponding
adjacency matrix A = {ai, j}, the weighted versions of clustering coefficients are also
defined. Suggested by Tabak et al. [2014], the matrix L here is scaled by the largest






and then let L = L to be used in the definitions introduced in this section. Tabak et al.
[2014] comment that fue to this specification of the measure, the weighted clustering
coefficient is hugely affected by the largest link in the network. This effect will be
discussed in Section 6.2.3.
Let L[
1
3 ] denote the matrix that each cell labelled (i, j) has a weight equal to the real























where C˜Di is the weighted version of C
D
i . The gross clustering coefficients for directed










Figure 3: The four types of directed clustering coefficients defined by Tabak et al. [2014]
Tabak et al. [2014] further define the four types of directed triplets as: (a) cycle, (b)


























































∑i ai, j(∑i ai, j−1)
However, since in an interbank network, the in-degree or out-degree for small
banks are very likely to be 1 or 0, i.e. there could be a lot of NaNs in the results, which
are traditionally treated as zeros instead. Kaiser [2008] suggests a remedy to this issue
by introducing the adjustment upon clustering coefficient, which is determined by θ , the




So that all the clustering coefficients are enlarged by 11−θ , in compensation of the
loss of clustering property that due to NaNs being overly set as zeros.
Moreover, Sorama¨ki et al. [2007] present a different result by using data of daily
payment flow from Fedwire. They state that the daily networks have characteristics that
commonly found in other empirical complex networks, such as high average clustering
coefficient. The authors show that a fairly high proportion (over 35%) of banks have
clustering coefficients as 0 or 1, and attribute it to the fact that banks with clustering
coefficient of 0 have only one link with others (probably a small bank’s trade with a
large bank that act as its local intermediary), and that banks with clustering coefficient
of 1 are all in and only in triplets that consists of nodes with degree two, in other words,
together with other banks with clustering coefficient of 1.
Iori et al. [2008] also employ clustering coefficient for analysing the network of
the Italian overnight money market. They assert that due to the transparency and
multilateral nature of the market, banks do not need to act as intermediaries, and hence
the low clustering is displayed.
3.2.4 Centralities
‘Centralities’ include degree centrality, betweenness, closeness and eigenvector
centrality. These measures help indicating the importance of the nodes.
Degree centrality, as defined in Section 3.2.2, explicitly shows that how many links
come from/go into a node (i.e. the connectivity of a node), and the distribution of the
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degree centrality can give implication on properties of the network structure. Banking
networks are found to have power-law distributions of degree centralities, therefore
banking networks are scale-free, but not of Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random model (Baraba´si et al.
[1999]). Since banking networks are directed, the distributions of in-degree and out-
degree are also studied. e Santos et al. [2010] report that the distributions of in-degree
and out-degree of banks in Brazilian banking network are both heavy-tailed, i.e. the
network is scale-free.
Betweenness, which is firstly proposed by Freeman [1977], is a measure of node’s
importance to the network than just connectivity: it measures the number of shortest
paths from all nodes to others passing through a node, particularly indicating the





where k is a certain node in the network, gi j gives the number of shortest paths between
nodes i and j, while gi j(k) counts the number of shortest paths between node i and
node j that passing k. Therefore, betweenness shows the relationship between one
node and the global network, while connectivity is merely a local property. Boss,
Summer and Thurner [2004] find that betweenness of a node in a banking network
is linearly related to contagion impact (the number of nodes to fail by the default of this
node).
Closeness takes the sum of reciprocals of the distance from one node to all the others





This could be naturally defined in a directed fashion, with D j,i representing the length
of shortest path (undirected or directed) from node j to node i. If the network is dis-
connected, i.e. there are pairs of nodes that no paths lie between them, then these
nodes have infinite closeness. Since this measure captures the relationship between
any node and the whole system, it is used in empirical analysis on banking networks
(see Von Peter [2007] for example).
Eigenvector centrality measures the influence of a node to all the others in a network.
This measure is derived from the adjacency matrix of a network (see definition in
Section 3.1). Suppose λ is one of the eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix A, then
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the eigenvector of A, ~x, satisfies:
A~x= λ~x
which follows the definition of eigenvalue for a matrix. Markose et al. [2010] comment
that eigenvector centrality “measures the extent of connectivity and concentration of
linkages of a node in the network”. In the context of directed network, this is also
called ‘right’ eigenvector centrality, as the left hand side of the defining equation above
calculates the centrality that related to all the out-links from each node. The ‘left’
eigenvector centrality can be similarly defined as:
AT~x= λ~x
Kleinberg [1999] propose ‘hub-centrality’ and ‘authority centrality’ to identify the impor-
tant node in a network. A hub is the type of node that helps indicating authorities, while
an authority is the type of node that contains useful information of interest; in other
words, a node with high hub-centrality points to many authorities, and a node with high
authority-centrality is pointed to by many hubs (Newman [2010]). In this sense, the
hub-centrality and authority-centrality are naturally defined for directed networks. Let
~H = {Hi} denote the hub-centrality and ~U = {Ui} denote the authority-centrality:
~U = αA~H, ~H = βAT~U
or by combining the two equations:
AAT~U = αβ~U , ATA~H = αβ ~H
therefore, the authority-centrality and the hub-centrality are actually the eigenvector
centrality of AAT and ATA, respectively.
Feedback centrality is a category of network centrality measure that firstly suggested
by Seeley [1949] and later formulated as Katz index for social network analysis by
Katz [1953], which gives one solution to eigenvector centrality that mentioned above by
allowing a small amount of centrality into each node:
~x= αA~x+β~1
⇒~x= β (I−αA)−1 ·~1
where ~1 is a vector filled with 1, and α is the normal eigenvector centrality term in
which the centralities of the nodes linking to node i are summed, and β is the small
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amount that added to each node (Newman [2010]). This kind of measures actually
consider effects from one to another via all possible paths, either direct or indirect (i.e.
via others with length no smaller than 2). Feedback centralities are usually solved by
linear systems, as the effect from node i to node j, will be involved in the calculation for
other pairs of nodes that directed paths between them may go through the directed link
from node i to node j. Finally a loop will be formed by recursion, and hence a linear
system remains to be solved.
PageRank is recognised as one type of feedback centrality, which is applied by Google
search engine in ranking the priority of search results (Page et al. [1999]). This measure
overcomes the undesirable feature that Katz centrality has: if a vertex with high Katz
centrality points to many others then those others also get high centrality (Newman
[2010]). PageRank incorporate the scaling of out-degree into each node’s centrality so
as to dilute this effect of passing on centrality to out-neighbours. In this context, while
assessing the importance of the out-neighbours of a popular webpage with millions of
accesses every day, those neighbours will not receive the centrality that implied by the
millions of accesses, but will have these accesses scaled by the number of this popular
webpage instead:
~x= αAD−1~x+β~1
⇒~x= β (I−αAD−1)−1 ·~1
where D−1 is the inverse of the matrix D = {Di, j} with main diagonal elements Di,i =
max{douti ,1} and other as 0.
DebtRank is a feedback-centrality-like measure, which is proposed by Battiston et al.
[2012] for banking network analysis, similar to PageRank that mentioned above. In the
analysis of interbank network, it is worth assessing the feedback-centrality-like measure
for banks, in the sense that how vulnerable a bank is by receiving risk impacts from
others, and how contagious a bank is to affect others (even not direct neighbours).
DebtRank incorporate not only the weight of out-links into the model while diluting
the loss that each bank can pass onto its out-neighbours, similar to how PageRank
gets improved from Katz centrality, but also a contagion mechanism similar to the one
proposed by Furfine [2003] for determining which bank to be deactivated, by the criteria
that once a bank is hit by loss, it must be labelled as ‘deactivated’ to avoid repeated
aggregation of loss in further steps via cyclic paths. This specification finally results in
an explicit risk measure that indicates the impact of each bank’s distress on the whole
system.
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Following the notation in Section 2.4.4.2, Battiston et al. [2012] define the impact
of bank i on bank j as:
Wi, j =min{1, L j,iR j }
and the relative economic value, vi, of bank i:
vi =
∑ j Li, j
∑i∑ j Li, j




If taking into account the impact of bank i on itrs indirect successors, i.e. the nodes
that can be reached from bank i and are at distance 2 or more (i.e. the path connecting
the two banks consists of at least two links), a recursive equation that incorporates the






where β < 1 is a dampening factor that models the shrinking effect on the cyclical paths
mentioned above. In matrix notation, the above defining equation can be solved as:
~M =W~v+βW ~M
⇒ ~M = (I−βW )−1W~v
However, Battiston et al. [2012] consider that the repeated calculation of the cyclical
effect may overestimate the impact that one bank could impose on its out-neighbours: a
single reverberation of the impact of bank i back to itself “is realistic and mathematically
acceptable”, yet further reverberations may aggregate and finally become larger than
the original impact. Simply removing the cycles from the network will remove entirely
the reverberation as well as many links, leading to underestimation of the impact. To
overcome this difficulty, the authors propose a contagion mechanism which is very
similar to the one by Furfine [2003] introduced in Section 2.4.4.2. The only difference
is the recognisation of ‘deactived banks’: Furfine’s mechanism recognises a bank to
be failed once the aggregated loss that imposed on it exceeds its absorbing resource
(i.e. tier-1 capital for solvency and cash for liquidity), while the mechanism proposed by
Battiston et al. [2012] forces a bank to be deactivated once it is hit by losses due to its
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neighbours’ failures. This can allow the reverberation of impact from a bank to itself to
be passed onto the cyclical paths by once, while after the round of contagion in which
the bank is deactivated, no further reverberation can be counted on this bank.
Other network measures have also been used in literature. Von Peter [2007] uses
‘intermediation’ as an extension to the ‘betweenness’ by taking portfolios shares into
account, which measures the influence of a ‘hub’, i.e. a large bank that has large
connectivity and acts as an intermediary in the interbank market (however, this measure
is poorly defined in Von Peter [2007] as the author has not given the definition of
some notions in the formulas). He also uses ‘prestige’, which is an extension of
eigenvector centrality with valued network (compared with adjacency matrix that carries
no information of the weights of links or nodes), to evaluate the importance of a hub by
considering the contribution from those hubs that lend to it. The matrix of the ratio of
loans from bank i to bank j to all the loans that bank i lend to its peers is defined as




and the eigenvector ~ν measures the prestige of all the banks in the market:
~ν = PT~ν
Iazzetta and Manna [2009] extend measure for ‘degree correlation’ and ‘distance’
by incorporating weights of links and nodes, and they also employ ‘maximum distance’,
‘diameter’, ‘resilience’ and ‘geodesic frequency’ to assess the importance of nodes in
the whole system. In Table 3, the ~ei is an N× 1 vector with 1 in the i-th column and
0 otherwise, and ~1 is an N× 1 vector filled with 1, while N is the number of nodes in
the network as denoted in Section 2.4.4.2. The matrix D and Dw consist of generic
elements Di, j the distance between node i and node j that denoted on the previous
page, and Dwi, j, the ‘weighted distance’ defined in Table 3. The ‘resilience’ examines
the resilience of the network by eliminating the i-th row and column; the ‘geodesic
frequency’ examines how frequent the node lies in the shortest path between other two
nodes. ~1−imaxn−1 is a vector that takes value 1 only corresponding to the banks belonging to
the largest component remaining after the elimination of the node i; L−i is derived from
the interbank loan matrix L by eliminating the i-th row and column, i.e. representing the
network that bank i is excluded; and 1(D j,k=D j,i+Di,k) is an indicator function for the event
that node i lies at the shortest path from node j to node k.
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Table 3: Extension of network measures by Iazzetta and Manna [2009]
valued out-degree of node i vouti =
~eTi X~1
~1TX~1












average distance of node i hg = ~eiD
~1
n−1
weighted average distance of node i hwi =
~eiDw~1
n−1
average distance of the network h= 1n∑i hi
maximum distance (eccentricity) of node i ei =max(~eTi D)
diameter (eccentricity) of the network e=maxi (ei)




geodesic frequency of bank i fi =
1(Dj,k=Dj,i+Di,k)
[(n−1)(n−2)]/2
3.3 Interbank Market in Different Countries
Besides the fact that there is not rich literature focusing on network topologies of
interbank networks, van Lelyveld et al. [2014] employs the Core-Periphery model, which
is firstly proposed by Borgatti and Everett [2000] in the study of social networks, in
describing interbank networks. Consider the simplest example for a small banking
system, with only one big bank and several small banks. If all the small banks will only
trade with the big bank (for safety reason or for regulatory policies, etc), but not directly
making transaction with others, the big one in this case becomes the ‘intermediary’ (in
the sense that intermediating the interbank lending between small or local banks) and
also the actual unique ‘core’ in the system. All the others are peripheries and therefore
the banking network will display a shape of star, i.e. a star-shaped network that
mentioned in the introduction part of Section 3.2. In’t Veld et al. [2014] propose a model
for simulating the formation of core-periphery homogeneous banking network, and
apply it to the Dutch interbank market. Leo´n et al. [2014] reveal the inhomogeneity and
core-periphery structure in Columbian financial networks, contradicting the traditional
assumptions in interbank contagion models, such as homogeneity, symmetry, linearity,
normality, and static equilibrium. These results show that heterogeneity is crucial in the
network model.
A core may have multiple nodes, which are tightly connected with each other,
while a periphery node is very unlikely connected with other peripheries, but must be
connected with at least one node in the core. In the context of real banking systems,
there are usually more than one ‘intermediaries’, which are served by local large banks
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or central banks, while not all the intermediaries can be the core, and vice versa (Fricke
and Lux [2012], Craig and Von Peter [2014]). The structure of this type of networks can
be typically reflected by an adjacency matrix as below:
0 1 · · · 1 · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1 0 . . .
... · · · · · · · · · · · ·
... . . . . . . 1 · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1 · · · 1 0 · · · · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · 0 0 · · · 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · 0 0 · · · 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · ... ... . . . ...
· · · · · · · · · · · · 0 0 · · · 0
where the top-left sub-matrix represents the core, which is a matrix filled with 1 but the
main diagonal is full of 0: each bank has ‘1’ in the adjacency matrix with others, implying
that in the core, every bank is connected to each other. The bottom-right sub-matrix
has all its cells with zero, implying that the peripheries do not build up links with other
peripheries. The sub-matrices on the top-right corner and on the bottom-left corner,
which are filled with ellipsis, indicate the adjacency status between core nodes and
periphery nodes; the cells in these sub-matrices can either be 1 or 0.
The core-periphery model is also examined by Sui [2012], Fricke and Lux [2012]
and Craig and Von Peter [2014]. Becher et al. [2008] studies CHAPS, UK’s large-
value payment system, and divides the banking system into two tiers: a clearing
system consists of only 15 banks that maximally-connected (any pair of the 15 banks
are connected) as the superior tier, and an interior tier of banks that are not direct
member of CHAPS that have to make payments via the superior tier. Sui [2012] then
mentions the core-periphery structure in CHAPS: the first tier functions as the core,
while all the other non-members are the peripheries. Upper and Worms [2004] find
that ‘interbank lending in Germany is characterised by a two-tier structure’. Fricke
and Lux [2012] examine the quarterly networks from a dataset containing all overnight
interbank transactions on the e-MID trading platform from January 1999 to December
2010, and estimate different versions of core-periphery model. Although a payment
network or an overnight network (compared with relatively long-term interbank loans)
does not necessarily have a similar topology as an interbank network does, the idea of
core-periphery structure is still worth noticing. Craig and Von Peter [2014] assert that
intermediaries (via which other banks must transfer their funds) give rise to interbank
credit exposure, and emphasise that ‘core’ is a qualitative concept, not only depending
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on the size of intermediaries. This might follow the idea of ‘Systemically Important
Financial Institution’ mentioned by Thomson [2009] and Zhou [2009].
Network properties can be market-specific across different countries. Take
clustering coefficient, which is a common focus among literature as an example. Boss,
Elsinger, Summer and Thurner [2004] examine the Austrian interbank market (between
2000 and 2003) and find the clustering coefficient within the range 0.12±0.01.
Roukny et al. [2014] monitor a series of common network measures for Germany
market between 2002 and 2012, which is an empirical study for a two-layer network
that consists of a credit network (in fact, the network for interbank exposure, the type of
banking network that my research focuses on) and a derivative network. The measures
to be examine include the network density defined as below:
d =
∑i∑ j ai, j
N(N−1)
The density of the credit network had stayed in the range of (0.006, 0.007) between
2002 and 2012, and the density of the derivative network had increased from 0.002 to
0.003 during the period. This result shows how sparse a banking network is in reality. In
other words, only no more than 0.1% of all the possible connections in the network are
established, and this concretely questions the rationality of application of Maximum-
Entropy estimation that produces maximally-connected networks that seem far from
the reality, which will be introduced in Section 5.1. Roukny et al. [2014] also employ
measure such as: degree (either in-degree or out-degree, and the total degree which
is the sum of the both directed degree), average shortest path length (the same as
‘average distance’ defined in Table 3), diameter (defined in Table 3), volume (node-wise
measure as the sum of total borrowings and total lendings), Herfindhal-Hirschman index
for market concentration, clustering coefficient, betweenness, closeness, eigenvector,
percentiles (for tail distribution), and correlation (equivalent to ‘assortativity’ that defined
in Section 3.2.2). They find that the average betweennesses (i.e. the average value of
betwennesses regarding to all the banks in a network; a global network measure) for
both the credit network and the derivative network are very small to lie between 4.5×
10−4 and 1.5× 10−3, which is in line with the networks “having a highly heterogenous
structure”, commented by the authors. They also examine the measure-wise correlation
between the credit network and the derivative network regarding to degree, volume,
and betweenness, and find that the correlation between the two layers of the German
market high: the correlation on degree and the correlation on betweenness both stay
around 0.9 between 2002 and 2012, while for volume, the correlation had experienced
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a fall from 0.8 to 0.4 before the 2007 Subprime mortgage crisis, and gradually increased
back to 0.8 between 2009 and 2012. However, they find that the clustering-clustering
coefficient between the two layers negative and stable around -0.2, which implies the
difference in the banks’ strategies for choosing the two channels of financing.
Other studies have also provided network analyses employing network measures
such as assortativities and clustering coefficients, which will be applied in my empirical
study in Section 6.2. For assortativities, Iori et al. [2008]show that the assortativity of
the Italian overnight money market had generally followed an increasing trend from -0.5
to -0.35 between 1990 and 2006; Roukny et al. [2014] find the assortativity for German
credit network fluctuate around -0.45 between 2002 and 2012, while in the same period
the assortativity of German derivative network had dropped from -0.4 to -0.5.
For clustering coefficients, Roukny et al. [2014] find that German credit network
between 2002 and 2012 has a clustering coefficient decreased from 0.87 to 0.80, while
the measure for derivative market (for CDS) is around 0.17 with an increasing trend to
0.35 till the end of the period. Anand et al. [2015] use data for German interbank market
from the second quarter of 2003, and find that the average value of local clustering
coefficient is 0.466 for the real network. Rørdam et al. [2009] for Danish interbank
payment market and money market in 2006, show that the clustering coefficient for
payment market lies between 0.4 and 0.7, and for money market is between 0 and 0.5.
Vandermarliere et al. [2015] employ data for Russian interbank network between
1998 and 2005, and find the average local clustering coefficient (over all the nodes
and time periods) to be 0.198. The author assert that the result is close to the 0.2
found by Cont et al. [2010] for Brazilian interbank network (in 2007 and 2008). Tabak
et al. [2014] propose directed weighted clustering coefficients for interbank networks.
However, they find that directed weighted clustering coefficients for Brazilian interbank
markets (between 2004 and 2007) mainly lies between 10−4 and 10−5.
Sorama¨ki et al. [2007] find the clustering coefficient for US payment system around
0.53±0.01 in 2004. Bech and Atalay [2010] explore the data for Federal funds market (a
market for overnight borrowings between banks) between 1997 and 2006, and find that
the in-clustering-coefficients lie between 0.2 and 0.4, while the out-clustering-coefficient
lie between 0.1 and 0.2. Martinez-Jaramillo et al. [2014] show that the daily average of
clustering coefficient for Mexican payment network (between 2005 and 2010) fluctuate
around 0.8. One can see from above that properties of banking network properties may
vary a lot across countries, or among different types of interlinkages, such as interbank
network, payment network, overnight payment network and money network.
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To summarise, this chapter defines the network model in represention of an
interbank market, and defines network measures, including degree, weight (and
volume), clustering coefficient, assortativities, betweenness, closeness, eigenvector
centrality, and some extensions to them that proposed by literature but have only been
applied in few recent empirical studies, in the notation that denoted in the definition
of network model. This chapter has also examined the results of empirical studies
for banking system in different countries. The results show that a banking network in
reality is very sparse, i.e. has only a few links (relative to the number of all potential
links). The banking network in every country that mentioned in this chapter has shown
explicit differences in network measures with each other, while banking networks that
established by different financing tools have also shown varied results, implying the
existence of country-specific and market-specific properties.
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4 Risk Assessment
This chapter focuses on the risk assessment that applied by regulatory bodies
(represented by the Basel Committee from Bank of International Settlement), and also
those risk measures that adopted by earlier studies but proved to be misleading during
the recent financial crisis. Furthermore, this chapter introduces some new network-
theoretic measures that take advantage of the network structure of interbank market.
4.1 Assessment Using Non-network-based Risk Measures
‘Traditional’ risk measures focus on risk assessment for every financial institution
individually, but often ignore the individual’s prominence against the whole system or the
influence from the others. This section briefly reviews those risk measures that have
been used for risk assessment, such as VaR, expected shortfall and their variations,
and elaborate their drawbacks in assessing systemic risk.
4.1.1 Value-at-Risk
Some measures have been developed for risk assessment for individual institutions,
such as value-at-risk (VaR) with its variations. An X% VaR is the threshold value of
loss, that the probability of the loss not exceeding this threshold is X%. It assesses the
loss distribution of the portfolio that a firm holds, and is adopted for risk assessment
and for regulatory use. VaR works well while the market is not under distress, but
during systemic events (for instance, the recent 2007 Subprime mortgage crisis), the
probability of extreme events (such as joint defaults of large fraction of the financial
system) increases, and VaR cannot reflect the risk under such circumstances. Turnbull
et al. [2008] comment that “traditional VaR risk measurement models are static in nature
and do not capture the impact on potential losses of limited liquidity and complex non-
linearities embedded in structured credit products”. Haldane et al. [2009] comments
that VaR as one of the node-by-node diagnostics has given a poor guide to institutional
robustness during the crisis.
Brunnermeier and Adrian [2009] state that, in the context of regulatory capital and
margin being set relative to VaR, i.e. sufficient to cover the position’s VaR for the loss
to happen at a probability of X% (while X% is a very small number such as 1%; in
other words, the 99% VaR is considered), the forced unwinding of one institution tends
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to increase market volatility: it lowers market liquidity by fire-sale and leads to higher
margins in equilibrium, then tightens other institutions’ funding constraint further by
making others more likely to be forced to unwind and delever at fire-sale prices, and
so on (Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009]). Brunnermeier and Adrian [2009] argue
that VaR cannot capture the effect of ‘margin spiral’, and hence it fails to explain
why those institutions regulated by the setting of capital buffer relative to VaR still
fail in the systemic event. Additionally, Danielsson et al. [2001] point out that VaR is
misleading when returns are not normally distributed as in the case with credit, market
and operational risk, generating imprecise and widely fluctuating risk forecasts.
There are stil some studies on applications of VaR in banking system and systemic
risk. Canedo and Jaramillo [2009] scales VaR by the total potential loss to measure
the fragility of the Mexican banking system. Boss et al. [2006] propose a model called
‘Systemic Risk Monitor’ that assess systemic risk in the Austrian banking system at
a quarterly frequency and perform regular stress testing exercises, mainly assessing
loss distributions and examining VaR-like measures. White et al. [2010] develop an
econometric framework to estimate and make inference in multivariate, multi-quantile
models, for instance, VaR by a vector autoregressive model.
Besides the inability in capturing risk during extreme events, VaR is not a coherent
risk measure. Heath et al. [1999] comment that the VaR of the sum of two portfolios
can be higher than the sum of their individual VaRs, which contradicts ‘diversification’.
Expected shortfall, which is an alternative to VaR that also called ‘conditional VaR’,
i.e. an X% expected shortfall provides an average of VaR from 0% to X%, is an
attempt to overcome the incoherence of VaR. Acharya et al. [2012] further introduce
the ‘systemic expected shortfall (SES)’, which measures each institution’s propensity
to be undercapitalised when the system as a whole is undercapitalised. This ex ante
measure increases with the institution’s leverage and with its expected loss in the tail
of the system’s loss distribution, and shows how stressful the financial institutions are
during systemic events. The authors also suggest ‘marginal expected shortfall (MES)’
as a measure to cover the sensitivity of a bank’s overall risk to the risk of a component in
its portfolio. Econometric tests in OLS and Probit regressions show that MES performs
better than ‘traditional’ risk measures, such as beta, volatility and expected shortfall,
in explaining the realised cross-sectional returns. They also conclude that MES can
forecast the equity performance during financial crisis, using CDS return data in the
test (in contrast, tests using CDS spread exhibit dramatically lower explanatory power).
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4.1.2 Correlation Measures
Examining correlation between banks provides an intuitive assessment for the likelihood
of contagion. Information is mainly extracted from stock price and return. Corsetti et al.
[2005] reconsider Hong Kong stock market crisis of October 1997, which is part of
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, applying a contagion model that based on bivariate
correlation analysis. They propose a measure for interdependence of cross-country
stock market return, and warn that correlation and covariance between individuals could
increase even without linkage between them. Chakrabarti and Roll [2002], and Baig and
Goldfajn [1998] emphasise on the change of cross-border correlation during 1997 Asian
crisis. De Nicolo and Kwast [2002] analyse the dynamics of correlations, and then relate
the correlations between firms to their consolidation activity by estimating measures of
consolidation elasticity. The authors measures the interdependencies between firms
by the correlations of percentage changes in large and complex banking organisation
stock prices. Here the interdependency consists of two aspects: direct and indirect.
The former arises from inter-firm on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet exposures,
including linkages through payment and settlement systems. The latter arises from
correlated exposures to non-financial sectors and financial markets.
Acharya [2009] employs the endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets
held by banks. Mashal and Zeevi [2002] comment that correlation only forms a part of
the dependency between two firms, which can be measured by the co-movements of
the firms’ returns under extreme conditions. Bae et al. [2003] propose ‘coexceedance’
that covers the joint occurrence of extreme returns on both tails of return distributions,
explaining contagion as a phenomenon associated with extreme returns.
Later, as the network structure of banking systems begins to draw researchers’
attention, correlation measures in network theory such as degree correlation, node-
wise correlation with weights (Iazzetta and Manna [2009]; Sorama¨ki et al. [2007];
Battiston et al. [2010]). These correlation measures for network are not the main
measures that aim to assess the extent of systemic risk, but are used as part of
the assessment of network properties. Again, although the correlation measures can
exhibit how likely that two banks are to fail dependently or simultaneously while hit by
shock, they do not explicitly capture either the systemic risk or the influence that an
individual bank can impose on the system.
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4.2 Efforts in Macro-/Micro-prudential Regulation
According to Committee et al. [2010], Basel III is a comprehensive package of reform
measures that “presents the Basel Committee’s reforms to strengthen global capital and
liquidity rules with the goal of promoting a more resilient banking sector”. The Basel III
not only targets at microprudential regulation that supplying recommendation on capital
and liquidity requirements, but also at macroprudential regulation on the system-wide
risks that “can build up across the banking sectod as well as the procyclical amplification
of these risks over time” (Committee et al. [2010]).
As per Clement [2010], the concept of ‘macroprudential’ might have been firstly
proposed at a meeting of the Cooke Committee (the forerunner of Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision) in 1979, which discussed the potential collection of data on
maturity transformation in international bank lending. The rapid pace of lending to
developing countries might have implication on macroeconomic and financial stability.
Moreover, a document by Bank of England, also in 1979, examines the use of prudential
measures and explicitly put forward the proposition of macroprudential regulation, which
considers problems that “bear upon the market as a whole as distinct from an individual
bank, and which may not be obvious at the micro-prudential level”. Yet, the term
“macroprudential” has not gained so much attention until the recent Subprime crisis that
urges the development of systemic risk measure. Galati and Moessner [2013] provide
a literature review of macroprudential policies, and raise further research questions
such as the effective ness of macroprudential tools, including quantifying the effect
of macroprudential policy instruments on credit growth, leverage, asset prices and
asset price bubbles, as well as evaluating the practicality of proposed macroprudential
measures such as CoVaR, etc. These are exactly the reform that Basel III attempts to
implement but yet to be improved on the macroprudential side.
4.2.1 CoVaR
Shin [2011] criticises that Basel III still focuses on individual monitoring rather than
monitoring the financial system as a whole, while suggesting that measures of cross-
exposures across intermediaries, such as ‘CoVaR’ that proposed by Brunnermeier and
Adrian [2009], may be useful complementary indicators for macroprudential regulation,
since cross-exposures are procyclical and track non-core liabilities. The common
drawback of value-at-risk and those VaR-like measures is they assume that each bank
is standalone, and assume the risk assessment to be done without considering the
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effect that peer banks in the market might impose on every single bank. ‘CoVaR’
measures the risk in a macroprudential fashion by calculating the VaR of the whole
financial sector on condition that one specific bank is in distress; also, they propose
the ‘∆CoVaR’ between ‘CoVaR’ and the unconditional financial sector VaR, capturing
th e marginal contribution of a particular institution, which is again a risk measure
for individuals, but with implication on their importance to the system. These will be
discussed in Section 4.2.1.
Brunnermeier and Adrian [2009] develop a co-risk measure, CoVaR, to capture
the risk of one financial institution on condition that other financial institutions are under
distress. They suggest CoVaR as a remedy for the ‘margin spiral’ (mentioned above
in the ‘VaR’ section). The prefix ‘Co-’ means conditional, co-movement, contagion and
contribution. The authors use ∆CoVaR, the difference between ‘the CoVaR for bank j
conditional on bank i being distress’ and ‘the VaR of bank j’, to measure the contribution
from bank i to bank j in risk measurement. The CoVaR for bank j conditional on
bank i, i.e. CoVaR j|iq , is implicitly defined by the q-quantile of the conditional probability
distribution as below:
Pr(X j ≤CoVaR j|iq |X i =VaRiq) = q




where the conditions can be extended to the whole system, and then the CoVaR can
measure the contribution of a certain financial institution to the overall systemic risk.
One natural extension is from a mere bank j to the whole system, which measures how
an individual failure of bank i contribute the systemic risk:




Brunnermeier and Adrian [2009] comment that this measure “captures externalities that
arise because an institution is ‘too big to fail’, or ‘too interconnected to fail’, or takes on
positions or relies on funding that can lead to crowded trades”.
Another direction of extension is to assume the whole system’s failure, showing that
which bank is the most at risk while a systemic crisis happens, by finding the impact
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Figure 4: CoVaR network structure. Source: Brunnermeier and Adrian [2009]
that a system-wide failure on one single bank j with ∆CoVaR j|systemq :




They also use CoVaR to form a network among a financial systems, which explicitly
measures the spillover effect by CoVaR (see Figure 4 for example). The top number
around each arrow represents the CoVaR of the pointed institution conditional to the
event that the institution at the origin of the arrow is in distress. The bottom number
represents the CoVaR in the opposite direction (Brunnermeier and Adrian [2009]).
CoVaR has been adopted and extended by literature for analysing various risk in
financial networks across countries and regions. Arias et al. [2010] apply CoVaR to
the network of Columbian financial institutions to assess the systemic contribution of
market risk, which increased significantly during 2009. As in that paper the analysis is
performed with quantile regressions, the ∆CoVaR does not explain the specific channel
by which the risk of one entity affects another entity’s risk assessment, but can only
be interpreted as a co-dependence measurement. Moreover, Jaeger-Ambrozewicz
[2013] provides a counterexample with the application of Gauss-Copula comparing
with Clayton-Copula, showing that ∆CoVaR may produce a wrong ranking of systemic
risk. Hakwa [2011] proposes a closed formula for calculating CoVaR by using a Copula
approach, instead of panel regression methodology in Brunnermeier and Adrian [2009].
Chen and Khashanah [2014] follow this extension and apply vine copulas in obtaining
CoVaR, and assert that choosing a suitable marginal distribution is more important than
a suitable copula.
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Girardi and Ergu¨n [2013] perform a multivariate GARCH estimation of CoVaR,
by modifying the original conditional CoVaR (for bank j conditional on bank i) with
changing the condition from the institution ‘being exactly at its VaR level’ to ‘being at
most at its VaR level’, hence allowing for more severe distress events:
Pr(X j ≤CoVaR j|iq |X i ≤VaRiq) = q
The authors assert from the result for back-test on CoVaR that taking skewness and
excess kurtosis into account in financial modelling is important, with experiment based
on Gaussian distribution and skewed-t distribution. They also find that the VaR and
∆CoVaR (under their alternative definition) both weakly related in time-series and in
cross-section, in contrary to the finding by Brunnermeier and Adrian [2009], who find
that ∆CoVaR (under the original definition) strongly related to VaR in time-series. Mainik
and Schaanning [2014] follow the definition that proposed by Girardi and Ergu¨n [2013],
and find that the monotonicity of the alternative CoVaR with respect to dependence
parameters “is related to the concordance ordering of bivariate distributions or copulas”,
giving a much more consistent response to dependence of distribution models (such
as bivariate Gaussian distribution, of bivariate t-distribution) in the calculation of CoVaR
than the original one does.
Bernardi et al. [2013] is the first to implement a Bayesian inference for the CoVaR,
performing quantile regressions and obtaining posterior inference from CoVaR in time
series, which are calculated for nineteen US firms across six sectors of Standard and
Poor 500 composite index. The authors find that the dynamic version (allowing variables
to have their own dynamic) of their model outperforms the time-invariant model that
only allows for contemporaneous variables, in providing a more realistic and informative
characterisation of extreme tail co-movements.
A natural extension for CoVaR by Cao [2013], ‘Multi-∆CoVaR’, computes CoVaR
with simultaneous distresses on multiple financial institutions instead of one:
Pr(rsyst ≤CoVaR1,...,Sq,t |C(r1t ), . . . ,C(rSt )) = q
that theCoVaR1,...,Sq,t is conditional on some events {C(r1t ), . . . ,C(rSt )} at time t. The ‘Multi-
∆CoVaR’ can be used as a measure for total systemic risk on the whole system. The
paper adopts Shapley value to allocate total systemic risk to each financial institution,
and finds that the sum of each Shapley value exactly equals to the ‘Multi-∆CoVaR’ of
all the distressed financial institutions. The author suggests the macroprudential policy
“can potentially be efficiently implemented based on this measure”.
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To summarise, CoVaR and ∆CoVaR are proposed by Brunnermeier and Adrian
[2009] and are shown to be able to reflect individual bank’s risk in terms of affecting
others while it fails, or in terms of exposure to impact from others’ failures. The measure
could be extended to a systemic measure by allowing it assess the impact of a systemic
crisis (i.e. all the banks being at their VaR levels) on an arbitrary bank, or to assess
the loss in terms of CoVaR that one bank’s failure can impose on the whole system
(considered as a portfolio). Other extensions from the literature include choosing
alternative models for the distribution of the loss while specifying the distribution of
VaR, or releasing the condition of the failure event to allow for more general distresses.
Results for these extensions have shown improvement against the original CoVaR.
4.2.2 Basel III’s Microprudential Policies
Besides the effort in the reform of macroprudential regulation, Basel III keeps on
improving regulation on the microprudential side. Ojo [2014] compares the Basel III
and the Basel II, highlighting the progress that Basel III attempts to make in limiting
the identification of Tier-1 capital to raise the quality of capital financing. Hannoun
[2010] also emphasises that Basel III has several breakthrough over Basel II, especially
in reducing the reliance on banks’ internal models which used to be a feature for
Basel II regulation, with a greater focus on stress testing. However, the Basel III
is criticised by literature to be limited in microprudential regulation that does not
well fit the current economic and financial environment. Shin [2011] proposes two
questions against the Basel III’s microprudential: (1) loss absorbency may fail to
address directly excessive asset grow during booms, and (2) loss absorbency may
divert the attention on the vulnerability from the liabilities side and the reliance on
unstable short-term funding/short-term foreign currency debt (which fuelled the German
crisis and Scandinavian crisis that mentioned in Section 2.2).
Hanson et al. [2010] mention the weak point of Basel III in regulating the shadow
banking system, through which that banks may have heavier reliance on financial
intermediation that driven by the higher capital and liquidity requirements. This raises
the problem of banks’ financing via non-core liabilities that became popular in financing
during the rise of shadow-banking system, in contrast to the core liabilities that consist
of traditional retail deposits. Hahm et al. [2013] conduct empirical analysis on the non-
core bank liability ratio with data from IMF’s International Financial Statistics database.
The results show that non-core bank liability ratio has better predictive power over
credit-to-GDP ratio and is more informative. Systemic risk in cross-exposures is
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procyclical with the boom-bust economic cycle, in the sense that assets of banks double
in size while the pool of retail deposits stays fixed, hence the proportion of banking
sector liabilities in the form of retail deposits must fall, and the cross-claims across
banks must increase. Additionally, Repullo and Saurina Salas [2011] criticise the new
capital buffer, which is based on the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio in the new Basel
III regulatory framework, as countercyclical with examination on the correlation between
GDP growth and real credit growth over time. The new Basel accords strengthened the
regulation on common equity buffer, liquidity requirement and leverage cap. However,
these do not guarantee a more stable financial system, which has become much
interconnected by various financing tools from shadow-banking system.
Christopoulos et al. [2011] apply the ‘CAMELS rating system’ on the study
of Lehman Brothers’ collapse, and evaluate the capital adequacy by the criteria
of 8% in Basel II. The CAMELS rating system, to which is the Uniform Financial
Institutions Rating System referred that implemented in US financial institutions by
the Federal Reserve, is a regulatory tool to assess a bank’s condition. CAMELS
refers to ‘Capital adequacy’, ‘Assets’, ‘Management capability’, ‘Earnings’, ‘Liquidity’
and ‘Sensitivity to market risk’ (added in the 1997 revised version). Analysis for ‘Capital
adequacy’ by using CAMELS system can refer to the criteria of capital requirement
that recommended by the Basel Accords. This piece of study assesses the change
of ratios related to the six aspects of CAMELS rating system, and asserts that the
decline in the ratio that monitoring Lehman Brothers’ condition should have given a
warning to the regulatory bodies of its sudden collapse. Rosato [2010] consider that
although the Lehman Brothers comply the capital adequacy standard of 8% “on paper”
(i.e. through proper accounting methods), which is 7.268% in 2007 by the calculation
in Christopoulos et al. [2011], the serious lapses in compliance with the requirements
still resulted in questionable levels of capital being maintained, considering the sudden
collapse afterwards. This is what Basel III actually attempts to improve.
Moreover, ‘Liquidity’ and ‘Sensitivity to market risk’ are also implemented by Basel
III. As per Committee et al. [2010], a survey of Basel Committee members conducted in
early 2009 identified that more than 25 different measures and concepts of monitoring
tools, particularly for liquidity risk profiles of banking organisations as well as across
the financial sector, are used globally by supervisors. The committee develops a set of
common monitoring metrics for supervisors as the minimum types of information they
should use for international consistence.
‘Contractual maturity mismatch’ provides a baseline of contractual commitments,
and is useful in comparing liquidity risk profiles across institutions, highlighting to both
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banks and supervisors when potential liquidity needs could arise. ‘Concentration of
funding’ covers concentrations of wholesale funding, assisting supervisors in assessing
the extent to which funding liquidity risks could occur in the event that one or more of
the funding sources are withdrawn.
‘Available unencumbered assets’ measures the amount of unencumbered assets
a bank has which could potentially be used as collateral for secured funding either in
the market or at standing central bank facilities. ‘Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) by
currency’ is assessed in each significant currency, in recognition that foreign exchange
risk is a component of liquidity risk. Meanwhile, Committee et al. [2013] requires banks
to report LCR that ensures banks to have appropriate amount of unencumbered High-
Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA). This regulatory measure will be introduced on 1 January
2015, with a minimum requirement set at 60% and gradually increased to 100% in four
years.
Finally, the committee suggests monitoring market-related data, including (1)
market-wide data on asset prices and liquidity, (2) institution-related information such
as credit default swap (CDS) spreads and equity prices, and (3) additional institution-
specific information related to self-funding ability in various wholesale funding markets
(and the price at which it can do so).
Additionally, Basel III requires banks to employ Effective Expected Positive
Exposure (EEPE), a measure for counterparty credit risk that gives the expectation
of potential future exposure over time and scenarios (Mitra et al. [2005]), in determining
their default risk capital charges.
4.3 Assessment Using Network-based Risk Measures
The term ‘network-based’ here distinguishes the measures that incorporate influence
from all the nodes in the network: a measure for individual banks should take the
interactions between one bank and all the others into account, and a measure for the
whole system should reflect the risk borne by all the nodes together, which is usually
an aggregation of individual measures.
One way to construct coherent systemic measure is the framework proposed by
Chen et al. [2013], which aggregate coherent risk measures for single firms by a
convex, monotone and positively homogeneous ‘aggregation function’ (assuring the
coherence after the composition). ‘Systemic expected shortfall’ by Acharya et al. [2012]
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(mentioned in Section 4.1.1) is an example under this framework, since it is constructed
from a coherent single-firm risk measure, ‘expected shortfall’, and the aggregation
function defines the aggregate loss of a cross-sectional profile as the sum of profits and
losses of individual firms. Therefore, a systemic risk measure constructed under such a
framework can capture both the individual risks of each firm as well as the contribution
of each firm to the system by the aggregation function. The authors also highlight the
use of this framework in network model, by providing examples of a measure for the
loss in link capacity in a flow network, and a general way to introduce mechanisms for
contagion in financial network by carefully defining the individual risk measure.
Besides this framework, a systemic measure for a banking network can also be
developed in the fashion of eigenvector centrality, or defined naturally as a loss measure
for a contagion mechanism. This section also introduces two risk measures: one is
the eigenvector itself, and the regulatory tool ‘super-spreader-tax’ which is based on
it; another is ‘DebtRank’, which defines a contagion process as Furfine [2003] and
Eisenberg and Noe [2001] do in Section 2.4.4.2.
4.3.1 Eigenvector Centrality Related Measure
As introduced in Section 3.2.4, eigenvector measures the importance of a certain node
by assessing its influence all the others in a network. Haldane et al. [2009] proposed
the concept of ‘super-spreader’, which is a highly-connected bank of high risk and high
infection: this concept is then related to systemic risk in identifying highly contagious
banks. Measures such as eigenvector centrality are considered for identifying such
banks.
Leo´n et al. [2014] investigate the concept of ‘super-spreader’ in financial network,
with the characterisation of the measure based on eigenvector centrality. They apply
the measure on the Columbian banking system, which is ‘ultra-small’ (with an average
geodecis distance around 2) and “robust yet fragile”. This is a typical application of
eigenvector centralities to identify the important node in a network (especially, in the
sense of ‘systemic’). The hub/authority centrality that proposed by Kleinberg [1999]
(see Section 3.2.4) can also be applied in this context. By the idea on which the two
measures are defined, the hub-centrality assesses the ability that a bank can spread
losses to other banks that are exposed to potential losses on many bank loans (to be
‘contagious’ once failed), while the authority-centrality assesses how likely a bank can
be connected to banks with much out-loans (to be ‘vulnerable’ once others failed).
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Addtionally, on the regulatory application of these eigenvector-like measures,
Markose et al. [2010] further propose the idea of ‘super spreader tax’ to help
enhancing the network stability for regulatory reasons, which is defined proportionate




where the ~x = {xi} is the eigenvector centrality as denoted in Section 3.2.4. The aim
of the super-spreader tax is to have financial institutions with high right eigenvector
centrality parameters (indicating the importance of a node in the sense of giving out
links to others in the network, i.e. the level of risk-spreading of a bank) to internalise the
costs that they inflict on others by their failure and to mitigate their impact on the system
by reducing their contribution to network instability as given by the largest eigenvalue.
4.3.2 DebtRank
DebtRank is a feedback-centrality-like measure as introduced in Section 3.2.4. While
referred to a specific triggering event, which may consist of one or multiple distress
events in the system, the DebtRank is defined as the distress that induced in the system
during the contagion process, excluding the initial distress by the triggering event.
There are some studies either theoretical or empirical applying DebtRank. Thurner
and Poledna [2013] propose an agent-based model based on different levels of
DebtRank transparency among the banks in a system, and show that systemic risk
can be reduced by increasing transparency. Aoyama et al. [2012] perform an empirical
experiment on Japanese credit network, argue that DebtRank is a powerful tool that
provides importance and vulnerability of nodes at times of crisis. However, this measure
has some drawbacks to be overcome. In their formation of DebtRank, all banks are
simply assumed to fail in the next round after they get distressed, whether or not the
distress level can really bring them to insolvency. This could lead to underestimation or
overestimation for the damage that the failure of one bank could impose on the whole
system, depending on the channels of contagion (insolvency or illiquidity, or even both
at the same time).
To conclude, besides the framework by Chen et al. [2013], ‘traditional’ risk
measures, such as VaR and ES, mainly assess risk individually, but not considering
the effect of one institution to the financial network. In other words, to assess the
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systemic risk in the context of network, those risk measures stated above may not
be suitable. Eigenvector centrality and similar measures such as hub-centrality and
authority-centrality that show the importance of every individual bank in the system
should be considered in the analysis. They can also be applied for regulatory use, for
instance, super-spreader tax defined as proportionate on the right eigenvalue, which
indicates the contagious level of a bank (while the left eigenvalue, which may imply
the vulnerability of a bank towards financial linkages from others, also worth studying).
Recursive feedback centralities such as DebtRank have also been used for assessing
the damage that an individual bank could impose on the whole system.
Moreover, ‘traditional’ risk measures can be extended for network analysis. For
instance, CoVaR measures the risk that a participant can spill over others or the whole
system, conditional on the others or the system being under distress, while it can still be
extended by being incorporated into network model, by composing the CoVaR network
with network measures like centralities.
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5 Network Reconstruction
This chapter introduces network reconstruction techniques (in terms of matrix
representation that defined in Section 2.4.4.2) that have been applied in the context
of interbank markets. There are mainly two types of reconstruction that distinguished
by the density of the network that simulated: ‘dense’ reconstruction which produces
networks with a lot of links and a majority of nodes with high connectivity, and ‘sparse
reconstruction’ that produces networks with core-periphery structure (mentioned in
Section 3.3), which is specified by a few links from heavily-connected nodes to nodes
with few connections.
5.1 Dense Reconstruction
Dense reconstruction is usually based on the assumption of banks having similar
patterns of trading in the market. One extreme is assuming that each bank is willing to
build up financial connections with all the others for risk-sharing, making the banking
network ‘maximally-connected’. This will be discussed in Section 5.1. The literature
have also applied ‘Mean-field Theory’, which assesses the interaction between one
object with all its neighbours, in terms of the average all the interactions. The focus
is modelling the overall impact from the ‘field’ around the object that consists of all the
interactions. As per Fredrickson [2013], the approximation of the behaviour of multiple
objects in a system with mean-field theory works better in a system that contains many
interactions, especially while the interactions have long distance effect.
Data of bilateral interbank transactions are usually not available to the public.
These data may be collected by regulatory bodies for regulation use, while the
information which is publicly-available might be the balance sheets for banks. Maximum
Entropy estimation gives a solution to the issue that reproducing interbank networks
from banks’ balance sheet figures. It is an algorithm proposed by Jaynes [1957],
that maximises the entropy function on given information (‘Shannon entropy’ from
information theory). The entropy function takes the form of the expected value
of information contained in a ‘message’ (that carries the information and could be
passed onto others), which is then the balance sheet data in the context of the
construction of banking network. In other words, maximising the entropy function is
equivalent to minimising the information loss. For interbank matrix reconstruction, an a
priori adjacency matrix is usually needed to determine the adjacency structure of the
78
reconstructed network before the estimation, and the reconstructed matrix will have its
adjacency matrix identical to the a priori adjacency matrix. In the case of ‘maximum
entropy’, the adjacency matrix is the maximally-connected one, i.e. for any pairs of
bank i and bank j, if bank i has positive lendings and bank j has positive borrowings,
then there must be a link from bank i to bank j, in other word ai, j=1. Otherwise, if
bank i has no lendings or bank j has no borrowings, then ai, j must be 0. With this
configuration of a priori adjacency matrix, the Maximum-Entropy estimation derives a
complete network for an interbank market (Mistrulli [2011]). The principle of ‘Cross-
Entropy Minimisation’ (the Kullback-Leibler divergence, which will also be applied in
Section 5.3 later in this chapter) between the adjacency matrix and the estimated














where L= {Li, j} gives the interbank loan matrix to be generated, and A= {ai, j} is the a
priori adjacency matrix. The solution to the minimisation problem of finding minLC(L,A)
is given by Wells [2004] (examining the UK interbank market), with Maximum-Likelihood






Lk, j, IBAi =∑
k
Li,k, ∀i, j ∈ {1,2,3, . . . ,N}
)
where IBLi is the interbank liabilities (i.e. the total loans that given out) of bank i,
and IBA j is the interbank assets (i.e. the total loans that received of bank j), which
are variables that can be aggregated from balance sheet items (See Section 6.1.2 for
example of variable construction). As the banking system must have total interbank
liabilities and total interbank assets balanced, the denominator ∑k IBLk actually equals
to ∑k IBAk. However, since one bank cannot lend money to itself, the volume of the cells
on the main diagonal must be forced to zero:
Li,i = 0, i= 1,2,3, . . . ,N
where N is the number of banks in the system. Therefore, there will be
Li,1,L2,2,L3,3, . . . ,LN,N extracted from the matrix L, leaving the interbank liabilities (sum
of each row) and the interbank assets (sum ofeach column) for each bank not equal
to the value assigned by its balance sheet figures. These outstanding amounts are
allocated to all the other links between banks (represented by the cells of L except
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for the main diagonal) to meet the restrictions of the sums of rows and columns that
specified by the interbank assets and the interbank liabilities. Wells [2004] adopts RAS
algorithm for this allocation, which is an algorithm proposed by Bacharach [1965] that
maintains the adjacency structure of a matrix while adjusting the volume of its cells to
fulfil the restrictions of row sums and column sums. This methodology is also applied
by Upper and Worms [2004] for German interbank market, Elsinger et al. [2006] for
Austria, Degryse and Nguyen [2007] for Belgium, and Toivanen [2009] for Finland.
Upper [2007] mentions three reasons why maximum-entropy estimation might
not be realistic for interbank network reconstruction. Firstly, fixed costs for
screening of potential borrowers and monitoring loans may render small exposures
unviable, however, maximum-entropy estimation always returns positive cells even the
row/column sums are rendered to zeros in the above case. Second, relationship lending
may limit the number of counterparties of any one bank and could thus lead to a higher
degree of market concentration than suggested by maximum-entropy estimation, which
is supported by the study on Portuguese money market by Cocco et al. [2009]. Finally,
the results by maximum-entropy estimation in all banks holding essentially the same
portfolio of interbank assets and liabilities, differing only by size and by the fact that no
bank has any claims on itself.
Sorama¨ki et al. [2007] explore the network topology of commercial bank network
(using data from Fedwire Funds Service), and reveal a scale-free distribution over
the degree centralities. e Santos et al. [2010] find a similar pattern for Brazilian
banking system. Georg [2013] performs experiment of contagion effect on banking
systems with different network topologies, including random, small-world and scale-
free, though the author assert that banking systems are realised to be scale-free.
Moreover, Mistrulli [2011] and Van Lelyveld and Liedorp [2004] found that maximum
entropy estimation underestimate the possibility of default contagion. These studies
question the assumption of maximally-connected interbank networks.
Preferential attachment (involving network growths) is proposed by Baraba´si et al.
[1999] for generating networks with power-law degree distribution (which is free of
scale), implying that during the generation of networks, nodes with high degrees are
more likely to make new connections. In van Lelyveld et al. [2014], this mechanism is
applied for generating banking networks, in the sense that banks “want to interact with
a reliable counterparty that is used by many other banks”. May et al. [2008] comment
that banking networks are disassortative, meaning that large banks with high degrees
tend to be attached by small banks with low degrees, although this does not contradict
the statement by van Lelyveld et al. [2014].
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To summarise, Maximum-Entropy estimation produces dense networks that are
maximally-connected, i.e. each node makes connections to all the others as long as
the connection can exist, in the sense of the node can reach out its link to any node that
is able to receive links. This leads to the network being too dense to match the sparsity
that shown by real interbank networks.
5.2 Mean-Field Approximation
Maximum-entropy estimation fails to produce interbank networks that are as sparse
and power-law (in degree distribution) as real banking networks, therefore some efforts
have been attempted on ‘Mean-field’ approximation. For banking network, a mean-
field approximation implies the simulated network is homogeneous, which does not
necessarily mean that all the banks have the same connectivity, but the distribution of
the connectivity is determined by a distribution function that equally ineffected on each
bank, depending on the banks’ individual features such as balance sheet figures.
For instance, Inaoka et al. [2004] apply the mean-field approximation in banking
network, based on the findings of differences between banking network and the scale-
free network that produced by the model of Baraba´si et al. [1999]. The authors propose
a model of random network formation based on power-law distribution, that the number
of nodes (or links) with one specific property higher than a criterion p is proportionate
to a power function of p:
N(≥ p) ∝ p−γ
where N(≥ p) gives the number of nodes (or links) with the specific property above p,
and γ denotes the power-law coefficient. This property can be the weight of a node (or
a link), or the number of links that come from or go into it (i.e. degree), or any other
measures that globally assigned to every nodes (or links). In that paper, the weight of
the interaction between bank i and bank j, denoted as wi, j, is modelled as the product
of the weight of both parties involved (denoted as mi and m j):
wi, j(t) = mi(t)×m j(t)
where the lower index for the bank follows the order that the bank with the smallest
label, i.e. bank ‘1’, ranks the first in weights, while the bigger the label, the smaller the
weight of the bank. The initial weights are assigned to the banks randomly. Additionally,
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The recursion ends when the preset maximum of ‘t ’, denoted as T has been reached.
And finally, both {wi, j(T )} and {mi(T )} can be applied as the property p that mentioned
above, for estimating the distribution of the number of links with weights over a certain
threshold, and the number of links that belong to a node with a weight over a certain
threshold. The mean-field approximation is thus performed via the specification of the
interaction in terms of the weight, with the weights of both parties involved.
Although Inaoka et al. [2004] successfully produce scale-free banking networks
that satisfy the empirical finding of power-law degree distributions (mentioned in
Section 3.2), the applicability of mean-field theory in reconstruction of banking network
is still questionable. The major issue is the heterogeneity of banking network could
be violated by mean-field approximation. May and Arinaminpathy [2010] perform
simulations of systemic crisis on their mean-field approximation results, but they
question the relationship between systemic risk and homogeneity within the banking
system. As stated in Section 3.2, banking networks are neither random (i.e. links
are not randomly made but deterministically established with consideration of both
parties’ profiles instead) nor homogeneous (in the sense of each individual bank’s
balance sheet structure, but not their patterns in connection with others). Li and
He [2012] generate financial networks with tiering structure, assuming that the credit
degree interaction between banks is non-mean-field, since the credit degree of the
bank with liquidity shortage is a major consideration. Battiston et al. [2007]) argue that
the mean-field approximation yields useful predictions when units interact in an all-to-all
fashion and are not too heterogeneous, otherwise the dynamics of the system may be
qualitatively different from the mean-field prediction.
In summary, one can use mean-field theory to model the distribution of degrees
with respect to the weight of nodes or links, in terms of the modelled interacting
patterns, and can fit the distribution to fulfil the power-law property of interbank networks
that assured by real data and literature. However, mean-field theory tends to violate the
heterogeneity of the banks in a banking system, as it assumes that all the interactions
between one bank and all of its neighbours (i.e. those banks that have financial
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connections with it) are modelled as one interaction with the whole of the other banks
(i.e. a ‘field’ effect around the bank), making the behaviour of banks in interacting
with others become homogeneous. Literature has provided evidence of the violation of
heterogeneity of banking systems as stated above.
5.3 Sparse Reconstruction
As stated in previous sections in this chapter, dense reconstruction is not suitable for
interbank network. The issue ‘Sparse Reconstruction’ then arises for reproducing
networks which are sufficiently sparse to match the findings of sparseness in real
interbank network by literature.
An intuitive extension is applying the ‘Cross-Entropy Minimisation’ with given data
(for sums of rows and columns) and an a priori adjacency matrix, just as mentioned
above. However, the determination of the a priori matrix remains to be the main
problem, and there are only few studies on this issue in the field of interbank network.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no study that directly extract adjacency structure
from publicly available information such as balance sheet data.
Some variations of this methodology have been proposed. Li et al. [2010] perform
Maximum-Entropy estimation first, then set up a threshold to determine whether a link
Li, j from bank i to bank j could exist. If the weight of the link is lower than the threshold,
then the link will be kept; otherwise the link is eliminated and the weight, Li, j that borne
by the link, will be proportionately allocated into other debtors of bank i by performing
‘Cross-Entropy Estimation’ by RAS algorithm which explained in Section 5.1. However,
the authors do not explain why they select the threshold in such a fashion.
Another method that make use of the publicly-available balance sheet data is
‘message-passing algorithm’ that suggested by Mastromatteo et al. [2012]. This
method is based on ‘Belief Propagation’, which is an efficient way to solve inference
problems (which is based on passing local messages from one to another in a system;
in the context of interbank network, a message that can be passed from one bank
to another is specified by how likely the financial connection between them could be
made) that arise in statistical physics, computer vision, error-correcting coding theory,
and artificial intelligence (Yedidia et al. [2003]). Weiss and Freeman [2001] state that
belief propagation can be performed on Bayesian networks to yield the most probable
a posteriori result. Commented by Yedidia et al. [2003], a Bayesian network defines
an independency structure the probability that a node is in one of its states depends
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directly only on the states of its parents. The ‘message-passing algorithm’ makes
use of this property of the Bayesian network model (directed and acyclic; although
real interbank networks are found to cyclic, similar to the structure that shown in part
(a) of Figure 3), allowing the interbank network that generated under this algorithm
to have the similar property, that the likelihood of the link (the interbank loan) from
bank i to bank j is determined by the information that borne by bank i (including the
information received from its creditors) and bank j (including the information sent to
its debtors). In this sense, the interbank network is generated with consideration of
information that contained by each bank, which is more rational than assuming all the
banks to be homogeneous (Iori et al. [2006]; could also be referred to the findings
of non-randomness of interbank networks by literature as stated in Section 3.2), or
than the maximally-connected network model above that assumes the banks to be
homogeneous in behaviour.
Mastromatteo et al. [2012] start from a maximum-entropy estimation of the bilateral
matrix, which is followed by an exclusion of small links that under a threshold T of
weights (usually a quantile of all the loans). All the links above the threshold are
kept and denoted as ‘observed’, and all those below as ‘unobserved’, assuming that
loans above a certain volume must be disclosed to the public13. The excluded small
links will be aggregated again into the accounts for outstanding interbank assets and
interbank liabilities, which are not only the outstanding amount to be allocated into
the matrix, but also the information to be used in determining the probability of links
to exist during reconstruction. The algorithm requires these re-allocated links not to
exceed the threshold T in weight (otherwise they should be initially kept in the matrix
as ‘observed’). Therefore, the T is not only the threshold for links to remain in the
starting matrix for reconstruction (after the filtration of small links), but also the cap
for the links to be added into the matrix during reconstruction. Note that the number
of links of a reconstructed matrix does not necessarily equal to the number of links
of a maximally-connected matrix, and this is what the sparse reconstruction in this
section aims at: maintaining part of the information from the initial maximally-connected
banking system, using the rest of the information to find a solution for sparse network.
The interbank network is transformed into an equivalent factor graph that could
perform belief propagation before the reconstruction, where each bank is split into two
‘factors’ including: (1) ‘←’, the operation of loans coming into the bank from others and
(2) ‘→’, the operation of loans going out from the bank to others. The reconstruction
13These loans are disclosed in an aggregate value that provided in the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation’s Statistics on Deposit Insurances call report, which will be employed in Chapter 6 and
Chapter 7.
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Figure 5: The transformation from a graph for interbank network to a factor graph for
interbank lending(→)/borrowing(←).
is firstly performed on the factor graph and then the factor graph will be transformed
into the corresponding adjacency matrix. Each cell ai, j of the adjacency matrix that
indicates the adjacency relation from bank i to bank j is equivalent to a factor triplet:
(1) the factor −→i , operates with bank i’s interbank assets, (2) the factor ←−j , operates
with bank j’s interbank liabilities, and (3) an exact interaction between them that can
go in both directions. In Figure 5, the arrows connecting −→i and ←−j , which represent
the action of “Bank i lending to Bank j”, mean that the message can pass from both
sides. In other words, −→i →←−j and ←−j →−→i are both allowed but different from each
other, since the message that borne by −→i is not necessarily the same as the message
borne by ←−j (explained later). The transformation between an interbank network and
the corresponding factor graph satisfies that:
∑
j
Li, j = L→i , ∑
j
ai, j = d→i
∑
i
Li, j = L←j , ∑
i
ai, j = d←j
where L→i and d→i give actually the aggregate interbank assets and the out-degree of
bank i, and L←j and d←j give the aggregate interbank liabilities and the in-degree of
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bank j. Here all the Li, j denote the ‘unobserved loans’, the financial connections that
excluded from the initial matrix of interbank loans in the filtering of those ‘unobserved’.
They are used as information for formatting the ‘message’ that can be passed from
one factor to another of the factor graph. According to the definition above, these
loans have a cap equal to the threshold T , since these loans are initially regarded
as ‘unobserved’. This cap T is specified by the top r% of all the interbank loans in
the maximally-connected network. In other words, supposed there are M links in the
maximally-connected network, the T is the [r% ·M]-th largest weight of all the links
(where [ · ] indicates the largest integer that no bigger than the value inside). Therefore,
if scaling all those unobserved Li, j by T , the scaled weights L→i and L←j borne by the


















ai, j = d←j
The message-passing algorithm employs Boltzmann distribution in modeling the
probability for the system (in this context, the adjacency structure of the banking system,
which is equivalent to the corrsponding factor graph to be reconstructed) to be in a
certain state with taking into account of the energy of that state:
P{ai, j}= 1Ze
−βH{ai, j}z∑i, j ai, j
where H{ai, j} stands for the ‘cost function’ that measures the energy of the adjacency
link ai, j in such a system and in such a state that these links exist, specified by the
volume and degree of out-operation factor and in-operation factor.
H{ai, j}=∑
i
[θ(L→i − k→i )+θ(L←j − k←i )]
(
L→i ≤ d→i , L←j ≤ d←i
)
Here θ(·) is the Heaviside function, i.e. while x is non-negative, θ(x) = 1, otherwise
θ(x) = 0. k→i (k←i ) stands for the number of all possible unknown outgoing (incoming)
links of bank i.
Let ∂−→i represents the set of all the ‘unobserved’ neighbourhood of −→i , i.e. all
those ←−j which are not already assigned any interaction to −→i , except for ←−i for bank i
itself. Let ∂←−j similarly be defined for ←−j . Therefore, the size of these sets are actually∣∣∣∂−→i ∣∣∣= d→i and ∣∣∣∂←−j ∣∣∣= d←j .
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The probability is calculated by a recursion since it is hard to be solved analytically.
For every link ai, j, the probability of its existence is considered in two directions: from−→i to ←−j , and from ←−j to −→i . Since the two parties, bank i and bank j as well as their
patterns of interacting with others are not homogeneous, their decision making should
be considered independently, i.e. the operation −→i and the operation←−j are affected by
different information from their neighbours respectively. In this sense, the probability
P(−→i → ←−j ) of the interaction from −→i to ←−j in the factor graph, and the analogous
probability P(←−j → −→i ) are not necessarily the same, although they assess the same
link ai, j in the adjacency network from different perspectives. This P(
−→i →←−j ) is called
the ‘message’ that passed from the operation −→i to the operation←−j , and is defined as
the reduced marginal probability, which is based on the probability P{ai, j| j˜←} of ai, j to
exist that conditional on the operation←−j being absent. In other words, the summation
on the right hand side of the equation below sums up all the possible message that
pass from all the other neighbours of −→i except for←−j , i.e. to consider the set of factors
∂−→i \←−j (the notation is adopted later in this section):
P(−→i →←−j ) =∑P{ai, j| j˜←}δ (ai, j = 1)
where δ (·) is the Kronecker delta, that if ai, j = 1 then δ (ai, j = 1) = 1, otherwise 0.
The messages needs to fulfill self-consistent relations, which are the Belief
Propagation equations as the essential of the algorithm, which can be written in terms
of the statistical weightsVm
S→←−j , in which m is the cardinality (i.e. the number of elements
in the set) of any subset for the summation, while S denotes the ensemble of all the both
side of operations of ‘unobserved’ interactions −→i and←−j :
Vm
S→←−j = ∑∀U⊂S,|U |=m ∏−→i ∈U





where U is all those subset of S containing m unknown neighbours of ←−j (i.e. those
potential neighbours that may lend to j). This can be written in recursions with regard
to m, as the ensemble S excluding the operation factor −→i is matched with the cardinality
m− 1 of the arbitrarily chonsen subset of S\−→i . The recursions start from m = L→− 1




S\−→i )→←−j +P(−→i →←−j )Vm−1(S\−→i )→←−j , ∀b ∈ S
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The probability of ai, j is then calculated as a marginal probability by P(
−→i →←−j ) and
P(←−j →−→i ):
P{ai, j}= P(
−→i →←−j )P(←−j →−→i )






which is the probability that specified by the Boltzmann distribution (introduced earlier
in this section). In each round of the selection, the marginal probability of each link is
calculated, and the link with the highest probability will be added into the matrix. The
weight is capped by the threshold T , so that if L→i < 1, then the weight allocated to the
newly-added link is L→i · T , otherwise T itself is allocated to this link with 1 extracted
from L→i . The adjustment of L→i and d
→
i are assigned t for indicating the time in the


















The process can be analogously done on the side of ←−j . Finally, as all the L→i and
L←j become zero, the reconstruction process ends, and the factor graph, the equivalent
adjacency structure, and the interbank bilateral exposure matrix are generated. The
authors assert that this message-passing algorithm generates sparse networks with
power-law degree distribution, hence satisfying the finding of these properties of
interbank networks in literature.
5.4 Other Studies on Network Formation
De Masi et al. [2006] propose a model to characterise the formation of communities in
the network of the Italian e-MID market. They assert that this model, which is based on
Pareto’s Law (a type of power-law distribution), makes no use of growth or preferential
attachment, and reproduces correctly all the statistical properties of the system. The
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total daily volume of transaction of a bank is used as a measure of its size, called the
‘fitness’ in the model, and is simulated by Pareto distribution and used for calculating
the likelihood that a transaction link (involving two banks) to exist. An earlier proposal
of this model is by Caldarelli et al. [2002], which studies the issue of scale-free network
generation with the assumption that a node with larger ‘fitness’ is more likely to be
highly connected.
Finger and Lux [2014] apply the ‘Stochastic Actor-Oriented Model (SAOM)’, which
is firstly proposed by Snijders [1996] ‘to model and analyse longitudinal network data’,
on network formation on the Italian e-MID system (quarterly between 2001 and 2010).
The authors consider the model to fit this market because all the participants have
access in real time to all the information that used in their analysis, which is the
assumption of the model. However, the network for interbank loans may not satisfy
this condtion.
Some literature employ a game-theoretical process in the formation of network,
i.e. the ‘network formation game’, and use game-theory in assessing the stability of
networks and the stability during the formation of networks. Jackson and Wolinsky
[1996] propose a model of social and economic networks, discussing the incompatibility
between stability and efficiency of networks (in the sense that with a value function
defined on the sets of nodes in the complete graph, the value of the network is no
smaller than that of any others). Babus [2013] extends the study by Jackson and
Wolinsky [1996] on financial networks, and asserts that networks emerge in equilibrium
are resilient to contagion. Recent literature, such as Galeotti et al. [2010], study
the Bayesian equilibrium arose in network formation, and by reviewing the model by
Bramoulle´ and Kranton [2007], they suggest that even in the simplest networks (a star-
shaped network with only one core and a few peripheries, mentioned in Section 3.2),
games on networks can have multiple equilibria that exhibit very different patterns,
‘even when all agents of the same degree choose the same actions’. Goyal [2002]
examines directed complete networks, assuming that nodes learn from others’ activities
that lead to convergence of behaviour (non-strategic interaction), and star networks by
game-theory with multiple equilibria, which implies that coordination and cooperation
exist between nodes (strategic interaction). However, studies adopting game theory in
reproducing banking networks are usually unable to cope with big banking systems,
due to the complexity in solving multile equiibrium. For instance, Gilles and Sarangi
[2010] give an example of network formation game of a simple system with only 3
players. Wang et al. [2015] examine the network formation game with 20 participants
while each of them can only have interactions with at most 3 of the others. I focus on
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the sparse reconstruction that aims at estimating networks with properties that shown
by real data, in order to overcome the confidentiality of bilateral exposure data, rather
than using game-theoretic reconstruction approaches that suggested by the literature
above.
To summarise, this chapter reviews and introduces several network reconstruction
methodologies that have been adopted by literature. Reconstruction of interbank
network is necessary since the exact data of bilateral trading between any pair of
banks are usually confidential (unless obtained by regulatory bodies for regulation),
and are only disclosed in aggregate items on balance sheets. Dense reconstruction
such as Maximum-Entropy estimation generates networks that are too dense to match
the sparseness of real banking network that uncovered by literature. Mean-field
Approximation that specifies the power-law distribution for node degrees violates the
heterogeneity of banking system, as it assumes that for every bank, the interactions
between this bank and all the others are homogenous. Cross-Entropy estimation
requires a priori adjacency matrix whose information should be extracted from real data
such as balance sheet data, but cannot guarantee the power-law property of the results.
I adopt Message-Passing algorithm, which requires only the aggregated balance sheet
figures and provides results of networks with power-law degree distributions and low
density that satisfy the findings of properties of banking network by literature.
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6 Empirical Reconstruction of US Interbank Market
This chapter describes the data that my research is based on, and provide empirical
studies on the measures for network structure of the networks generated by Message-
Passing algorithm (see Section 5.3). This chapter then assesses the result to verify
that the message-passing algorithm can successfully generate networks with required
properties that found for real interbank networks by literature.
Section 6.1 introduces the data selection in detail, from which the network structure
is reconstructed of US interbank market between 2006−2010. Section 6.2 analyses
the simulated networks and finds consistency in the performance of network measures
such as assortativities and clustering coefficients for dense networks (reconstructed
for each period), while the results for sparse networks can be distinguished from
those for dense networks – in fact, in the distribution of network measures of an
entire sample that consists of dense networks and sparse networks, the data points
for sparse networks are mostly in the position of ‘outliers’. This implies that dense
reconstruction may distort our understanding of the real network structure of banking
system, especially while many literature have shown evidence of sparse banking
networks.
An independent experiment is performed in Section 6.3, using a different dataset of
the same market as mentioned in Section 6.1. Mastromatteo et al. [2012], who suggest
the application of message-passing algorithm in reconstructing interbank networks,
assert that the networks generated by this algorithm have power-law property.
Section 6.3 then examine the result of power-law fit to the small networks (both
sparse and dense) that generated by message-passing algorithm in this independent
experiment, aiming at verifying the application of the test of power-law property. It also
examines whether increasing the size of banking networks (in terms of the number of
banks in it) can improve the result of power-law fitting.
6.1 Data
This section firstly describes the data that used for the matrix reconstruction. My
research only focuses on the transaction between US banks, while all the lendings
between US banks and foreign banks (including overseas branches of US banks)
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are not considered14. The data are extracted from FDIC’s Statistics on Depository
Institutions (SDI) reports. Let the term ‘domestic banks’ refer to those banks that are
neither branches of foreign banks in US nor US banks’ oversea branches that insured
by FDIC. I define those banks that have interbank assets held in ‘domestic banks’ or
interbank liabilities from ‘domestic banks’ as ‘active banks’. Banks that either have no
‘domestic’ interbank assets or have no ‘domestic’ interbank liabilities are not included
in the reduced ‘active’ interbank system for the US market.
Data on these SDI reports are aggregated from raw data on bank balance sheets,
covering the period from Q1 2006 to Q3 201015 on a semi-annual basis: Q1 2006, Q3
2006, Q1 2007, Q3 2007, Q1 2008, Q3 2008, Q1 2009, Q3 2009, Q1 2010 and Q3 2010
(hereafter Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 represent the first, second, third, and fourth quarter of a
year, respectively). The reason that Q1/Q3 are selected rather than Q2/Q4 is, during the
reconstruction of the interbank network structure, the RAS algorithm, which determines
the initial complete networks as a starting point of the network reconstruction, fails to
converge on some of the Q2/Q4 between 2006 and 2010. Furthermore, as explained
in Section 7.1.1, all the banks that failed between 2006 and 2011 are recognised as
failures by FDIC at either Q2 or Q4. Therefore, whether the intervals start from Q1 to
Q3 or from Q2 to Q4 does not affect the number of failed banks (in each period), while
in my thesis, I select the former to allow for convergence of the network reconstruction.
6.1.1 US Interbank Market
This section generally examines the data from Q1 2006 up till Q3 2010. The upper
green curve depicts the number of all the banks insured by FDIC: at Q1 2006 the
number was 8790, but had been strictly decreasing during the whole period, and
finally dropped to 7761 at Q3 2010. The lower blue curve describes the number of
the ‘active banks’ defined in Section 6.1, i.e. either borrowers or lenders of domestic
banks (also defined in Section 6.1) in the interbank market. In this context, the number
of active banks is not decreasing. One can see from the Figure 6 that the number of
active banks decreases from Q3 2006, but reached the bottom at Q3 2007 and kept
rising until Q1 2009, which coincided with the period of the burst of 2007 subprime
14This is due to the limitation of data: if we want to consider both ‘domestic’ loans and ‘foreign’ loans,
we need the accounts for both domestic interbank assets/liabilities and for the foreign part. However,
this implies involving all the banks in the world (or at least the main financial markets including Europe,
Asia, North America and South America, merely for analysiing the US interbank market), making the
problem computationally intractable.
15Here ‘Q1 2006’ and ‘Q3 2010’ are the starting date of each period. For instance, for the period of Q3
2010−Q1 2011, the data for Q3 2010 are used to determine the network structure, while the data for
Q1 2011 are used for deciding the number of failed banks that insured by FDIC.
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Figure 6: Number of banks disclosed in SDI report by FDIC, between Q1 2006 and Q3
2010
mortgage crisis. This implies that when banks came across with difficulties in financing
through derivatives or other financial instruments via shadow-banking system (see
Section 2.2.4.1), they might choose interbank loans instead.
FDIC discloses failed banks by announcing their acquirers online. These acquired
banks, as well as those banks that are no longer insured by FDIC, are removed from
FDIC’s quarterly SDI reports. One can see from Table 4, that the disclosed failures
peaked between 2009 and 2010 as the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis.
Before the crisis, bank failures have been rare.
While the number of banks follows a decreasing trend, the changes in the gross
total assets, gross tier-1 capital, gross cash, and gross interbank assets/liabilities are
not necessarily decreasing. In fact, the sizes of the market in terms of the gross total
assets, the gross risk-weighted assets, the gross tier-1 capital, and the gross cash
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Table 4: Number of bank failures disclosed by FDIC, between Q1 2006 and Q3 2010
Date Q1 2006 Q3 2006 Q1 2007 Q3 2007 Q1 2008
Number 0 0 1 2 4
Date Q3 2008 Q1 2009 Q3 2009 Q1 2010 Q3 2010
Number 21 45 95 86 71
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for key features of always-active, partially-active (active










Always 1887 1.46×106 8.68×104 1.14×105 2.71×104 1.51×104
Partially 3072 5.65×105 3.56×104 2.12×104 3.04×103 3.21×103
Never 4302 3.32×105 3.09×104 5.54×103 0 0
Median
Always 1887 231.32 21.91 10.25 0 1.95
Partially 3072 151.94 15.61 7.09 0 0.76
Never 4302 97.74 10.68 4.78 0 0
Mean
Always 1887 4.50×103 330.09 289.1 47.33 32.03
Partially 3072 1.03×103 88.82 46.79 3.77 9.88
Never 4302 636.53 59.34 22.72 0 0
Minimum
Always 1887 3.20 1.05 0.09 0 0
Partially 3072 3.21 0.87 0.03 0 0
Never 4302 2.10 -4.60×103 0 0 0
Skewness
Always 1887 21.99 20.54 21.94 24.84 31.83
Partially 3072 40.16 30.68 31.48 32.03 29.14
Never 4302 36.30 34.56 19.89 NaN NaN
have been generally increasing. However, both the total assets and the total risk-
weighted assets declined between 2009 and 2010, right after the number of actual
bank failures reaching the peak in the recent years (see Table 4). The rise of the gross
tier-1 capital has been smooth, while the account of gross cash has experienced a
steep rise since the Subprime mortgage crisis occurred. As stated in Section 4.2 the
regulatory requirement on liquidity and tier-1 capital by Basel III is effected from 2015,
so that one could expect to see a continuous rise in the cash account and the tier-1
capital account from then on.
The system of active banks is compared with the system of all the banks in the form
of market share. Figure 7 and Figure 8 shows how much market share the active banks
have in the whole banking system, and Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the
key features of active banks and non-active banks that illustrated in Figure 7 and 816. All
16For non-active banks, according to the definition that these banks do not have any interbank
assets/liabilities. Therefore, the skewnesses of the non-active banks’ interbank activities are all NaNs.
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(a) total assets and total risk-weighted assets
(b) total tier-1 capital and total interbank assets
Figure 7: Comparison between active interbank market and the whole market (1)
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(a) total cash and total interbank liabilities
(b) ratio of active interbank market to whole market
Figure 8: Comparison between active interbank market and the whole market (2)
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the 9261 banks that have ever been on FDIC’s bank list are counted and categorised
into three types: ‘always-active’, ‘partially-active’ and ‘never-active’. The 1887 banks
that always have either interbank assets or interbank liabilities in Q1 2006−Q3 2010
are called ‘always-active’. There are 4302 banks that have never entered the interbank
system during that period, and the remaining 3072 banks are active in only some (but
strictly not all) of the semiannual periods. For each individual bank, the data are firstly
averaged by items, and then the averaged numbers form the series of all the banks in
each category for calculating the descriptive statistics. One can see from Table 5 that,
by and large, the always-active banks are bigger in size of each balance sheet item
than those partially-active banks, while those never-active banks are far smaller. Some
never-active banks even have negative tier-1 capital, implying that those banks may be
temporarily insolvent but still kept on FDIC’s list but not disclosed to fail. Furthermore,
the median of interbank assets are all zeros, showing the reluctance of the entire market
in interbank lending that over a half of banks do not deposit their money in other market
participants. Finally, as define in Section 6.1, the measures for active banks do not
include any elements from foreign banks or branches in foreign countries. The total
assets and the total risk-weighted assets were mostly above 75% during the period for
assessing the subprime crisis (and rose to 80% at the end), so that the active interbank
sample should have a good representation of the market.
Since only active banks can have interbank assets or interbank liabilities, there is
no difference between the interbank assets/lilabilities in the active interbank system or
in the whole system. Therefore, there is only one curve for interbank assets/liabilities in
Figure 7/ 8. The gross interbank assets, i.e. the whole amount that banks lend to the
other banks in the system, have been generally decreasing from Q1 2006 to Q3 2010,
while the gross interbank liabilities, i.e. the aggregated amount that banks’ deposit
account held by other banks, have been increasing with some fluctuation (especially in
the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis). The combined Figure 10 shows that
there are usually gaps between the interbank assets and the interbank liabilities. This
imbalance might be due to the fact that some banks do not report their data since their
total assets are below $300 million dollars (see the definition of ‘interbank assets’ for
the FDIC SDI dataset in Section 6.1.2). It might also be due to the exclusion of those
uninsured banks, which have interbank tradings with insured banks. Moreover, the
curve of cash in Figure 8 (a) and the curve of total interbank assets in Figure 10 show
that, between Q1 2006 and Q1 2009, the cash in the entire market had been hoarding
and the overall interbank lending in the market had been decreasing. This is in line with
the behaviour of liquidity hoarding instead of providing interbank lending that discussed
in Section 2.4.3.2. At Q3 2009, the trends of both curves reverted, which might have
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Figure 9: Number of banks entering and quitting the insurance by FDIC in each quarter
(Q1 2006 - Q3 2010).
Figure 10: Total interbank assets and liabilities in each quarter (Q1 2006 - Q3 2010).
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been due to the asset purchase policies, such as TARP and P-PIP that mentioned in
Section 2.2.4.2.
Figure 9 shows the number of banks that enter or quit the FDIC’s insurance in each
quarter. Some of these exits are due to failures or acquisition that disclosed by FDIC as
stated above. One can see from Figure 9 that, the dark blue curve (for quitting banks)
is always above the red curve (for entering banks). This explains why the number of
FDIC-insured banks has been decreasing throughout the period.
However, the identification of an active FDIC-insured bank is complex: the bank
must have either interbank assets or interbank liabilities. A quitting active bank is not
necessarily exiting the insurance by FDIC, but may just temporarily have no interbank
assets or interbank liabilities at the next disclosure date. A bank could have interbank
assets or interbank liabilities at a certain date K, but turns to have no interbank assets or
interbank liabilities at the next date K+1, then returns into the active interbank market
at date K + 2 by holding interbank assets or interbank liabilities again. Since then,
this bank has experienced ‘being in the active interbank system’ → ‘getting out of the
active interbank system’ → ‘re-entering into the active interbank system’. In terms of
the number of banks in the active interbank market, the number changes with regard to
this specific bank by ‘-1’ between date K and date K+1, then by ‘+1’ between date K+1
and date K+2. Unlike those banks that excluded from the list of FDIC-insured banks,
these active insured banks can temporarily quit the interbank market but return soon,
depending on whether their balance sheets indicate that they have interbank activities.
This explains why the number of active insured banks is not always decreasing,
while the number of all the insured banks is. As shown in Figure 9, the green and
the light-blue curves depict the number of quitting and entering banks in the context of
active interbank market. One can see that there are more banks entering than quitting
between Q3 2007 and Q3 2008, which is right after the burst of the subprime mortgage
crisis. This phenomenon shows that banks tend to adopt interbank loans for financing
while the liquidity market is almost dried-up (see discussion in Section 2.2.4.1).
Finally, there still exist a few banks that are problematic. Some of them have no
data for tier-1 capital on their balance sheets. Some statistics of the banks suffering this
problem are depicted in Figure 11. These banks will be excluded from the list, since they
only possess a very little proportion of the market; and there is no big bank involved,
in terms of either total assets or interbank exposures (both lending and borrowing).
Another type of banks that could be problematic are those with negative tier-1 capital.
































banks are recapitalised to have positive core capital again in the following quarter; or
a signal of failure as the bank will soon be disclosed as failed/acquired. This type of
banks are kept in the list during matrix reconstructions and contagion simulations, and
they will remain if successfully recapitalised, or removed if disclosed as failed banks.
In literature (reviewed in Section 3.2.4 and Section 5.2), the distribution of total
assets for a banking system is usually assumed to be power-law, and so are the in-
degree and out-degree distributions of the network which representing the system.
The test of the power-law property for a small sample may suffer finite sample-size
bias in performing maximum likelihood estimation, which finds the power-law exponent.
The systems above may not suffer too much from this problem, though, and they
present a good power-law property in the distribution of total assets. Figure 12 and
Figure 13 show the power-law fits in the cumulative distribution function plots17, which
are examples for US banking system and the corresponding active sub-system at Q1
2006. The exponential coefficients of the power-law fits for total assets distribution are
1.7999 for active banks and 1.8884 for all the banks. This is close to what is shown
by literature: Pushkin and Aref [2004] show 1.9 as the same coefficient for US banking
system by Q3 2002, and Boss, Elsinger, Summer and Thurner [2004] show 1.87 for
Austrian banking system, also by Q3 2002.
6.1.2 Variables
Due to limitation of computation time, the banking systems will be limited in size. I aim
at assessing the US active interbank market, so that all the measures for interbank
activities are only composed by elements from active banks. The selection of banks
for representing the banking system for each semi-annual period will be explained in
Section 6.1.3. This section discusses the definitions of the variables for the empirical
study in this thesis.
The variables for each bank are selected and integrated from the Statistics on
Depository Institutions (SDI) call report by FDIC as follow (for detail, refer to the
definitions of SDI variables provided online by FDIC [2015]).
17Similar test of power-law fit could be performed on interbank assets or interbank liabilities, however,
ploting the cumulative distribution functions is computationally insolvable due to out of memory
problem.
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Figure 12: The power-law fit of total assets of banks in active interbank market for
2006Q1
Figure 13: The power-law fit of total assets of banks in US banking system for 2006Q1
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1. Total assets, or risk-weighted assets (RWA)
These two measures of bank size are applied in selecting the top banks (in size) to
represent a high proportion of the banking system, also applied in evaluating whether
a selection of banks possess a sufficiently large market share in assets. Both variables
can be found in the category ‘Assets and Liabilities’: ‘total assets’ is the 2nd variable,
while ‘total risk weighted assets’ is the 39th one.
The rankings of total assets and risk-weighted assets are not necessarily the same,
but banks with large total assets usually have large risk-weighted assets. As shown by
the power-law fits of cumulative distribution function of total assets (see Figure 12/ 13),
most of the assets in the banking system are held by only a few large banks.
As stated above, the banking systems for each period will be re-sized by selecting
banks (see Section 6.1.3) for representation. The market share of selected banks in
either total assets or risk-weighted assets are very close while top banks are selected.
2. Interbank assets (IBA)
This measure consists of two elements, which can be found in the category
‘Loans to Depository Institutions’: the 2nd variable ‘loans to commercial banks in US’,
and the 4th variables ‘loans to other depository institutions in US’ of the FDIC SDI
database. However, both items are not reported (especially from 2001 on for the ’loans
to commercial banks in US’) by institutions with less than $300 million in total assets
(beginning in 2001), i.e. small banks may be assumed to have no interbank lending.
This measure aggregates all the interbank loans to others.
3. Tier-1 capital
This measure refers to the 50th variable, ‘tier one (core) capital’18, in the category
‘Assets and Liabilities’ of the FDIC SDI database. Tier-1 capital is assumed to be
absorbing any losses incurred in interbank assets, due to shocks that defaulted debtors
impose on their creditors’ current assets. If a bank cannot afford the losses in interbank
assets, it will simply go bankrupt by ‘insolvency’. In my application of the credit risk
contagion models, the contagion via insolvency channel works in this mechanism. For
18‘Tier one (core) capital’ in the FDIC SDI database includes common equity plus noncumulative
perpetual stock, plus minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries, less good will and other ineligible
intangible assets.
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liquidity dry-up model, a bank’s capital limits the amount of its assets to be on fire-sales,
otherwise it fails by insolvency.
4. Interbank liabilities (IBL)
The 6th variable in the category ‘Total Deposits’ of the FDIC SDI database
gives ‘deposit held in commercial banks and other depository institutions in US’. This
measure is in fact the sum of two other variables: one is the 5th variable in the sub-
category ‘Transaction Accounts’, which is ‘transaction accounts in commercial banks
and other depository institutions in the US’; the other is the 5th variables in the sub-
category ‘Nontransaction accounts’, which is ‘nontransaction accounts in commercial
banks and other depository institutions in the US’ (held in domestic offices, given by
the definition from FDIC). This measure aggregates all the interbank loans that a bank
receive from others in terms of holding others’ deposits.
5. Cash
This measure refers to the 3rd variable in the category ‘Assets and Liabilities’ of the
FDIC SDI database which is ‘cash & balances due from depository institutions’. Cash is
assumed to be absorbing any losses incurred in interbank liabilities, which may be due
to shocks that defaulted creditors impose on their debtors’ liabilities. In my application
of contagion models, if a bank does not have sufficient cash to absorb the loss in its
interbank liabilities (i.e. being illiquid), it will not be bailed-out by a central bank but will
be forced to cease functioning in the system, following the mechanism that suggested
by Furfine [2003] and Krause and Giansante [2012] This measure also works for the
liquidity contagion mechanisms: fire-sales provide banks with cash, making them more
liquid but alsotheir values more questionable.
6. Long-term assets
This measure refers to the 36th variable in the category ‘Assets and Liabilities’
of the FDIC SDI database, measuring the loans and debt securities with remaining
maturities or repricing intervals of over five years. In the contagion mechanisms of
liquidity dry-up, I adopt this item as the assets to be on fire-sales.
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6.1.3 Selecting Banks Representing the Active Interbank System
With the specification of these measures for bank feature, the active interbank market
will be limited in size by the following steps:
Firstly, as stated in the beginning of this chapter and the preivous Section 6.1.1,
only those banks have non-zero interbank assets or non-zero interbank loans are
considered semianually for the period between Q1 2006 and Q3 2010. These
selections of active banks are shown in Figure 8 to represent 75%∼80% of the whole
market.
Secondly, the largest banks (in terms of asset size) are chosen to represent each
active interbank market. For the whole period between Q1 2006 and Q3 2010, 150
banks are chosen, of which 30 banks are selected from those banks that are either
possible to fail by insolvency:
Tier-1 Capital < Interbank Assets
or by illiquidity:
Cash<Interbank Liabilities
As explained in Section 6.1.1, a bank that is not in the active set at date K might be in
at date K+1, as it is not removed from the list of banks that insured by FDIC, but simply
not having any interbank activities at date K and re-adopt the interbank financing at
date K+1. Therefore, the sets of banks that are possible to fail by the insolvency and
illiquidity defined as above, do not necessarily follow a reducing trend, i.e. there could
be a bank that is possible to fail at date K+ 1 but impossible to fail at date K. These
possibly-failing banks are selected in this fashion:
(1) Let F1,F2, . . . ,F10 be the series of possibly-failing banks for Q1 2006, Q3 2006, . . .,
Q3 2010;
(2) Rank the banks in each F1,F2, . . . ,F10 in the order of decreasing asset size, let F ij
denote the j-th largest bank in the set F i, where i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,10} and j ∈ {1,2, . . . , |F i|};
(3) Define a new series F0 with the elements in F1,F2, . . . ,F10 by:




(b) for n≥ 2, if F0n−1 = F ij , then the assignation to F0n depends on i and j by F0n−1:





(b.2) if the assigned value F i+1j or F
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(b.3) if F i+1j or F
1









Keep increasing the upper index until the new entry does not fulfil (b.2) and (b.3).
The selection of elements into F0 can guarantee that: firstly, no repeated banks
are included; second, the selected banks are the largest banks that are possible to
fail in at least one of the ten periods of the whole period that I examine; and finally,
those banks that are impossible to fail in an early date but possible to fail in a later
date are also considered since F0 is aggregated from all the series of possibly-failing
banks, {F1,F2, . . . ,F10}, in each of the ten periods (hereafter refer to the semiannual
time interval between Q1 2006 − Q3 2006, and Q3 2006 − Q1 2007, etc.). The banks
in the series of F0 are not necessarily following a decreasing order in asset size, but
the priority is specified by both the possibility of failing and the timing of being possible
to fail, which can be found in the definition above. The earlier to be recognised as a
possibly-failing bank, and the bigger the asset size, the prior is the bank in F0, i.e. to
prior to be chosen into the set of representing banks for the active interbank system.
As stated before, 150 banks are selected for the whole period between Q1 2006
and Q3 2010. From F0, 30 biggest banks are chosen in the order of decreasing
‘priority’ (indicated by the increasing lower index number), being selected for allowing
the representing set for some possibility of bank failures during the contagion simulation
in Chapter 7. The other 120 banks are simply selected in the order of decreasing total
assets from the active banks at Q1 2006, which is the beginning of the period. Again, if
during the selection of these 120 banks, there are banks that are already in the set of
30 possibly-failing banks, then these banks are skipped and the selection will naturally
turn to the next non-selected largest bank. Since there are 3247 banks in the active set
for Q1 2006, the selection for 120 banks is always approachable. Therefore, the set of
150 banks consists of:
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Table 6: Basic facts of the selection of banks
Actual Potential Number TA IBA IBL
Failures Failures of Banks Ratios Ratios Ratios
Q1 2006 0 21 148 86.66% 98.40% 67.73%
Q3 2006 0 18 142 86.10% 98.14% 67.94%
Q1 2007 0 14 135 86.55% 98.57% 65.10%
Q3 2007 0 16 127 86.86% 96.55% 65.52%
Q1 2008 1 18 121 86.12% 97.15% 67.19%
Q3 2008 1 18 123 85.47% 92.70% 69.83%
Q1 2009 2 10 119 84.08% 87.72% 66.82%
Q3 2009 6 10 111 82.31% 93.90% 69.21%
Q1 2010 6 9 101 82.94% 93.72% 56.17%
Q3 2010 2 7 90 82.27% 96.57% 58.55%
{first 30 banks in F0} ∪ {120 largest banks at Q1 2006, no repeated from the 30}
Let F define this selection of 150 banks. The 30 banks from F0 are not necessarily all
included in the set of active banks at Q1 2006. In fact, three banks are recognised to be
possibly-failing after Q1 2006, and this is the reason that only 147 banks are selected
for Q1 2006 for representation. Yet all the banks chosen for each period must be in F ,
no matter if the selected banks for date K+ 1 can be recognised as potential failures
before date K.
There are a lot of banks unselected in each period for representation. These banks
are all aggregated into one single unit, acting as the ‘sink’ for the contagion process,
which is assumed to be not failing under any circumstances. The total interbank assets
and the total interbank liabilities should be equal to each other, however, this condition is
not always satisfied in my data, which could be due to banks not reporting because their
total asset is lower than $300 millions, as stated earlier in this section in the definition of
interbank assets, or because those banks not under the inusurance (also supervision)
by FDIC are initially excluded. My remedies to this problem is filling the gap between
the total interbank assets and the total interbank liabilities by adding the difference onto
any side wherever necessary, in the synthesised big ‘sink’ unit as stated above. In this
sense, this sink also represent (but not to the full extent) all the financial interactions
between the selected reseidential banks to all the rest of the US banking system,
including unselected active banks, banks uninsured by FDIC and inactive banks.
Eventually, the number of banks selected for representing each period is the
number of banks being in F0 and being insured and active, plus the sink unit. Table 6
shows the number of banks, and the market share of the representing banks in total
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assets, interbank assets and interbank liabilities for each period. It shows that the
number of banks for Q1 2006 is 148, equal to 147 (with 120 banks originally chosen
from Q1 2006, and 27 out of the first 30 banks in F0, since the rest three are not yet
recognised as possibly-failing banks by Q1 2006) plus 1, which is the sink unit. The
number of banks selected for each period generally follows a decreasing trend, except
for Q3 2008. This exception is consistent with the pattern shown in Figure 9, that
between Q3 2207 and Q3 2008, the number of active banks entering the interbank
market is higher than the number of those banks quitting. Moreover, the decreasing
trend is simply a reflection of the decrease in numbers of banks insured by FDIC and a
result of bank failures disclosed by FDIC for each quarter, shown in Figure 6.
The term ‘Actual Failures’ is those bank that being in the selection in each period,
but disclosed to be failed by FDIC after that date. ‘Potential failures’ are the banks with
either insufficient tier-1 capital to cover a full loss on interbank assets, or insufficient
cash to cover an entire loss on interbank liabilities. These potential failures do not
necessarily include all the ‘actual failures’, since incapability in interbank activities is not
the only mechanism for a bank to fail; also, failures may be due to financial interactions
with inactive banks, which are not considered in my research.
One can see from Table 6 that the market share in total assets is very high
(between 82% and 87% for each period) implying a good representation of the active
interbank system by these mixtures of large banks and vulnerable banks. As the
interbank lending (i.e. holding interbank assets) is usually dominated by top banks
in asset size, these selection of banks always possess a high proportion of interbank
assets (between 87% and 99%), while the coverage of interbank liabilities is not as
big as the former, since more than 30% of the interbank deposits are held by those
unselected small banks, as shown by Table 6.
These banking systems with limited sizes will be used in Section 6.2 for
reconstruction of banking networks, and then in Chapter 7 for contagion simulation
by two mechanisms, in order to evaluate the impact of the subprime mortgage crisis on
the US active interbank system.
6.2 Reconstruction Sample
This section applies the Message-Passing algorithm in Section 5.3 on the active
interbank systems configurated in the previous section, and examine the properties
of the reconstructed networks by network measures such as degree centralities,
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assortativities and clustering coefficients (see Section 3.2 for definition). The networks
are also used in Chapter 7 for contagion simulation.
The banking systems for the 10 periods that specified in Section 6.1.3 are used in
the reconstruction by the Message-Passing algorithm. For each period, 500 networks
are derived, covering the range of density from very low (0.0236) to very high (0.9999,
nearly equivalent to the maximally-connected network). Here the term ’density’ is
defined as the relative density of the reconstructed network to the maximally-connected
network, i.e. the ratio of the number of links in the reconstructed network to the
number of links in the maximally-connected network, aiming to measure to what extent
the reconstruction can recover the loss of information compared to the original one.
Although the dense networks that reconstructed by the Message-Passing algorithms
seem against the expectation of sparse reconstruction, these networks are still derived
for analysis in Chapter 7 as they can help telling how the contagion result changes
when the network becomes denser.
6.2.1 Relative Density of the Reconstructed Networks
The 500 networks for each semi-annual period have different ‘staring density’.
Supposed there are M links in the maximally-connected network (derived by Maximum-
Entropy estimation that mentioned in Section 5.1), and the ‘starting density’ is r%. As
define in Section 5.3, the threshold T that applied in the message-passing algorithm, is
specified by the [r% ·M]-th largest weight of all the links (where [ · ] indicates the largest
integer that no bigger than the value inside). For the k-th network in a 500 network
sample (the label k ∈ {1,2, . . . ,500}), the ‘starting density’ is 0.2k%. In other words,
the k-th network is firstly assigned with a Maximum-Entropy estimation of maximally-
connected network, then those links with weights below the [0.002Mk]-th largest links
are removed from the network, remaining a network with a relative density of 0.2k%
which is the ‘starting density’. Those removed links are then aggregated again as
the outstanding interbank loans to be reallocated into the network, and also as the
information to determine the probability of a link to exist during the reconstruction.
Figure 14 shows to what extent the message-passing algorithm can recover a
network with a given ‘starting density’ to a maximall-connected network. The X-axis
shows the label number of the banks, and the dashed line indicates the starting density
of each banking network, which is 0.002k as defined above. The distance between
a curve and the dashed line shows that, in that period for that specific network k,
how much information the reconstruction method can recover from the information loss
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Figure 14: Comparison between the final density of the simulations and the initial
density they start with the reconstructions.
when the maximally-connected matrix is reduced to the starting matrix with a density
0.002k. From Figure 14, one can see that the distance between the clustered curves
and the dashed line reaches the peak when the label number of banking networks is
around 150, i.e. when the starting density is around 0.319. The curves for the relative
densities of all the 10 periods show some features: (1) they are too clustered together
to be distinguished; (2) the density of the networks cannot be too much higher than the
starting density that indicated by the dashed line, and (3) they show some concave and
increasing trends. These phenomena might be due to the following reasons.
Firstly, while the number of links is low at the beginning, although there is more
information to be allocated and to be affecting the message that passed on the existing
routes, there might be fewer market participants that are eligible for accepting the
information. Take the k-th network as an example, where k is a small number that
no higher than 30% of the number of networks in a sample (in this context k ≤ 150).
19However, 0.3 is a very large density comparing to those below 0.01 of interbank networks in the real
world. See discussion in Section 3.3.
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Figure 15: Power-law property of the weight of links in an interbank market
The new links to be reconstructed are selected on a probabilistic base, while the
probabilities of them are determined by the message that can be passed on to such
links (also those points that they connect). As stated above, while a new link is built,
its weight will be simultaneously allocated, which has an upper limit of the ‘threshold’,
an amount that decided by the [0.002Mk]-th largest weights of links in a maximally-
connected network (here M is still the number of links in the maximally-connected
network). This could be sufficiently big to be much bigger than the volume of those
reconstructed links when k is small, i.e. when [0.002Mk] is so small that the threshold,
the [0.002Mk]-th largest weight of the maximally-connected network, is so much higher
than all the other reconstructed links, since the weight of links also follow a power-law
distribution, shown by Figure 15.
Secondly, as the starting density increases, i.e. the label of network become bigger,
the ‘threshold’ is no longer as big as before (still due to the power-law distribution of
the weight of links), comparing with the then outstanding interbank assets/liabilities
which are to be allocated. From the curves of densities in Figure 14, one can
see that the biggest gap between the simulated density and the starting density is
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approached while the label gets close to 150. The reason may be the outstanding
interbank assets/liabilities being no longer such easily spent by a relatively small
‘threshold’: in message-passing algorithm, a newly-determined link will be allocated
with a weight exactly equal to the ‘threshold’ if the outstading interbank assets/liabilities
allow, otherwise all the remaining interbank assets/liabilities should be allocated to that
specific link. In other words, a relatively lower threshold may imply a higher number of
links to be added than those links allowed by a relatively higher threshold.
Finally, when the ‘starting density’ approaches the highest possible amount, which
is 0.998 (=1-1/500) in this context, the available room for links as well as the outstanding
interbank assets/liabilities to be allocated are too few to allow for a large number of
additional links. This explains why the gap in Figure 14 between the simulated density
and the starting density falls while the label gets over 150−200.
The ten samples of networks perform very diferently in measures for network
structure, yet in general, most of them meet the expectation of the properties for
interbank network that summarised by literature.
6.2.2 Assortativity
The assortativity of a network depicts how likely a node with a certain degree will be
connected with other nodes with similar degree. In the context of directed networks, the
directed assortativity can be categorised in four types: in-in, in-out, out-in, and out-out
assortativity (see Section 3.2.2 for definition). According to the literature that reviewed
in Section 3.2.2, an interbank network should be disassortative, i.e. banks with higher
degree should be more likely to be connected with banks with lower degree, or, in other
words, large banks are more likely to build connections with small banks. Ideally, the
in-in assortativity and the out-out assortativity in this situation should be negative, since
these assortativities are actually the correlation coefficients between banks with very
different behaviour in decision-making of interbank financing.
Figure 16 shows the boxplots of the assortativities of reconstructed networks for
each period between Q1 2006−Q3 2010. The green compact boxes display the
assortativities for the whole sample for each period, while the blue boxes with red
crosses as ‘outliers’ present the results for the sparsest reconstructions in each sample.
The in-in assortativity and the out-out assortativity show a steady trend of negative
values throughout the entire period of Q1 2006−Q3 2010, while the in-out assortativity
































































































































































Q1 2006 2.92×1011 4.06% 1.42×1011 1.97% 4.20×1010 0.58%
Q3 2006 3.17×1011 4.21% 1.20×1011 1.60% 4.52×1010 0.60%
Q1 2007 3.24×1011 4.17% 9.17×1010 1.18% 3.68×1010 0.47%
Q3 2007 3.68×1011 4.40% 7.47×1010 0.89% 3.73×1010 0.45%
Q1 2008 4.25×1011 4.75% 8.20×1010 0.92% 4.53×1010 0.51%
Q3 2008 6.12×1011 6.41% 7.19×1010 0.75% 5.86×1010 0.61%
Q1 2009 7.74×1011 8.52% 6.32×1010 0.70% 6.28×1010 0.69%
Q3 2009 7.74×1011 8.57% 9.39×1010 1.04% 7.50×1010 0.83%
Q1 2010 7.94×1011 8.66% 4.21×1010 0.46% 4.48×1010 0.49%
Q3 2010 7.02×1011 7.62% 4.70×1010 0.51% 5.19×1010 0.56%
interbank lending strategies, also present a majority of negative values in the sample.
This implies that in an interbank network, not only the banks with similar interbank
lending strategies, i.e. lend to many/few banks or borrow from many/few banks, are
not likely to build connections with each other, but also the connections between those
banks with different strategies, such as large banks who may have a lot of debtors and
small banks that may seek for many creditors, might be disassortative.
One may also see from Figure 16 that, for the whole sample of each period, the
compact parts, i.e. the range between 25% quartile and 75% quartile, are almost at the
same level throughout the entire period. However, for the sparsest networks in each
period, although the network structure seems stable before and during the crisis, there
are some downturns between Q3 2009 and Q1 2010. For out-out assortativity and in-
out assortativity, the decline from Q3 2009 to Q1 2010 seems a recover from the crisis
time to the status before the crisis, if comparing the data between Q1/Q3 2006 and Q1
2010 – the median are very close, but unlike those during the crisis time of 2007−2009.
For in-in assortativity and out-in assortativity, the downturns make the measure hit the
bottom in the whole period. This disassortativity in all the types of assortative measure
shows that in Q3 2009−Q1 2010, the market is reluctant in interbank lending/borrowing,
which is in line with the sudden fall of interbank activities that depicted by Figure 10.
One thing that might worth noticing is the distribution of the assortativities for
the sparest networks in Q1/Q3 2010, especially the in-out assortativity and the in-in
assortativity, are mostly the outliers of the distribution for the entire sample. This may
be due to the small size of the banking network, comparing to the earlier periods: 101
banks or 90 banks versus 111 to 148 banks. When the network size is small, the
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choice for a link to be allocated during the reconstruction, which prioritises the allocation
of links between banks with high potential in-/out-degree that are not allocated yet
(i.e. baring and passing on more information), may be relatively limited than large
networks and the reconstruction process may be sped up20. There might be fewer links
available from the large banks to the small banks (even to the large banks to form a core
structure), leading to a high disasortativity in all dimensions. Furthermore, from Table 7,
one can see that both the ratio and the amount of interbank assets and liabilities drop
dramatically from Q3 2009 to Q1 2010, showing that banks are in general much more
reluctant to participate in the interbank market in Q1 2010 than in Q3 2009. This is in
line with the distinct falls of assortativities in all dimensions.
6.2.3 Clustering Coefficient
This section employs analyses on the clustering coefficients to: (1) verify the sparse
reconstruction by showing the distinction between the structure of sparse networks and
the dense networks, via the comparison of distributions of clustering coefficients for
the samples including/excluding dense networks; (2) verify the use of the weighted
directed clustering coefficients introduced in Section 3.2.3 and; (3) show the impact
from the systemic crisis on the network structure, reflected by the inter-period shifts
of the distribution of weighted directed clustering coefficients, with relating them to the
entry and exit of active banks towards interbank market that that be identified by FDIC
SDI data.
Clustering coefficient shows how likely the two nodes that linked to one specific
node are linking with each other. This section applies the definition of ‘directed
clustering coefficient’ and ‘adjusted directed clustering coefficient’ that introduced in
Section 3.2.3. The gross clustering coefficient, which is also defined in Section 3.2.3
as the average of clustering coefficient for all the nodes in a network, evaluates the
clustering property of the network as a whole that to what extent all its nodes are
clustered. The four types of directed clustering coefficient that consider four different
types of triplet (a micro-structure in the network, that three nodes connected with
each other) on a certain node, in terms of connection patterns which are illustrated
by Figure 3, are also studied with the examination on the aggregation of these four
types which is the ‘local’ clustering coefficient (also see Section 3.2.3) that considers
all kinds of directed triplets. The boxplots in Figures 17, 19, 20, 21, and 22 exhibit both
the binary version and the weighted version for the unadjusted clustering coefficients
20In fact, the reconstruction has a computing time of order O(N2.5) to O(N3), empirically.
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and the adjusted clustering coefficients. In each sub-figure the green compact circles
depict the unadjusted clustering coefficients, and the boxes and whiskers and red
crosses depict the adjusted clustering coefficients. Also, each group of boxplots in
Figures 17, 19, 20, 21, and 22 provides comparison of the results for clustering
coefficients between the whole sample of 500 networks and the sub-sample with the
first (sparsest) 50 networks. Since most of the dense networks have similar results for
clustering coefficients, excluding these dense networks from the sample will impose
big changes in the boxplots, when refering to Figures 17, 19, 20, 21, and 22. This
again gives evidence of consistency in the performance of network measures in dense
networks that reconstructed from the same dataset.
For each group of boxplots, the sub-figure (a) and (b) depict the clustering
coefficients for the whole sample, while the sub-figures (c) and (d) depict the sub-
sample with the sparsest 50 networks. Also, (a) and (c) are for the binary clustering
coefficients, i.e. the weight of each link is assigned with 0 or 1 for indicating
disconnected or connected, while (b) and (d) show the weighted version, taking into
account not only whether a bank is connected in a directed triplet, but also the volume
of the connections involved. For each group, (a) and (c) share the same upper and
lower limit in the Y-axis, which display the distribution of the magnitude of the clustering
coefficients, for convenience in comparison; (b) and (d) also share the same axis limits
for similar reason. Each group of clustering coefficients are analysed as followed.
Local Clustering Coefficients
Local clustering coefficients are shown in Figure 17. In sub-figure (a) which exhibits
the binary local clustering coefficients, one can see that the median of the unadjusted
version that indicated by the line inside the hallow green box (for adjusted clustering
coefficients), and the median of the adjusted version that indicated by the black dot
inside the compact green box (for unadjusted clustering coefficients), are always at
the same level for the ten periods. Moreover, the upper and lower limits or the hallow
boxes and the compact boxes are consistent in most cases. This implies that the local
clustering coefficients for most of the networks in each entire sample are distributed
in nearly identical ranges. ‘Outliers’ in sub-figure (a) for both unadjusted measure and
adjusted measure are depicted by the green circles and the red crosses.
However, when looking at sub-figure (c), one can find that the median of the hallow
box for adjusted measure and the median of the compact box for unadjusted measure
























































































































































(i.e. the sparsest 10% of the entire sample). The median of adjusted measure is higher
than the median of unadjusted measure, and the overall level of the interquantile range
(specified by the upper and lower bound of the hallow box and the compact box) of the
adjusted measure is higher than that of the unadjusted ones.
Moreover, after excluding the dense networks from the sample, the interquantile
ranges of both unadjusted and adjusted have shifted from a high level in (a) down to a
lower level in (c), where used to be occupied by the ‘outliers’ in the entire sample. This
again explains that the ‘outliers’ in the entire sample are from the sparsest networks21.
These upward shifts of distributions from unadjusted to adjusted and downward
shifts from the entire sample to the sparse sub-sample are consistent for each period.




where ‘CC’ is one of the five types of directed clustering coefficients to be discussed
in this section. Note that the ‘CC’ here is the average of the node-wise clustering
coefficients, i.e. it measures the clustering of the network. According to the definition
in Section 3.2.3 for clustering coefficients, there can be a lot of NaNs for the node-wise
clustering coefficients, when a node has 1 or 0 in its in-degree or out-degree. These
NaNs are conventionally treated as zeros, but the adjustment by the θ < 1 which is the
ratio of the number of NaNs to the number of all nodes can compensate the loss of
clustering property by setting too many NaNs as zeros. For dense networks, nodes are
very unlikely to have 1 or 0 in their in-degree or out-degree, and the number of NaNs
for node-wise clustering coefficients can be very small. In other words, θ is too small
to give a big upward shift for the average CC. This is the reason that we can only see
short distances between the median of the unadjusted and the adjusted in the entire
sample, but for the sub-sample of sparse networks, the distances are not ignorable, as
shown in Figure 17.
Figure 17 (b) and (d) exhibit the weighted clustering coefficients. As stated at the
beginning of this section, the weighted clustering coefficient is calculated by the actual
weights (in terms of the proportion in the total sum of all the interbank activities, see
Section 3.2.3 for details) but not the binary value 1 or 0 that only indicates whether the
link exist or not. Since the binary value of an existing link, which is 1, is replaced by
the ratio of the weight it bears to the largest link in the network, which could be very
21This shift of ‘outliers’ in the boxplot for the entire sample to be the interquantile range of distributions in
sparse network sub-sample is consistent throughout the other four clustering coefficients that shown
in 19, 20, 21, and 22.
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small for a small bank. For instance, in a dense matrix, most of the small banks can
have all its links with scaled weight of 1×10−7, because small banks are usually much
smaller than large banks in either interbank assets or interbank liabilities, which leads
to the small links much smaller than the largest link that usually borne by the largest
bank (in terms of interbank activities but not total assets, in this case); in the meanwhile
they possess high binary clustering coefficients since the network is dense and many
links are built for small banks. The shift of the weights from 1 down to tiny weights
such as 1×10−7 for a lot of nodes can materially affect the overall weighted clustering
coefficient.
For a sparse network, the down-shifts from the unweighted to weighted is smaller
than that happened in a dense network, because most of the small banks have only 1
or 0 in their in-degrees or out-degrees, i.e. turn to be NaNs for node-wise clustering
coefficients and recognised as 0 in the calculation of the average clustering coefficient.
Adding a weight on them does not make any difference when they are initially 0.
Therefore, the denser the network is, the more the weighted clustering coefficient is
down-shifted from the corresponding binary one. Comparing Figure 17 (a) and (b), one
can see that the interquantile range of the unweighted version (a) lies above the outliers
that representing the sparse networks, are down-shifted so much to be entirely below
the outliers in the weighted version (b).
Similar to the shift of distribution from Figure 17 (a) to (c), in the context of weighted
clustering coefficient, the ‘outliers’ in Figure 17 (b) turn to be the interquantile range of
the distribution in Figure 17 (d) for the sparse networks. However, this shift is upward in
this case, since for dense networks small banks with small weights (of links) are highly
clustered as large banks are, while these high clustering coefficients for these small
banks dilute the clustering effect from the large banks with large weights. Excluding
these dense networks implies those diluted weighted clustering coefficients by too
many highly-clustered small banks are removed from the distribution. Therefore, the
non-diluted weighted custering coefficients, which are the outliers shown by the green
circles and red crosses in Figure 17 (b), turn to be the interquantile part of the new
distributions in Figure 17 (d)22.
One thing must be recalled that, although Tabak et al. [2014] mention the problem
of weighted clustering coefficients being materially affected by the largest links in the
network, for each sample of each period in my research, this does not affect the result
shown in Figures 17, 19, 20, 21, and 22: all those networks in the sample of the same
22The upshift of distribution from Figure 17 (b) to (d) is also consistent throughout Figures 19, 20, 21,
and 22 for the other four types of directed clustering coefficients
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period share the same value of the largest link, because all of them are reconstructed
from the same maximally-connected network, while during the application of message-
passing algorithm, the largest link of this maximally-connected network is kept in the
reconstructed matrix, and no other new links can be bigger than it (in fact, no bigger
than a threshold ‘T ’ which is no bigger than the largest link) due to the specification of
the algorithm (see Section 5.3 for details). Therefore, the clustering coefficients for the
networks in the same period are comparable.
Considering the binary (unweighted) local clustering coefficients for sparse
reconstruction, the sub-figure (c) is more reliable than the sub-figure (a) as most of the
dense reconstructions are removed from the sample. For the same reason, the sub-
figure (d) is more reliable than (b) while examining the results for weighted clustering
coefficients. There is no other paper adopting the adjusted clustering coefficient that
proposed by Kaiser [2008], hence there is no other empirical results to be compared
with the results in my research above. Moreover, no empirical results other than that by
Tabak et al. [2014] are provided by literature, while they only perform empirical test of
the weighted directed clustering coefficients on their dataset for the Brazilian banking
system, with no results from the unweighted one. It is hard to verify the results shown in
this section, yet it does still provide some implication on the possible network structure
of the US interbank market between Q1 2006 and Q3 2010, prior and post the recent
financial crisis.
As mentioned in Section 3.3, the local clustering coefficients for the interbank
market of different countries are: 0.466 for Germany Q2 2003 (Anand et al. [2015]);
0.198 on average for Russia between 1998 and 2005 (Vandermarliere et al. [2015]);
0.2 for Brazil between 2007 and 2008 (Cont et al. [2010]). Comparing with these non-
US interbank market, the result that shown in Figures 17 (c), which lies between 0.25
and 0.55 through out the period of Q1 2006−Q3 2010, is still close to reality. There
is no material inter-period change in the distributions of local clustering coefficients;
in other words, the impact of systemic crisis is not reflected by this measure. No
result has been done for the US interbank market, but for US payment system in 2004,
Sorama¨ki et al. [2007] find the local clustering coefficient to be 0.53. However, Bargigli
et al. [2015] suggest that the network structure for networks established on different
financial interactions for the same banking market could be very different from each
other (mentioned in Section 3.1); these result may have little implication on the structure
of US interbank network.
The weighted local clustering coefficient gives a different trend throughout the
period. One can see from Figures 17 (d) that both the unadjusted and adjusted
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are low before Q1 2008, with 95% quantile no higher than 0.004 for adjusted and
0.002 for unadjusted, and median no higher than 0.0015 for both. But after Q3
2008, the clustering coefficients are nearly doubled, with 95% quantile above 0.007 for
adjusted and 0.004 for unadjusted, and median above 0.003 for adjusted and 0.002 for
unadjusted. Although this is consistent with the pattern shown in Figure 9, that during
the crisis between Q3 2007 and Q3 2008, the number of active banks entering the
interbank market is higher than the number of exits, as the networks are reconstructed
from re-sized banking systems, there may be no direct causation between the upshift
of weighted local clustering coefficients for the re-sized system and the entry trend for
the initial system. The main reason that lead to this upshift is the change in the largest
weight of links in the maximally-connected network of each system.
Figure 18 compares the reciprocal of the largest link and the median of the
weighted local clustering coefficients. As defined in Section 3.2.3, the five types of
weighted clustering coefficients are all heavily influenced by the largest link of the
network, by which all the other links are scaled for measuring the weights. Since the
largest link of the maximally-connected network, which is assumed to be the most likely
to exist given that no information about the network structure is available, is maintained
in the initial network with any starting density before reconstruction, the reciprocal of the
weight of this link is in fact the common scale factor for all the reconstructed networks
in a specific period.
For comparison, both time series of the reciprocals of the largest weight and the
medium of weighted local clustering coefficients are scaled by the value at Q1 2006.







the series that displayed in Figure 18. The blue line with squares gives the scaled
reciprocal of largest link, and the green line with stars gives the scaled median of
weighted clustering coefficients.
The reciprocal of the largest weight only reflect how concentrated the interbank
assets/liabilities are in the largest two market participants against the rest of the market,
as the weight is proportional23 to the largest product of the interbank asset and the
interbank liabilities from two different banks, and to the reciprocal of the total interbank
assets/liabilities (in theory, which must be equal) of the entire market. The higher the
reciprocal, the lower the extent to which the interbank assets/liabilities are concentrated
by the largest players, or, the less willing the largest players are to participate in the
interbank market. From Figure 18, one can see that the reciprocal of the largest weight
had been increasing before Q3 2008, but then fluctuated at the end and in the aftermath
23See Section 5.1.
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of the crisis. This implies that the intensity of interbank activity declined before and
during the crisis (liquidity hoarding and liquidity freeze, especially caused by the actions
taken by the top banks), but recovered slightly after the launch of the rescue policies
such as TARP in late 2008.
Furthermore, before Q3 2008, there exhibits similar trends in the movement of
both series, while after Q3 2008 the upward trend of median of weighted clustering
coefficients is much higher than that of the largest link’s reciprocal. This may imply
that the network structure before the crisis was stable24, but after the start of the crisis,
the interbank network structure changes dramatically due to shifts in banks’ decision
making in interbank financing.
The Other Four Types of Directed Clustering Coefficients
The other four types of directed clustering coefficients are only adopted by Tabak
et al. [2014] for Brazilian banking system, in which only the weighted version is applied.
The results are compared with those found by Tabak et al. [2014] in Table 9.
Recall from Figure 3, the four types of directed clustering coefficients have diversed
emphases on what kind of clustering pattern they reveal.
The cycle clustering coefficient considers the cyclic path of a length of 3, i.e.
path from i to itself such as i→ j→ h→ i. Note that the j and h here are very likely
to be intermediaries such as local large banks in the core. This type of paths is rare
for small banks, since a small bank is unlikely to lend money to such intermediaries.
But for large banks that are assumed to be tightly connected in the core, this type of
clustering coefficient is high (in fact, large banks present high values in any type of
directed clustering coefficients).
The rest of three types all deal with non-cyclic triplets, i.e. h→ i→ j & h→ j
(but not considering j→ h). The middleman clustering coefficient depicts the typical
behaviour of intermediaries: suppose h lends money to j, then the transaction is either
finished directly by the link h→ j, or intermediated by the third bank i in the way that
h→ i→ j. This measure is also high in large banks in the core, and low in small banks.
The in-clustering coefficient gives how clustered are nodes like j in ‘h→ i→ j
& h→ j’, while the out-clustering coefficient depicts h in this context. As shown in
24Yet the effect of the crisis on the structure of interbank network was not instant, but it took some time
to affect the behaviour of the overall market, and was not presented until several quarter later.
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Figure 18: Comparing the median of the weighted local clustering coefficients and
the reciprocal of the largest weight of links in the maximally-connected network
for each semin-annual between Q1 2006−Q3 2010 (all numbers are scaled to be
dimensionless.).
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Table 8, almost all the banks selected to represent the interbank markets have interbank
liabilities (i.e. interbank borrowers), but the number of banks with interbank assets (i.e.
interbank lenders) is much smaller than that of interbank lenders. Moreover, most of
the interbank lenders are large banks. Therefore, one can expect the in-clustering
coefficient to be higher than the out-clustering coefficient.
Table 8: Number of banks that borrow or lend in the market for Q1 2006−Q3 2010
Date Banks Interbank Borrowers Interbank Lenders
Q1 2006 148 140 72
Q3 2006 142 134 62
Q1 2007 135 128 58
Q3 2007 127 121 59
Q1 2008 121 117 61
Q3 2008 123 120 60
Q1 2009 119 117 55
Q3 2009 111 109 49
Q1 2010 101 99 43
Q3 2010 90 88 40
Figures 19, 20, 21, and 22 present the boxplots for the distribution of these
four types of directed clustering coefficients. Comparing sub-figures (a) and (c) for
each group of figures, downshifts of the distribution of unweighted directed clustering
coefficients from the whole sample to the sub-sample of sparse networks still exist,
similar to that for local clustering coefficients shown in Figures 17. As discussed for
the tour types clustering coefficients, it is the large banks who contribute the majority
of all the four types coefficients. Small banks may have some contributions on cycle,
middleman and in-clustering coefficients, but on out-clustering coefficients they may
have only little impact. As small banks have little effect on out-clustering for sparse
networks, the downshift in out-clustering coefficients incurred by the removal of dense
network with small banks of high out-degree is lower than the other four types, on
which the small banks may have more effect for sparse network than on out-clustering
coefficients. The downshifts of the clustering coefficients (for all the five types) by
30% to 70%, which are non-ignorable evidence that dense reconstructions distort the
distribution of network measures by shifting the distributions far away from where they
should be.
For the values of the clustering coefficients, Table 9 shows that the four types of
weighted directed clustering coefficients of US interbank system present results not
consistent with those for Brazilian banking network shown by Tabak et al. [2014]. This


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9: Mean of weighted clustering coefficients of sparse networks
Cycle Mid In Out
Q1 2006 7.78×10−5 2.54×10−4 6.56×10−4 5.97×10−5
Q3 2006 9.61×10−5 2.98×10−4 8.51×10−4 9.02×10−5
Q1 2007 1.41×10−4 4.95×10−4 1.22×10−3 1.37×10−4
Q3 2007 2.31×10−4 5.36×10−4 1.75×10−3 1.81×10−4
Q1 2008 3.19×10−4 7.25×10−4 2.02×10−3 2.77×10−4
Q3 2008 8.16×10−4 1.45×10−3 4.69×10−3 5.75×10−4
Q1 2009 6.96×10−4 1.22×10−3 5.41×10−3 3.56×10−4
Q3 2009 6.65×10−4 1.62×10−3 6.27×10−3 4.57×10−4
Q1 2010 3.61×10−4 1.01×10−4 3.61×10−3 2.71×10−4
Q3 2010 7.51×10−4 1.60×10−3 4.48×10−3 6.54×10−4
Brazilian (2004−2007) 9.33×10−5 6.75×10−4 1.89×10−4 2.09×10−4
Table 10: Mean of binary clustering coefficients of sparse networks
In-clustering Out-clustering
Q1 2006 0.4918 0.0893
Q3 2006 0.4481 0.0777
Q1 2007 0.4541 0.0604
Q3 2007 0.4615 0.0845
Q1 2008 0.5212 0.1000
Q3 2008 0.4943 0.1034
Q1 2009 0.5822 0.0655
Q3 2009 0.4675 0.0516
Q1 2010 0.4996 0.0875
Q3 2010 0.4433 0.0586
US (1997−2006) 0.2−0.4 0.1−0.2
measures, which is determined by the largest weight of links in the network before
scaling. Scaling the network by the sum of all the weights of the links might eliminate
this inconsistency, which could be considered in future research.
Moreover, Table 10 compares the binary (unweighted) in-/out-clustering
coefficients for the results derived in this thesis with the results for Federal funds market
in US between 1997 and 2006 by Bech and Atalay [2010]. It shows that the network
structure is not too far away from those networks extracted from new data. Still, as
per Bargigli et al. [2015], since Federal funds market is different from the US interbank
market, it is questionable how much implication could be given on these results.
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6.3 Testing the Power-law Properties
This section performs an entirely independent experiment testing the power-law
property of degree distributions (as well as the approapriateness of the power-law fit
in this specific context of small system with around 200 participants only) for networks
reconstructed by message-passing algorithm. The reconstruction is also based on the
FDIC SDI dataset, but the set-up of the reconstruction and the re-sized banking system
are different from the ones in Section 6.2.
Two samples of networks are generated from the banking systems for Q3 2008.
One sample is of 126 banks representing the market with a market share of 80% in
total assets, while the rest are aggregated as a sink unit, i.e. 127 participants in the
system, similar to the re-sizing of interbank market in Section 6.1.3. The other sample
has 205 banks covering 85% of total assets plus one sink unit. From each sample,
630 networks25 are generated by the Message-Passing algorithm. In other words, the
two samples examine the same banking system, while the sample with 206 banks
has network in bigger size (represented by 206-by-206 matrices) than the sample with
127 banks does (127-by-127 matrices in this case). One of the aim of this test is to
find out whether a reconstructed network in a bigger size can present better power-
law property than a smaller network for the same interbank market, since re-sizing
of a banking system with over 3000 banks is performed for ten different semiannual
period between Q1 2006 and Q3 2010 in Section 6.1.3. This is an issue that limited
by computation time, but if enlarging the size of the representing network for a banking
system improves the calibration of power-law property that found by literature, then this
could be performed in future studies for better evaluations for interbank networks.
Power-law fits are performed on the 206-bank sample, and part of the results are
shown in Figures 23 and 24. Figure 23 exhibits the histogram and the cumulative
distribution function with power-law fit for the in-degree of the 100th, the 300th and
the 500th networks of the 206-bank sample, which represent sparse reconstruction,
‘moderately’ dense reconstruction26, and dense reconstruction, respectively. The left-
half of the sub-figure (a), the histogram of the 100th network’s in-degree, shows a
typical pattern of power-law, that a high number of nodes with small in-degree (can
be refered to the property p that mentioned above) and a visually right-skewed heavy-
tailed distribution, and it passes the power-law test at the significance level of 95%. The
25The number 630 is determined by the number of links in the maximally-connected network for the
127-bank sample, 6300.
26Networks that are not too dense but not too sparse; in fact having a relative density of around 50%, i.e.
half of the possible finanical interactions are made.
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right-half of (a) also presents a good fit of the line against the cumulative distribution
function, which depicts the linear relation between the logarithm of the number of links
regarding to the value of a certain property p of the nodes (See Section 5.2 for details)
and the logarithm of the value of p:
N(≥ p) ∝ p−γ ⇒ log(N(≥ p)) =−γ log(p)+ c
where c is the proportionate coefficient between N(≥ p) and p−γ . In theory, the power-
law fit line should be asymptotic to the curve of cumulative distribution. The right-half of
(b) shows a good power-law fit for the 300th network, however, the left-half presents a
histogram that is far from a power-law pattern. Finally, for the 500th network which is a
dense one, the sub-figure (c) shows a bad fit of power-law property with a distribution
in histogram without a long, fat tail. Moreover, most of the networks in the 206-bank
sample have passed the power-law test for the in-degree in terms of p-value.
Figure 24 exhibits the results of power-law test for out-degree distributions of the
100th, the 300th and the 500th networks of the 206-bank sample. In a banking system,
there are much fewer banks acting as interbank lenders than those interbank borrowers.
For this 206-bank system, only 59 banks have interbank assets; in other word for the
maximally-connected network, there are 206− 59 = 147 banks have 0 for out-degree
(for sparse network, this number is even bigger). This phenomenon is shown by the left
half of Figure 24. Therefore, in the histograms, the majority of banks are bunched in
the bar of zero out-degree, making the distribution much right-skewed.
The left half of Figure 24 (a) shows a histogram of power-law pattern, and the right
half shows a good fit of the log-log plot to the cumulative distribution function, which is
proved by the significance test. One can see from the left half of (a) that in the 206-
bank system, the 100th ‘sparse’ network has nearly 160 banks with out-degree as 0. A
few large banks have out-degree as 205 (i.e. giving interbank loans to all the other in
the system), forming the ‘fat tail’. Things are different for the 300th ‘moderately dense’
network. From the left half of Figure 24 (b), one can see that besides the 30 banks
having 205 as out-degree (which are more than those belong to the 100th network),
only no more than 30 banks have out-degree between 0 and 205, while aounrd 150
banks have zero out-degree; this hardly forms any power-law pattern while the tail is
much thicker than the main body of the histogram. Yet the log-log plot still passes the
test for p-value at a significance level of 95%. For the 500th network, 45 banks have 205
as out-degree (again, more than the one for 300th, as the density gets higher), and no
more than 20 bank have out-degree between 0 to 205 in this case. In Figure 24 (c), the





Figure 23: Histogram, cumulative distribution function and power-law fit for in-degree,





Figure 24: Histogram, cumulative distribution function and power-law fit for out-degree,
of the (a) 100th, (b) 300th and (c) 500th simulations for the 206-bank system
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show a bad fit to the cumulative distribution function. Yet it still passes the significance
testing.
As discussed above, the question that whether it is appropriate to perform the test
of power-law property, when the sample is too small to avoid finite sample-size bias
in this test, is led to by the contradictions among these findings: (1) the histogram
showing or not a power-law pattern; (2) the log-log plot fitting or not the cumulative
distribution and; (3) the test of significance. A bigger banking system with more banks
may overcome the problem. However, as restricted by the issue of computation time,
this thesis only adopts the reconstruction of networks for banking system with a small
number of banks.
In summary, assortativities, clustering coefficients, and power-law property are
examined in analysing the structure of the simulated networks. Assortativity should
show low or negative values in the in-in and the out-out categories, as interbank
networks are assumed to have few connections between banks in similar sizes, and
most of the samples satisfy this assumption, yet the results in the in-out and the
out-in assortativities show that the disassortativity may exist in all the dimensions in
an interbank network. Clustering coefficients are discussed in five different types in
Section 6.2.3. The exclusion of dense networks can impose material shifts on the
distributions of clustering coefficients, which can be a strong evidence that the dense
reconstruction may distort our knowledge of the network structure of banking systems.
Weighted directed clustering coefficients of the four types proposed by Tabak et al.
[2014], and the binary (unweighted) in-/out-clustering coefficients of the simulated
sample are close to the empirical results from real banking networks. This verifies the
application of these recently proposed measures (but not widely adopted by literature
for interbank network).
In a test for power-law property for small samples in Section 6.3, the results show
that the test for power-law itself could suffer from finite sample-size bias, in which case
a dense network, with the histogram of degree close to that of a uniform distribution,
may be recognised as presenting power-law property by significance testing. Therefore,
even though one can conduct the test of power-law property on a small banking system,
the results may not be reliable.
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7 Result of Contagion Simulation
This chapter examines the results of contagion simulation on the dataset developed
in Section 6.1, by adopting the contagion mechanisms proposed by Furfine [2003]
introduced in Section 2.4.4.2; also the results of contagion simulation on the reduced
US banking system that specified in Section 6.1.3 via the liquidity dry-up channel that
proposed by Malherbe [2014].
Furfine’s mechanism performs contagions on two channels, the illiquidity channel
and insolvency channel as introduced in Section 2.4.4.2. This chapter also assesses
the joint effect of these two channels, to examine whether there are banks that cannot
be triggered to fail by illiquidity channel or insolvency channel solely, but can fail while
contagion are transmitted via both channels simultaneously.
Moreover, in Chapter 6, I compare the network structure of sparse networks and
dense networks that generated from the same dataset, and conclude that dense
network may have misled the understanding to the network structure of interbank
market. This chapter reveals that for simple contagions that triggered by one single
bank, results on sparse networks are different from those on dense networks. But in
contagions that triggered by multiple initial failures (in some extreme events), there is
nearly no difference in the results between sparse networks and dense networks that
generated from the same dataset.
Malherbe’s liquidity dry-up mechanisms in general outperforms Furfine’s
mechanism, in the way that it can simulate the failure of banks that disclosed to fail
by FDIC while Furfine’s cannot. The instinct restriction of Furfine’s mechanism is that,
if a bank’s cash can afford a full call back of its interbank liabilities, or its absorbent
capital can cover the losses of debtors’ defaults on its interbank assets, the bank
will be absolutely safe, regardless of the network structure. But some of these ‘safe
banks’ failed during the crisis, implying that there are other channels besides direct
credit linkages for banking failure transmission. The liquidity dry-up mechanism that
formulated in Section 2.4.3.3 considers not only the liquidity problem, but also the
losses that brought from the fire-sale and the asset write-down on capital. Some
‘safe banks’ that cannot fail by Furfine’s credit risk contagion mechanism can then be
detected as vulnerable in fire-sale by Malherbe’s liquidity dry-up model.
In this chapter, I will firstly assess the results of Furfine’s mechanism. I will examine
some essential limitations from the dataset on Furfine’s mechanism, and then specify
the contagion experiments while given the limitation from the dataset, and assess the
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incapability of Furfine’s mechanism on insolvency channel in finding bank failures and
predicting losses on balance sheet figures. The results of Furfine’s mechanism by
illiquidity is then selected as the sample for detailed analysis. Loss given default, which
can materially affect the contagion results, will also be mentioned at the end of this
chapter with a discussion in bank failure prediction, which will not be expanded due to
the scope of my thesis.
Secondly, I will present the results of liquidity dry-up mechanism. I will specify
the contagion experiments on two alternative routes. One is the ‘shock-driven’
mechanism, in which the triggering bank suffers a random shock on its cash and needs
to decide whether to perform fire-sale, and once it performs fire-sales, all the non-
TARP and potentially illiquid banks must sell their assets at the fire-sale price to restore
their liquidity so as to survive the run on its interbank liabilities. All these fire-sale
banks are recognised as of ‘low-quality’27. The other is the ‘anticipation-oriented’
mechanism, in which the triggering bank is voluntary for fire-sale because it anticipates
all the others will sell their assets and hoard their cash. Once it performs fire-sales, all
the banks that are similarly solvent and liquid, and in a similar size to it, will also take
the fire-sale action. All these fire-sale banks and the potentially insolvent banks (that
subject to losses on asset value at fire-sale prices) are recognised as of ‘low-quality’28.
Especially for the anticipation-oriented mechanism, the potentially insolvent banks also
worth noticing as they are likely to fail by insolvency, and in fact, these potentially-
insolvent banks include all or most of the true failures that disclosed by FDIC in the
simulations.
Finally, I compare the total losses of the simulated failures on several financial
measures between the Furfine’s mechanism, the two mechanisms from the liquidity
dry-up model, and the true failures. The results will verify the equilibrium of Malherbe
[2014]’s proposition of ‘higih-liquidity equilibrium’ during the stage of liquidity hoarding
that before the crisis, and the switch of equilibrium to ‘liquidity dry-up’ that fire-sales are
performed and everyone’s assets are recognised as lemons, such that the liquidity is
frozen and the crisis is ignited.
27See Section 2.4.3.3 for point (1a), (2a) and (3a).
28See Section 2.4.3.3 for point (1b), (2b) and (3b).
136
7.1 Specification of Contagion by Furfine’s Mechanism
This section examines the implication from the data on the contagion simulation of
Furfine’s mechanism, and then specifies the contagion simulation. Considering the
nature of the mechanism, the banks that can be triggered to fail should be indicated
before specifying the contagion simulation: it is meaningless to check whether a bank
that will never fail by that mechanism is simulated to fail.
7.1.1 Data Implication on Furfine’s Mechanism
Furfine’s mechanism assumes that if a bank suffer losses in full amount on its interbank
assets/liabilities, given that it does not have sufficient tier-1 captial/cash to cover the
losses, it will then be deactived as a ‘failed bank’. However, some of the failed banks
that disclosed by FDIC may satisfy none of the conditions below (as discussed in
Section 6.1.2):
Potentially insolvent: Tier-1 Capital < Interbank Assets
or
Potentially illiquid: Cash < Interbank Liabilities
Note that the concept of ‘potentially insolvent’ in the context of Furfine’s mechanism is
different from that in the liquidity dry-up model. In this case, only those actually-failed
banks that satisfy any of the conditions above should be compared for successfully-
predicted failures.
Banks in the selected active interbank system that disclosed by FDIC to fail29 are
listed in Table 11. There are in total 18 banks in the table, while only 6 of them can
fail by illiquidity and none of them can fail by insolvency, as shown in the last two
columns. To be more precise, Table 12 shows how many banks are disclosed to fail in
each semiannual period. The contagions via Furfine’s mechanism are limited in either
potentially-insolvent banks or potentially-illiquid banks, as defined above. Therefore,
from Table 12 one can see that no results can be compared with insolvency while a few
actual failures can be compared with illiquidity. Moreover, since all the banks in Table 11
29These banks only include the banks that are exactly selected in the representing active interbank
system, i.e. the re-sized market, in the period that they actually fail. They may fail in other periods in
which they are either not potentially-illiquid/potentially-insolvent or not selected for representation. This
issue will be discussed in Section 7.3.1.
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Table 11: The banks in the selected active interbank system that disclosed to fail by
FDIC








9 May, 2008 ANB Financial Q2 2008 No No
7 November, 2008 Franklin Bank Q4 2008 No No
10 April, 2009 New Frontier Bank Q2 2009 No No
1 May, 2009 Silverton Bank Q2 2009 No Yes
30 October, 2009 San Diego National Bank Q4 2009 No No
30 October, 2009 Califonia National Bank Q4 2009 No No
30 October, 2009 Park National Bank Q4 2009 No No
6 November, 2009 United Commercial Bank Q4 2009 No No
13 November, 2009 Orion Bank Q4 2009 No Yes
18 December, 2009 Imperial Capital Bank Q4 2009 No No
16 April, 2010 Riverside National Bankof Florida Q2 2010 No No
23 April, 2010 Amcore Bank Q2 2010 No No
23 April, 2010 Broadway Bank Q2 2010 No Yes
30 April, 2010 Eurobank Q2 2010 No Yes
30 April, 2010 R-G Premier Bankof Puerto Rico Q2 2010 No Yes
30 April, 2010 Frontier Bank Q2 2010 No No
15 October, 2010 Premier Bank Q4 2010 No Yes
22 October, 2010 Hillcrest Bank Q4 2010 No No
fail either in Q2 or Q4 for each year, they will be counted in the period of Q1−Q3 and
the Q3−Q1(but the next year), respectively.
The trend of the number of FDIC-disclosed failures for the active interbank system
is consistent with the trend for the entire banking system, as shown in Table 4, that the
number is low before the crisis, increases during the crisis and peaks at Q3 2009 and
Q1 2010. This implies that the selection of the active interbank system can represent
the entire system well.
However, due to the existence of the ‘sink unit’, the structure of the network,
especially the distribution of the weight of links might have been distorted: links that
should have been distributed from large banks to those small banks in the sink, are
all aggregated as one large link to the sink unit. This kind of large link from large
banks to the sink unit is very likely to exist in a reconstructed network that generated
by Message-Passing algorithm, since the network is reconstructed from a maximally-
connected network whose links are proportionately distributed by interbank assets and
interbank liabilities of all the banks, and the higher the density, the more likely that large
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Table 12: Summary of the actually-failed banks for each period





Q1 2006−Q3 2006 0 0 0
Q3 2006−Q1 2007 0 0 0
Q1 2007−Q3 2007 0 0 0
Q3 2007−Q1 2008 0 0 0
Q1 2008−Q3 2008 1 0 0
Q3 2008−Q1 2009 1 0 0
Q1 2009−Q3 2009 2 0 1
Q3 2009−Q1 2010 6 0 1
Q1 2010−Q3 2010 6 0 3
Q3 2010−Q1 2011 2 0 1
links will be kept in the initial matrix for reconstruction (see the specification of the initial
matrix in Section 5.3). As shown in Table 6, the market share of interbank liabilities of
the sink unit for each period equals to one minus the percentage in the last column,
which is over 30%. This intuitively shows it is very likely that the sink unit obtains large
amount of interbank loans from other large banks, impairing the large banks’ capability
of lending to other small banks. Therefore, beside the fact that only very few banks
satisfy the condition of being potentially-insolvent, on the illiquidity side, although there
are some banks that are eligible to be potentially-illiquid, failures from single large banks
are not likely to trigger other small banks’ failures.
Table 13 shows a summary of contagions via Furfine’s illiquidity that triggered by
each single bank in the system for each period. A contagious bank means that the
bank is able to trigger others to fail by its own failure. A vulnerable bank is a bank that
can be triggered to fail by others’ failures. For each period, the sample size equals to
the number of banks (except for the sink unit, which is assumed to be never failing).
The contagion outcomes are compared with the actual failures that shown in Tables 11
and 12. If a bank, which is disclosed to fail by FDIC, is predicted by the contagion
simulation, then it will be counted in the number of successfully predicted banks.
The comparison between sparse networks (the 50 sparsest ones) and dense
networks (the rest 450 networks) is also performed. It is obvious that for each period,
there are much more contagious banks and vulnerable banks in the sparse networks
than in the dense networks. This is because as networks get denser, the link is more
evenly allocated during the network reconstruction. On one hand, this leads to the
phenomenon that, large banks have many links with many small banks, but only a few
links have sufficiently large volume to force its debtors to fail when the large bank itself
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sparse 147 18 18 0 0
Q1 2006
dense 147 2 10 0 0
Q3 2006
sparse 141 16 17 0 0
Q3 2006
dense 141 2 7 0 0
Q1 2007
sparse 134 23 13 0 0
Q1 2007
dense 134 3 7 0 0
Q3 2007
sparse 126 19 14 0 0
Q3 2007
dense 126 3 6 0 0
Q1 2008
sparse 120 25 17 0 0
Q1 2008
dense 120 4 6 0 0
Q3 2008
sparse 122 27 17 0 0
Q3 2008
dense 122 4 7 0 0
Q1 2009
sparse 118 8 7 1 1
Q1 2009
dense 118 4 3 0 1
Q3 2009
sparse 110 7 9 1 1
Q3 2009
dense 110 4 3 0 1
Q1 2010
sparse 100 5 7 3 3
Q1 2010
dense 100 2 1 0 3
Q3 2010
sparse 89 12 4 1 1
Q3 2010
dense 89 8 2 0 1
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is failed. On the other hand, only the largest banks (especially in interbank assets, but
not necessarily in total assets) can have sufficiently large links to trigger contagion. This
explains why the decline in both numbers is material. Moreover, in sparse networks,
all the FDIC-disclosed failed banks can be triggered to fail by at least one bank, as
shown in the column ‘successfully predicted banks’, while in dense networks none of
the banks in any period can trigger those actual failures to fail. This again shows the
difference between sparse networks and dense networks, and it also gives evidence
to the stabilising effect of interbank network that supposed by Iori et al. [2006]. Yet
this is only the results for contagions triggered by single banks’ failures, the results of
contagions trigger by multiple simultaneous bank failures will be assessed later in this
chapter.
On insolvency side, for all the ten periods, there is no bank can trigger others’
failures via the insolvency channel. Those potentially-insolvent banks are listed in
Table 14. For most of the periods, there is only one bank that satisfies the condition
of potentially-insolvent, except for Q1 2006 and Q3 2010, in which there are two,
respectively. As stated above, that the sink unit possess over 30% of the total interbank
liabilities of the system, while this unit cannot fail in the contagion simulation, the impact
on the other banks’ solvency from the sink unit (i.e. absorbing too much interbank
assets from other banks) should be taken into account. The fifth column gives the
interbank assets that the banks hold in other banks but not in the sink. One can see
that the First Commercial Bank of Florida in Q3 2010, who temporarily has negative tier-
1 capital (and is soon disclosed to fail in Q1 2011) and zero interbank liabilities. Besides
this bank which is considered to be naturally insolvent by Furfine’s mechanism, most of
the other banks turn to be solvent with the large amount to the sink unit subtracted from
their account of interbank assets (i.e. potential losses via insolvency channel), except
for the Citibank (South Dakota).
The Citibank (South Dakota) can still fail in Q1 2007, Q3 2007, Q1 2008, Q3 2008,
and Q3 2009. The difference between the tier-1 capital and the ‘interbank assets to
outside the sink’ is small (relative to tier-1 capital) in Q1 2007, Q3 2007 and Q3 2009,
so that this bank is not likely to fail by insolvency in these periods. For Q1 2008 and
Q3 2008, this bank seems vulnerable, as the remaining interbank assets are still nearly
twice as the tier-1 capital. However, no other banks can incur the failure of this bank
by the failure of itself, because the bank who has the largest interbank liabilities other
than the sink, which is the Bank of America, has only around 30% as the market share
in interbank liabilities (excluding the sink unit). Considering that the link between these
two big players in the interbank markets is one of the largests link in the maximally-
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Q1 2006 Citibank 46480000 64558000 18894599 No
Q1 2006 Citibank(Nevada) 2015180 2100000 633110 No
Q3 2006 Citibank 50608000 59878000 23142848 No
Q1 2007 Citibank(South Dakota) 7479281 22789836 9361894 Yes
Q3 2007 Citibank(South Dakota) 7003742 16215972 8182252 Yes
Q1 2008 Citibank(South Dakota) 6114226 21233239 12162870 Yes
Q3 2008 Citibank(South Dakota) 5986711 16630041 11404082 Yes
Q1 2009 Citibank(South Dakota) 14146536 18151591 9639454 No
Q3 2009 Citibank(South Dakota) 19431567 31491717 21080727 Yes
Q1 2010 Citibank(South Dakota) 16051530 18669616 3267734 No
Q3 2010 Citizens Bankof Pennsylvania 2513467 7000002 1573366 No
Q3 2010 First CommercialBank of Florida -9712 0 0 Yes
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connected network, and it is very likely that this link will exist in the initial matrix for the
reconstruction process by message-passing algorithm. As stated above, the link in the
maximally-connected network is allocated proportionately, i.e. the loan from Citibank
(South Dakota) to Bank of America is at most 30% of the total interbank assets that
Citibank (South Dakota) hold in other banks (except for the sink unit), which is not large
enough to be bigger than its tier-1 capital. In other words, the failure of a single bank is
not able to incur an insolvency failure on this Citibank (South Dakota).
This explains why insolvency is not likely to happen in the active interbank system
that I choose: even the most ‘vulnerable’ bank is not vulnerable unless in extreme cases
such as the largest banks all fail simultaneously, forcing this Citibank (South Dakota) to
fail by insolvency. The insolvency is so uncommon that I will not apply further contagion
simulation on it, since it is very likely to give zero bank failing as the result.
Additionally, as shown in Table 6, the market share of the sink unit in interbank
assets is one minus the percentages in the sixth column ‘IBA Ratios’, which is between
1.43% and 13.45%, while for most of the periods, the sink unit only possess more than
5% of the interbank assets of the system. In others words, for those banks which are
potentially-illiquid, their interbank liabilities account will not be affected as much as their
interbank assets account are while the part belongs to the sink unit is excluded, making
them very likely to be staying vulnerable by illiquidity. The existence of sink unit, and
the fact that potential insolvency is uncommon in my sample set affect the specification
of the contagion simulation, which will be introduced in Section 7.1.2.
The final point to be mentioned in this section is the joint effect of illiquidity and
insolvency. Given the fact that contagion running solely on the insolvency channel has
little impact on the banking network as shown by Table 14, the joint contagion via the
both channel may also be of a little effect. Table 15 shows how many bank failures are
incurred by the joint effect of the both channel, i.e. the number of banks failed in the
joint contagion less the number of banks failed in the illiquidity channel solely, and then
less the number of banks failed in the insolvency channel solely. The contagions are
triggered by each single bank in the system for each period, similar to the specification
in Table 13.
As shown in Table 15, some banks that are not vulnerable enough to fail on
the insolvency channel solely may be affected by those failures that incurred on the
illiquidity side. These extre failures follow the mechanism that, if on the insolvency
channel solely, given that the triggering bank k defaults to trigger the contagion effect,
a bank i may only suffer losses from interbank assets of (T1Ci denotes the tier-1 capital
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Table 15: Descriptive statistics of the joint effect of illiquidity and insolvency channels
by Furfine’s mechanism.
Date Maximum Median Minimum
Q1 2006 1 1 0
Q3 2006 0 0 0
Q1 2007 3 0 0
Q3 2007 0 0 0
Q1 2008 1 0 0
Q3 2008 1 0 0
Q1 2009 0 0 0
Q3 2009 1 0 0
Q1 2010 0 0 0
Q3 2010 0 0 0
of bank i):
Li,k < T1Ci
If considering the illiquidity side in the meanwhile, there could be several banks
failing. When the losses from these failing banks, {K1,K2, . . . ,Kl}, on to bank i has
accumulated such that:
Li,k+Li,K1 + . . .+Li,Kl ≥ T1Ci
then bank i fails because of insolvency. The most possible one to fail is still the Citibank
(South Dakota) as shown in Table 14, while it has a very large interbank assets (in fact,
this bank is always on of the top 3 banks in interbank assets during the entire period)
at the same time, which imples a further contagion effect on the illiquidity channel
to its debtors. However, one can see that the extra failures under the joint effect of
both contagion channels are still very uncommon in my samples. In other words, the
change in the contagion results (on illiquidity channel) by the joint effect of illiquidity and
insolvency channels may be too little to be worthing noticing.
7.1.2 Setting up Contagion Simulations
In Section 7.1, the limitations on the mechanisms by the dataset have been
discussed. Since Eisenberg-Noe’s mechanism cannot present much difference
between contagions triggered by different banks, and Furfine’s insolvency mechanism
only has very little contagion effect on my network samples, specifying the contagion
simulation for the illiquidity channel is the main focus of this section.
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Contagions triggered by single bank’s failure have been assessed in Section 7.1,
therefore the remainder of this chapter will focus on the contagions that triggered by
multiple simultaneous bank failures. Especially for the illiquidity channel as explained
above, those banks with the largest interbank assets should be the most capable ones
to stimulate the contagion effect. For the banking system of each period, the top 10
banks with the largest interbank assets will be chosen for the ‘triggering events’. With
the joint effect of their contagiousness, the contagion simulation may provide much
more severe scenarios than the contagions by single triggering bank can do. The
triggering events are specified as below.
Firstly, choose the top 10 banks with the largest interbank assets for each period.
For example, the active interbank system in Q1 2006 has 148 banks. Suppose 1 ≤
k1,k2, . . . ,k10≤ 147 are the label30 of these selected triggering large banks. Note that the
selection of {k1,k2, . . . ,k10} is not necessarily the same for any two period, but it always
assesses the contagions that triggered by large interbank players’ failures, which are
extreme events that are very unlikely to happen. Besides the drawback that it may lead
to a predicted loss much higher than the real case, this selection at least guarantees
the contagion effect to happen during the simulation, especially for the dense networks
while the links that can pass losses large enough to cause other’s failures are more
concentrated than in sparse networks, as implied in Table 13.
Secondly, allow any of the ten selected banks either to fail or not to fail. hence a
triggering event is formed by simultaneous failures of multiple banks. There can be two,
or three, or any of the ten banks (but up to ten) in the collection of triggering banks.
For instance, use a subset {k1,k5,k7,k8} of the set {k1,k2, . . . ,k10} to label the triggering
event that bank k1, bank k5, bank k7 and bank k8 failing while the other not failing.
Therefore, there are 210− 1 = 1023 possible triggering events, which is the number of
subset of the set {k1,k2, . . . ,k10}, excluding the event that indicated by the empty set /0,
in which none of the selected banks fails.
With the specification of these triggering events, the contagions via Furfine’s
illiquidity channel will be assessed. Eisenberg-Noe’s results will be examined the
first, since in contagions by each single bank’s failure, the mechanism show nearly
consistent results, which may not be informational for predicting the losses or the
number of failures, across all the reconstructed netwroks for each period.
Moreover, the ‘Loss Given Default’, in this case of loss being transmitted via direct
financial linkages between banks, is defined as the proportion of the loan that borne
30Note that the sink unit can never fail, therefore the label is no bigger than 148−1= 147 in this case.
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by the link to be reflected as the loss on the defaulting bank’s counterparty. Committee
et al. [2010] states in the Basel III regulatory framework that loss given default “is a
market assessment rather than an internal estimate”. The loss given default is set to be
consistent for all the banks in the system for each period, initally as ‘1’ which means that
an obligor will bear the loss at full amount31 via the link when its counterparty fails. This
may have overestimated the outcome of the contagion (in terms of losses and number
of failures), yet the contagion outcomes with loss given default at lower levels will also
be assessed at the end of this chapter as a test for the stability of the system.
7.2 Specification of Liquidity Dry-up Contagion
This section specifies the contagion simulations using the ‘anticipation-oriented’ and
the ‘shock-driven’ mechanisms that introduced in Section 2.4.3.3.
Similar to Furfine’s mechanism, both liquidity dry-up mechanisms that mentioned
above determine the failed banks by their illiquidity, i.e. whether one’s cash is sufficient
to afford the withdrawal of its interbank liabilities from its creditors. Furthermore, the
losses on asset values due to the marking-to-market effect at the fire-sale price will also
be considered when deciding whether a bank’s failure can be simulated via this channel.
However, since the marking-to-market effect can, in most cases, bring a majority of the
market participants to fail nominally by insolvency32, this may not be a proper prediction
of bank failures, but a supplementary indicator for those vulnerable banks that cannot
be discovered by Furfine’s mechanism.
Another difference, besides the extra contagion channel of fire-sale/insolvency to
Furfine’s mechanism, is the activation of the sink unit during the contagion process.
This huge unit, which occupies around 30% of interbank assets of the market, will have
its right to withdraw the interbank loans that lent to a low-quality bank from all the banks
which it consists of. This may bring higher impairment on to the banks’ liquidity side,
since for Furfine’s model the 30% of interbank assets of the sink unit, which is not
allowed to fail, will not have any contagion effect; but in the case of liquidity dry-up
mechanisms, the vulnerable banks may suffer an up-to-100% loss on its liquidity side,
which is more llikely to make it fail by illiquidity. Whether this difference will make any
change to the prediction of bank failures will be examined later in this chapter.
31The loss given default is set to 1, in order to guarantee the contagion can happen, since some systems
are so stable that no contagion can occur even though the loss given default is 0.9.
32Note that in Table 5, there are several banks that have negative tier-1 capital, but still active on FDIC’s
bank list.
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For both mechanisms, the contagion is simulated with one bank triggering the
fire-sale and (at least) one random variable that distinguishes the simulations. For
each triggering bank, the simulation is repeated for 1000 times. Therefore, for each
period, there are 1000(N−1) simulations, where N is the unmber of banks in the system
including the sink unit, while the sink unit does not trigger any fire-sale but contributes
in the withdrawal of interbank liabilities (i.e. the run on those ‘low-quality banks’ from
their creditors).
Shock-driven mechanism
Recall the contagion process of this mechanism, and let bank i to be the triggering
bank (the notations follow those in Section 2.4.3.3):
(1) Bank i suffers a shock of τCashi (0 < τ < 1) in its cash account. If the bank
is potentially illiquid: (1− τ)Cashi < IBLi, i.e. the bank may fail by illiquidity if all of its
interbank liabilities are withdrawn simultaneously, it must choose fire-sale to gain itself
some liquidity, otherwise the contagion ends as the bank refuses to fire-sale.
(2) If bank i performs fire-sale, the amount it sells, ∆LTi, should be restricted by the
capital and the fire0sale price λ : (1−λ )∆LTi <Capitali.
(3) All the non-TARP and potentially illiquid banks perform fire-sales, and the
amount of long-term assets to be sold are determined likewise by the capital and
the fire-sale price (even though this fire-sale amount cannot prevent them from being
potentially illiquid).
(4) Those banks that perform fire-sales are recognised as ‘low-quality’, while all
the others are ‘high-quality’ banks. Not all the high-quality banks will recall loans from
their low-quality debtors, and this operation is modelled as a fraction δk ∈ (0,1) of the
interbank liabilities of bank k to be withdrawn. If it cannot afford these withdrawals, it
fails by illiquidity, i.e.:
(1− τ)Cashk+λ∆LTk < δkIBLk
For this mechanism, there are two random variables the initial shock τ to the
triggering bank, and the fraction δk of interbank liabilities of bank k to be withdrawn.
A 1000-by-1 vector will be assigned to the shocks for the 1000 simulations for each
bank first, and this vector will be identical throughout the whole simulation for each
bank and each period. And a (N−1)-by-1 vector is assigned to the withdrawal fraction,
being random for each simulation. The fire-sale price is set to 0.9.
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Anticipation-oriented mechanism
Also recall the contagion process of this mechanism first:
(1) Bank i performs fire-sale, no matter if it is potentially illiquid or not. The amount
for fire-sale and the gain of cash are analogously determined by the capital and the fire-
sale price (even though this fire-sale amount cannot prevent them from being potentially
illiquid).
(2) The banks, which are similarly solvent and liquid to bank i and in similar sizes,
take the fire-sale action while they witness the fire-sale of bank i. The asset sizes of
these bank are restricted within a range of ±5% of bank i’s, and the two ratios should
be within the range Ri± 0.5std({Rk}k=1,2,...,N), where Ri denote the ratio of bank i and
std({Rk}k=1,2,...,N) denote the standard deviation of the ratio series of all the banks. The
amount for fire-sale and the gain of cash are determined likewise.
(3) Each bank that either performs fire-sales or is potentially insolvent, in the
case that the nominal loss on their long-term asset due to the marking-to-market effect
at fire-sale price exceeds their absorbent capital, is recognised as ‘low-quality’, while all
the others are ‘high-quality’ banks. A low-quality bank k will face a full withdrawal from
all its creditors. If it cannot afford these withdrawals, it fails by illiquidity, i.e.:
(1− τ)Cashk+λ∆LTk < IBLk
For this mechanism, the random variable is the fire-sale price. A 1000-by-1 vector
will be assigned to the fire-sale price for the 1000 simulations for each bank.
At the stage of deciding whether to perform fire-sale by a triggering bank, the
anticipation-oriented mechanism is more likely to have contagions being processed
than the shock-driven mechanism, since for the former a triggering bank must perform
fire-sales. Yet the initial impairment on a bank’s liquidity position can make it more
likely to fail in the withdrawals. Furthermore, in the selection of banks to follow the
fire-sale behaviour, the number of similar banks (in both ratios and sizes) is higher
than the potentially illiquid banks, leading to a larger simulated loss in terms of balance
sheet items. By and large, the anticipation-oriented mechanism provides a much higher
simulation result in loss or in number of failed banks. These will be discussed in the
following section.
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7.3 Results for Contagion Simulations
This section examines the results for the contagion simulated by Furfine’s illiquidity
mechanism, with the 1023 triggering events (for simultaneous multiple failures)
specified in Section 7.1.2, and the contagion simulated by the two liquidity dry-up
mechanisms that specified in Section 7.2. As discussed in Section 7.1.2, the insolvency
channel and the joint effect of both the illiquidity channel and the insolvency channel
will not be assessed in the contagion simulations of Furfine’s mechanism, since they
are unlikely to present meaningful results due to the limitation from the dataset.
7.3.1 Number of Simulated Failed Banks
For Furfine’s mechanism, Table 16 shows a summary of the contagions that triggered
by the 1023 events for each period. One can see that before and during the crisis,
the number of vulnerable banks in sparse networks is almost identical to the number
in dense networks, implying that the difference in contagion results between sparse
networks and dense networks is very small when the contagion effect is triggered by
extreme events, and is much more severe than those contagion triggered by single
bank’s failure as shown in Table 13.
The main reason for this elimination of the difference between sparse networks and
dense networks may be the accumulation of the losses via direct interbank loans. When
there is initially only one bank failing, the loss that imposed upon a small bank may not
be large enough to make it illiquid, given that this link may be very small. In a dense
network, which is reconstructed from an initially dense network that derived from the
maximally-connected network, the small bank’s interaction with others are very likely to
be split into several links that proportionately allocated by its interbank liabilities/assets,
while in a sparse network, the interaction is very likely to be one link with a large bank.
Therefore, in sparse networks where interbank loans are more concentrated than in
dense networks, the loss imposed on a small bank by the failure of its creditor may
not need to wait for accumulation before it is sufficiently large to incur illiquidity. In
the case of simultaneous multiple bank failures triggering the contagion, the diversified
borrowings accumulate and become large enough for those small banks, which are
resilient to single bank’s failure, to be illiquid. This gives implication of simulating
contagion with multiple triggering failures, since otherwise the resilience of small banks
towards multiple failures of their counterparties may not be assessed properly.
149
Table 16: Contagion incurred by top 10 banks in interbank assets for period Q1

















sparse 1023 147 19 0 0
Q1 2006
dense 872 147 18 0 0
Q3 2006
sparse 1022 141 17 0 0
Q3 2006
dense 873 141 17 0 0
Q1 2007
sparse 1023 134 13 0 0
Q1 2007
dense 924 134 13 0 0
Q3 2007
sparse 1023 126 15 0 0
Q3 2007
dense 937 126 14 0 0
Q1 2008
sparse 1023 120 17 0 0
Q1 2008
dense 976 120 16 0 0
Q3 2008
sparse 1023 122 17 0 0
Q3 2008
dense 988 122 16 0 0
Q1 2009
sparse 1020 118 8 1 1
Q1 2009
dense 971 118 4 1 1
Q3 2009
sparse 1016 110 9 1 1
Q3 2009
dense 989 110 6 1 1
Q1 2010
sparse 992 100 7 3 3
Q1 2010
dense 951 100 1 0 3
Q3 2010
sparse 1023 89 3 1 1
Q3 2010
dense 1021 89 1 0 1
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Table 17: Descriptive statistics for the number of banks incurred to fail in the contagions
triggered by individual triggers and by the 1023 triggering events, via Furfine’s illiquidity
mechanism
Date individual triggers 1023 triggering eventsMaximum Median Minimum Maximum Median Minimum
Q1 2006 11 0 0 19 9 0
Q3 2006 9 0 0 17 7 0
Q1 2007 10 0 0 13 7 0
Q3 2007 7 0 0 15 7 0
Q1 2008 9 0 0 17 7 0
Q3 2008 9 0 0 17 8 0
Q1 2009 3 0 0 6 3 0
Q3 2009 8 0 0 9 3 0
Q1 2010 3 0 0 4 1 0
Q3 2010 1 0 0 2 1 0
Table 18: Descriptive statistics for the number of banks incurred to fail in the contagions
by shock-driven mechanism and anticipation-oriented mechanism of the liquidity dry-up
model
Date shock-driven anticipation-orientedMaximum Median Minimum Maximum Median Minimum
Q1 2006 6 2 0 15 7 0
Q3 2006 5 2 0 13 6 0
Q1 2007 5 3 0 10 3 0
Q3 2007 5 3 0 13 6 0
Q1 2008 7 4 0 15 7 0
Q3 2008 8 5 0 14 5 0
Q1 2009 6 3 0 5 3 0
Q3 2009 5 3 0 8 4 0
Q1 2010 3 1 0 9 4 0
Q3 2010 4 2 0 7 3 0
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The number of vulnerable banks also increases marginally from Table 13 to
Table 16. The difference between the descriptive statistics of the number of banks
to be triggered33 by each single event, especially the increase in the median (shown by
Table 17), shows that bank failures are much more commonly triggered by those 1023
triggering events. This implies simultaneous multiple bank failures can result in more
banks failing than single bank failures do, by the loss accumulation as stated above.
Moreover, from Table 16, one may assert that the system was more unstable before
and during the crisis than after the crisis, from the perspective of the decreasing number
of simulated bank failures. However, only looking at Table 4, which shows the number
of bank failures disclosed by FDIC, one may argue that the contagion simulations fail to
reflect the true magnitude of the risk that a banking system is facing: there are much
more banks failing after the crisis than before. Malherbe [2014]’s liquidity dry-up model
has proposed an explanation to this phenomenon: banks have been cutting interbank
assets and hoarding liquidity before the crisis, and they assume the market to be highly-
liquid, yet their anticipation of high-liquidity switch to a future of liquidity freeze, in which
everyone just hoards cash but no one is willing to purchase others’ assets once they
attempt to obtain liquidity by fire-sales. Therefore, before the crisis, the liquidity situation
of banks keeps improving, represented by the number of simulated failures becoming
lower by time. However, once the switch of equilibrium from high-liquidity to liquidity
freeze, banks will not only be threatened by shortage of liquidity supplied by the market,
but also by the impairment of their asset holding from fire-sales.
Table 18 shows the number of bank faillures simulated by the two liquidity dry-
up mechanisms. Comparing between the results of these two mechanisms, one can
see that the anticipation-oriented mechanism generates more simulated failures than
the shock-driven mechanism does, which is in line with the discussion in Section 7.2.
While comparing these two mechanisms with Furfine’s, the shock-driven mechanism
has overall the lowest numbers for bank failure simulation, and Furfine’s has the highest.
This is reasonable since banks are allowed to obtain liquidity via fire-sale before their
interbank liabilities are withdrawn via the interbank network – they might have been
saved. Furthermore, as specified in Section 7.2, the anticipation-oriented mechanism
also imposes contagion effect on those nominally insolvent banks (affected by the fire-
sale prices, although they do not participate in fire-sales), which are the extra banks
that simulated to fail compared to the shock-driven mechanism.
33The maximum number of banks to be triggered by each event is not necessarily equal to the number of
banks being vulnerable in each period. For example, bank A and bank B are triggered to fail by event
E1, while bank C is triggered to fail by event E2. Given that E1 and E2 are the only events that trigger
faillures in this period, the maximum number of banks to be triggered by each event is 2, while there
are 3 banks in total that are vulnerable in this period.
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Table 19: The simulation of actual bank failures by Furfine’s mechanism, the two
mechanisms of liquidity dry-up model, and the nominal insolvency









New Frontier Bank Yes
Silverton Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
San Diego National Bank Yes
Califonia National Bank Yes
Park National Bank Yes
United Commercial Bank Yes
Orion Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes




Broadway Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eurobank Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-G Premier Bank
of Puerto Rico Yes Yes Yes Yes
Frontier Bank Yes Yes
Premier Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hillcrest Bank Yes Yes Yes
Table 19 examines whether the contagion mechanisms can simulate the actual
bank failures. Note that the mechanisms are in general unable to incur the failure
of potentially liquid banks. However, due to the specification of the initial liquidity
impairment that imposed on the triggering banks in the shock-driven mechanism, the
exception of ANB Financial’s failure can be simulated.
The main reason is that ANB Financial’s cash account ($37 millions) is not much
larger than its interbank liabilities account ($22 millions), while the long-term assets it
can use for transforming into liquidity is $9.3 millions. In the 119000 (i.e. 1000(N− 1))
times of simulations, it is possible for the random initial liquidity shock τ to be bigger than
70%, making the bank’s cash account can only have 37× (1−70%)+9.3×0.9 = 19.47
million dollars at most, which can not afford a massl withdrawa from its creditor for over
90% of its interbank liabilities, which is 22× 90% = 19.8 million dollars. This is in fact
very unlikely to happen since there are only 83 simulations out of the 119000 times that
the ANB Financial fails. Nevertheless, the shock-driven mechanism still presents the
possibility for it to fail, while all the others cannot.
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Besides the exception of ANB Financial, the Hillcrest Bank has the problem of
being vulnerable to fire-sale, since its absorbing capital is only $3.6 millions while its
long-term asset holding is $180 millions. Both the shock-driven mechanism and the
anticipation-oriented mechanism can simulate the failure of this bank. From Table 19,
one can also see that the liquidity dry-up mechanisms and Furfine’s mechanism can
simulate all those actually-failed banks that are potentially illiquid. However, the
other actually-failed banks could also be simulated to be insolvent, if considering the
decrease in asset value by fire-sale and marking-to-market effect. This implies that
except for the direct interbank financial linkages (note that the determination process
of bank failure in both of my liquidity dry-up mechanisms also relies on this channel,
simlar to Furfine’s), there are other channels for financial contagion to spread through
the interbank network, or not relying on the network structure at all such as the effect
of fire-sales on the nominal value of assets.
7.3.2 Losses on Balance Sheet
This section examines the losses on balance sheet figures of the contagion simulations
for all the mechanisms. The loss measures are defined as below:
(1) Total assets, the same as defined in Section 6.1.2;
(2) Total equity, which is not necessarily equal to bank equity in terms of disclosure
requirement: total equity includes non-controlling interest in consolidated subsidiaries
since Q1 2009;
(3) Time deposits of less than $100,000;
(4) Deposits based on a certain reporting threshold, which is $100,000 before Q3 2009,
and $250,000 after Q3 2009;
(5) Private deposits, and;
(6) Private loans, assessing the impact to private sector.
Before examining the figures that exhibit the loss measures, the number of
predicted failures by Furfine’s illiquidity mechanism and the number of actual failures
that successfully predicted should be recalled in Table 16. The overestimation of
the number of banks failing inevitably causes overestimation in the loss measures,
especially before the crisis when there is no actual failure (restricted by the selection of
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the representing banking system). Figure 25 shows that the median of the simulated
losses by shock-driven mechanism reflects a close prediction to the reality depicted
by the light-blue curve, especially before Q3 2009 and Q1 2010, in which the direct
interbank linkage contagion fail to simulate the proper bank failures. One can also
see that, between Q1 2006 and Q3 2007, there is no actual loss because no bank is
disclosed to fail in the selected banking system (see Table 12 for the exact numbers of
disclosure).
Figure 26 shows the results for the three mechanisms and the actual failures.
During and after the crisis there are a few banks disclosed to fail by FDIC, and
the boxplots for the simulated losses are able to capture the actual losses within
their interquantile ranges (taken as 25% ∼ 75%). The green boxes are for the
anticipation-oriented mechanism, the blue boxes present the results for the shock-
driven mechanism, and the pink boxes in between stand for the Furfine’s mechanism.
One can see explicitly from these figures that, in general for each loss measure, the
shock-driven mechanism provides the most prudent prediction of losses, while the
anticipation-oriented mechanism gives the highest estimation.
Especially for Q3 2009 and Q1 2010, which have distinctly higher losses than other
periods, there were 6 actual failures for each, respectively. The interquantile box of
Furfine’s mechanism (even with the outliers) cannot simulate such a high loss, since
this mechanism can only find 1 and 3 actual bank failures for each period, but fails to
trigger the failure of some larger banks.
Unlike the Furfine’s mechanism, the anticipation-oriented mechanism which not
only considers illiquidity by interbank liabilities withdrawal but also the insolvency by
fire-sale, can predict those larger banks’ failures. One can see from Figure 26 that
in Q3 2009 and Q1 2010, although both the Furfine’s and the shock-driven fail to
replicate the actual losses, there are always some points in the 75% ∼ 100% quartile
of the anticipation-oriented’s results. The anticipation-oriented mechanism might have
overestimated the losses and the number of failed banks, especially considering the
nomial insolvency channel – unlike the Furfine’s mechanism which requires a large
bank with large positions in interbank assets/liabilities to trigger others’ failure in
liquidity/solvency, in the anticipation-oriented mechanism, even a small bank can trigger
a lot of small banks to fail via the fire-sale channel, since the banks are modelled to
follow the behaviour according to their sizes and liquidity/capital ratios, i.e. small banks
and large banks might be analogously contagious under this framework.
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(a) Total assets (b) Total equity
(c) Time deposit of less than $100,000 (d) Deposits based on a reporting threshold
(e) Private deposits (f) Loans to private sector
Figure 25: The loss measures in percentage, by shock-driven mechanism and FDIC-
disclosed failures. The light blue curve with squares are for losses on FDIC-disclosed
failed banks. The light green boxes are for shock-driven mechanism.
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(a) Total assets (b) Total equity
(c) Time deposit of less than $100,000 (d) Deposits based on a reporting threshold
(e) Private deposits (f) Loans to private sector
Figure 26: The loss measures in percentage, by Furfine’s mechanism, liquidity dry-up
mechanisms and FDIC-disclosed failures. The light blue curve with squares are for
losses on FDIC-disclosed failed banks. The pink boxes and red crosses are for losses
simulated by Furfine’s mechanism. The light green boxes are for anticipation-oriented
mechanism, and the blue boxes are for shock-driven mechanism.
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One problem left unsolved is the simulated instability of the banking system before
the crisis, which turned out to be stable until the crisis began. Looking back at Table 1,
both the amount and the ratio of cash hoarding has experienced a sharp increase
between Q1 2008−Q3 2008 and Q3 2008−Q1 2009, followed by the downturn trend of
interbank assets holding. Moreover, although the long-term assets holding increased
in size, the overall expansion of the market size in total assets before Q1 2009 (shown
in Figure 7(a)) still implies the fall in the long-term assets ratio between Q1 2007 and
Q3 2008. Acharya and Merrouche [2012] assert that “the liquidity demand of large
settlement banks experienced a 30% increase in the period immediately following
August 9 2007, the day when money markets froze, igniting the crisis”. All of these
conditions are reconciled with the rationale behind Malherbe [2014]’s high-liquidity
equilibrium before the crisis, and liquidity-freeze equilibrium that triggering the crisis.
To summarise this chapter, the interbank network samples including sparse
networks and dense networks are assessed by the contagion mechanism proposed
by Furfine [2003] and the contagion mechanisms that built on the liquidity dry-up model
proposed by Malherbe [2014]. Shown by the successfully predicted failures by each
mechanism in Table 19, direct interbank loans may not be the only channel to spread the
contagion of bank failures by illiquidity, while fire-sales should also be taken into account
in simulating insolvent banks. The stability of the system is assessed by the number
of predicted failures and the loss measures. The results show overestimation against
the reality before the crisis, which is could be due to the selection of data set, while
the liquidity dry-up model suggests an explanation of banks choosing to believe the
market to be liquid, until they find the liquidity hoarding has already been at such a high
level that no one will be willing to purchase their assets, and this anticipation of market
illiquidity leads to fire-sale that fuels the systemic crisis. The shock-driven mechanism
might have proposed some good simulation for systemic crisis losses, especially when
the system was anticipated to be stable: see Figure 25 for the comparison between
the actual loss curve and the median of the shock-driven loss measures for each
period. Considering the specification of this mechanism, the chance for banks with
initial liquidity shock to decide whether to perform fire-sale might have modelled the
participants’ belief in a highly-liquid market: if the bank is still liquid, it will not be
panicked to sell its long-term assets for liquidity at that moment, but rather to hold
it to maturity. In some cases, the anticipation-oriented mechanism, which considers
nominally insolvent banks to be on runs of interbank loans by their creditors, may
provide some better results in loss simulation (see Figure 26 for Q3 2009−Q1 2010).
158
8 Concluding Remarks
This thesis addresses the issue of risk assessment of an interbank market with
limited disclosure of bank information, with the simulation of contagions via one major
mechanism proposed in literature, and one novel model of market participants’ self-
fulfilling behaviour leading to market failure. The period prior, during and post the recent
subprime mortgage crisis is studied by the experiment mentioned above.
My main contribution includes the following: (1) constructing sparse interbank
networks from aggregated balance sheet data which are disclosed by Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to the public; (2) proving that dense network
reconstruction distorts the understanding of the network structure of interbank market,
since the difference in the network structure measures between sparse networks
and dense networks that reconstructed from the same dataset is material; (3) by
performing contagion simulations on the reconstructed interbank system from FDIC’s
dataset, with the mechanism proposed by Furfine [2003] and the liquidity dry-up model
proposed by Malherbe [2014], I find that Furfine’s mechanism and the ‘anticipation-
oriented’ mechanism that I specify from Malherbe’s model overestimate the losses that
the selected interbank system may suffer before the recent financial crisis, while the
other ‘shock-driven’ mechanism from the liquidity dry-up model can supplement the
simulations before the crisis.
Due to the limitation of data availability, banking networks are usually simulated
from those limited data rather than directly extracted from confidential data for detailed
bilateral trading. Reconstruction methodologies of interbank networks have been
introduced in Chapter 5, while this thesis adopts the sparse reconstruction technique,
‘message-passing algorithm’, whose application in reconstructing financial networks
is suggested by Mastromatteo et al. [2012]. The reconstruction results are tested for
power-law property that has been proved by literature as mentioned in Section 3.2
and examined by network measures such as assortativities and clustering coefficients
for comparison with the results in literature. Since the size of the interbank market
employed in this thesis is too small to avoid the finite sample-size bias, the dense
networks, which do not present a power-law pattern in their histogram of degree
distribution, also pass the test of power-law fit; yet the sparse networks still presents a
good fit of the power-law property. Moreover, I examine the distribution of assortativities
and clustering coefficients of the sparse networks and dense networks that generated
from the same datasets, and find that the two types of networks must be distinguished
from each other, since the difference in the distributions is too material to be ignored.
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The dataset mentioned above is extracted from FDIC’s SDI (Statistics on
Depository Institutions) data. The entire market is too big to reconstruct due to
computational constraints, so that I resize the market into a smaller one with banks
representing the original one with over 75% of market share in main features such as
total asset, and total interbank activities (including interbank lending and borrowing).
The resized interbank system has a similar trend of the number of failing banks in
each half a year comparing with the original interbank system, however, since the
number of banks that are possible to be failed by the contagion mechanism (mainly
Furfine’s) follows a generally decreasing trend overtime, the simulated contagions
cannot reproduce the loss level during the post-crisis time from the true bank failures
disclosed by FDIC. The triggering events, simulatenous failures for large banks, are
so uncommon in reality that the contagion simulations might have overestimated the
contagion effect. In addition, network density, which makes big difference in network
structure measures’ distribution, has nearly no impact on the results of contagions
with such extreme triggering events. This phenomenon that being contrast to the
stabilising effect of dense network that proposed by Iori et al. [2006] may be due to the
specification of the reconstruction technique, which is the message-passing algorithm,
in the fashion of restricting the volume of links to be added in each step during the
reconstruction, which is detailed in Section 5.3.
Although Malherbe [2014]’s liquidity dry-up model suggest that the higher liquidity
requirement may results in liquidity over-hoarding and finally a self-fulfilling liquidity
freeze, the results in this thesis imply that illiquidity should be equally concerned as
insolvency, which has already been addressed by Basel III by requiring higher quality of
liquid assets as well as higher ratio of capital buffer from 2015. In addition, Basel III has
pushed forward their attempts in the reform of macroprudential regulation, by focusing
on individual bank’s risk profile and the risk profile for an entire financial system. The
macroprudential regulation may be assessed by risk measures that taking into account
the network structure as suggested in Section 4.3, or the risk measures that indicated
by the outcome of contagion simulations such as simple loss measures for balance
sheet items that adopted in Section 7.3.2.
Moreover, for studying the network structure of interbank market, reconstruction
techniques for sparse networks should be more preferable than those for dense
networks, while for the prediction of bank failures, the improvement from dense network
to sparse network may vary by the specification of dataset. The baseline of the
prediction using Furfine’s mechanism (although the direct linkage channel is not the
only one to be considered, shown in the thesis) might be the contagion on a maximally-
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connected network, which can be easily obtained from estimation. Since in this case
all the banks are assumed to diversify their risk evenly to all the others in the system,
therefore, if a bank is still vulnerable in a maximally-connected network, it should be
noticed by the regulators.
There are two main limitations in my research, which might have led to the
overestimation of systemic risk before the crisis and the underestimation after the
crisis, in terms of number of simulated failures and the losses on balance sheet items.
The first one is the specification of the dataset. For the period Q1 2006−Q3 2010,
there are 7761 to 8790 banks recorded in the Statistics on Depository Institutions by
FDIC. However, due to the computational constraints, I resize the banking system by
selecting no more than 150 banks to represent them. Although the selected banks
represent 75%∼85% of the total assets and around 90% of the interbank assets of the
entire system, the remaining banks being joint as one huge unit as a ‘sink’ to absorb
every interbank activities from the selected banks may cause a problem. This sink unit
possesses around 30% of the interbank liabilities in the entire system, in other words,
during the reconstruction of interbank networks, this sink unit is very likely to absorb
a high proportion of interbank assets from the selected banks, impairing those banks’
capability of lending to each other. This results in the rareness of insolvency in the
contagion simulations for Furfine’s mechanism, and might have hidden a part of bank
failures via this contagion channel.
The second limitation is the simplification of the contagion model. On one hand,
a default process of a bank may take years to be completed, but in the contagion
model this is usually assumed to be finished instantly. The impact from the change of
market prices is also modelled as the only chance for fire-sale, after which the liquidity
market is frozen. This might have simplified the contagious losses on the solvency
side. On the other hand, although the banks that were protected from TARP has been
considered, there is no other mechanisms that can protect banks from failures, such
as central banks injecting liquidity, or bailing-out banks in financial distress. The fire-
sale for liquidity can also be run for one round in the liquidity dry-up model, implying
that the banks must make a decision whether to go for fire-sale or to keep themselves
hidden from being ‘of low-quality’, before they face with illiquidity. These might have
led to overestimation of failures. Moreover, the loss given default, which can vary the
contagion outcomes materially, is simply set to 100% globally for all the banks, which
may have caused the overestimation.
Many extensions could be done in future work in response to these limitations.
Firstly, improvement in the computation time can allow for more selected banks for
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representation, hence the sink unit’s market share of interbank liabilities will be smaller,
and the contagion effect of insolvency in interbank lending may be revealed more
easily. Secondly, since the results show the gap between the reality and the prediction
by Furfine’s mechanism and the supplementary prediction of bank failures by the
nominally insolvency from fire-sale show, there could be more contagion effects other
than interbank loans and fire-sale. Extending the model in the dimension of contagion
channels may help dynamically capturing a more complete picture of the contagion
effects, e.g. incorporating other risk models such as market risk or information risk
as a variable that affects all the participants in the contagion process by altering their
profiles by time. The nature of multilayer of banking network shall also be considered.
For instance, interbank loan is not the only financing tool; banks may in the meanwhile
seek financing opportunities in other markets such as credit derivatives or repos. The
network structure for these markets may be different for the same system, therefore a
‘safe’ bank in the interbank loan market may be found ‘vulnerable’ in the repo market,
and the bank may be overall in distress while the risk aggregates from the two markets.
Loss given default can also be properly modelled to help better predicting the loss that
a bank may suffer in the contagion, and hence predicting whether a bank is possible to
fail in such a network structure. The type of assets (specifically as the items in datasets)
may also be carefully chosen for fire-sale, in order to reflect the potential of a bank to
save itself from illiquidity by fire-sales while maintaining its solvency. Additionally, the
reconstruction techniques and contagion mechanisms can be performed on different
datasets, for verifying the use of them in predicting bank failures. The problems in the
FDIC dataset may not be the same for other markets, and Furfine’s mechanism on the




Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A. E. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A. [2015], ‘Systemic risk in endoge-
nous financial networks’, Available at SSRN 2553900 .
Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A. [2013], Systemic risk and stability in
financial networks, Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Acharya, V. V. [2009], ‘A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regula-
tion’, Journal of financial stability 5(3), 224–255.
Acharya, V. V., Cooley, T. F., Richardson, M. P. and Walter, I. [2011], ‘Market failures
and regulatory failures: Lessons from past and present financial crises’.
Acharya, V. V., Gale, D. and Yorulmazer, T. [2011], ‘Rollover risk and market freezes’,
The Journal of Finance 66(4), 1177–1209.
Acharya, V. V. and Merrouche, O. [2012], ‘Precautionary hoarding of liquidity and inter-
bank markets: Evidence from the subprime crisis’, Review of Finance p. rfs022.
Acharya, V. V., Pedersen, L. H., Philippon, T., Richardson, M. et al. [2012], Measuring
systemic risk, World Scientific.
Acharya, V. V. and Viswanathan, S. [2011], ‘Leverage, moral hazard, and liquidity’, The
Journal of Finance 66(1), 99–138.
Acharya, V. V. and Yorulmazer, T. [2003], ‘Information contagion and inter-bank corre-
lation in a theory of systemic risk’.
Adalet, M. [2005], ‘Fundamentals, capital flows and capital flight: The german banking
crisis of 1931’, Department of Economics 549, 94720–3880.
Aghion, P., Bolton, P. and Dewatripont, M. [2000], ‘Contagious bank failures in a free
banking system’, European Economic Review 44(4), 713–718.
Aharony, J. and Swary, I. [1996], ‘Additional evidence on the information-based conta-
gion effects of bank failures’, Journal of Banking & Finance 20(1), 57–69.
Akerlof, G. [1970], ‘The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mecha-
nism1’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 89.
Allen, F. and Gale, D. [2000], ‘Financial contagion’, Journal of political economy
108(1), 1–33.
163
Amundsen, E. and Arnt, H. [2005], Contagion risk in the danish interbank market, Tech-
nical report, Danmarks Nationalbank Working Papers.
Anand, K., Craig, B. and Von Peter, G. [2015], ‘Filling in the blanks: Network structure
and interbank contagion’, Quantitative Finance 15(4), 625–636.
Aoyama, H., Battiston, S. and Fujiwara, Y. [2012], ‘Debtrank analysis of the japanese
credit network’, IDEAS repec 2011.
Arias, M., Mendoza, J. C. and Pe´rez-Reyna, D. [2010], ‘Applying cov ar to measure
systemic market risk: the colombian case’, IFC Bulletin 34, 351–364.
Babus, A. [2013], ‘The formation of financial networks’.
Bacharach, M. [1965], ‘Estimating nonnegative matrices from marginal data’, Interna-
tional Economic Review 6(3), 294–310.
Bae, K.-H., Karolyi, G. A. and Stulz, R. M. [2003], ‘A new approach to measuring finan-
cial contagion’, Review of Financial studies 16(3), 717–763.
Baig, M. T. and Goldfajn, M. I. [1998], Financial market contagion in the Asian crisis,
number 98-155, International Monetary Fund.
Balderston, T. [1994], ‘The banks and the gold standard in the german financial crisis
of 1931’, Financial history review 1(01), 43–68.
Baraba´si, A.-L., Albert, R. and Jeong, H. [1999], ‘Mean-field theory for scale-free ran-
dom networks’, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 272(1), 173–
187.
Bargigli, L., Di Iasio, G., Infante, L., Lillo, F. and Pierobon, F. [2015], ‘The multiplex
structure of interbank networks’, Quantitative Finance 15(4), 673–691.
Battiston, S., Gatti, D. D., Gallegati, M., Greenwald, B. and Stiglitz, J. E. [2007], ‘Credit
chains and bankruptcy propagation in production networks’, Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 31(6), 2061–2084.
Battiston, S., Gatti, D. D., Gallegati, M., Greenwald, B. and Stiglitz, J. E. [2012], ‘Li-
aisons dangereuses: Increasing connectivity, risk sharing, and systemic risk’, Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control 36(8), 1121–1141.
Battiston, S., Glattfelder, J. B., Garlaschelli, D., Lillo, F. and Caldarelli, G. [2010], The
structure of financial networks, in ‘Network Science’, Springer, pp. 131–163.
164
Battiston, S., Puliga, M., Kaushik, R., Tasca, P. and Caldarelli, G. [2012], ‘Debtrank:
Too central to fail? financial networks, the fed and systemic risk’, Scientific reports 2.
Bech, M. L. and Atalay, E. [2010], ‘The topology of the federal funds market’, Physica
A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 389(22), 5223–5246.
Becher, C., Millard, S. and Soramaki, K. [2008], ‘The network topology of chaps ster-
ling’.
Benmelech, E. and Bergman, N. K. [2011], ‘Bankruptcy and the collateral channel’, The
Journal of Finance 66(2), 337–378.
Benston, G. J. and Kaufman, G. G. [1988], Risk and solvency regulation of deposi-
tory institutions: past policies and current options, Technical report, Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago.
Bernardi, M., Gayraud, G. and Petrella, L. [2013], ‘Bayesian inference for covar’, arXiv
preprint arXiv:1306.2834 .
Bertsch, C. [2013], ‘A detrimental feedback loop: deleveraging and adverse selection’,
Riksbank Research Paper Series (108).
Bhattacharya, S., Boot, A. W. and Thakor, A. V. [1998], ‘The economics of bank regula-
tion’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking pp. 745–770.
Boissay, F. [2011], ‘Financial imbalances and financial fragility’, Available at SSRN
1731570 .
Bord, V. and Santos, J. A. [2012], ‘The rise of the originate-to-distribute model and the
role of banks in financial intermediation’, Economic Policy Review 18(2), 21–34.
Borgatti, S. P. and Everett, M. G. [2000], ‘Models of core/periphery structures’, Social
networks 21(4), 375–395.
Born, K. E. [1967], Die deutsche Bankenkrise 1931, Piper.
Boss, M., Elsinger, H., Summer, M. and Thurner, S. [2004], ‘Network topology of the
interbank market’, Quantitative Finance 4(6), 677–684.
Boss, M., Krenn, G., Puhr, C. and Summer, M. [2006], ‘Systemic risk monitor: A model
for systemic risk analysis and stress testing of banking systems’, Financial Stability
Report 11, 83–95.
Boss, M., Summer, M. and Thurner, S. [2004], Contagion flow through banking net-
works, in ‘Computational Science-ICCS 2004’, Springer, pp. 1070–1077.
165
Bramoulle´, Y. and Kranton, R. [2007], ‘Public goods in networks’, Journal of Economic
Theory 135(1), 478–494.
Brunnermeier, M. and Adrian, T. [2009], ‘Covar’, Staff Reports, Federal Reserve Bank
of New York .
Brunnermeier, M. K. [2008], Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007-08, Tech-
nical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Brunnermeier, M. K. and Oehmke, M. [2012], Bubbles, financial crises, and systemic
risk, Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Brunnermeier, M. K. and Pedersen, L. H. [2009], ‘Market liquidity and funding liquidity’,
Review of Financial studies 22(6), 2201–2238.
Bryant, J. [1980], ‘A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance’, Journal of
banking & finance 4(4), 335–344.
Caldarelli, G., Capocci, A., De Los Rios, P. and Munoz, M. A. [2002], ‘Scale-free net-
works from varying vertex intrinsic fitness’, Physical review letters 89(25), 258702.
Calomiris, C. W. and Kahn, C. M. [1991], ‘The role of demandable debt in structuring
optimal banking arrangements’, The American Economic Review pp. 497–513.
Canedo, J. M. D. and Jaramillo, S. M. [2009], ‘A network model of systemic risk: stress
testing the banking system1’, Intelligent systems in accounting, finance and manage-
ment 16(1-2), 87–110.
Cao, Z. [2013], ‘Multi-covar and shapley value: A systemic risk measure’, Banq. France
Work. Pap .
Cebenoyan, A. S., Cooperman, E. S. and Register, C. A. [1993], ‘Firm efficiency and
the regulatory closure of s&ls: an empirical investigation’, The Review of Economics
and Statistics pp. 540–545.
Cetorelli, N., Mandel, B. H., Mollineaux, L. et al. [2012], ‘The evolution of banks and
financial intermediation: framing the analysis’, Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Economic Policy Review 18(2), 1–12.
Chakrabarti, R. and Roll, R. [2002], ‘East asia and europe during the 1997 asian col-
lapse: a clinical study of a financial crisis’, Journal of Financial Markets 5(1), 1–30.
Chang, R. and Velasco, A. [2001], ‘A model of financial crises in emerging markets’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics pp. 489–517.
166
Chari, V. V. and Jagannathan, R. [1988], ‘Banking panics, information, and rational
expectations equilibrium’, Journal of Finance pp. 749–761.
Chen, C., Iyengar, G. and Moallemi, C. C. [2013], ‘An axiomatic approach to systemic
risk’, Management Science 59(6), 1373–1388.
Chen, K.-H. and Khashanah, K. [2014], ‘Measuring systemic risk: copula covar’, Avail-
able at SSRN 2473648 .
Chen, Y. [1999], ‘Banking panics: The role of the first-come, first-served rule and infor-
mation externalities’, Journal of Political Economy 107(5), 946–968.
Christopoulos, A. G., Mylonakis, J. and Diktapanidis, P. [2011], ‘Could lehman brothers
collapse be anticipated? an examination using camels rating system’, International
Business Research 4(2), p11.
Cifuentes, R., Ferrucci, G. and Shin, H. S. [2005], ‘Liquidity risk and contagion’.
Clement, P. [2010], ‘The term’macroprudential’: origins and evolution’, BIS Quarterly
Review, March .
Cocco, J. F., Gomes, F. J. and Martins, N. C. [2009], ‘Lending relationships in the inter-
bank market’, Journal of Financial Intermediation 18(1), 24–48.
Committee, B. et al. [2010], ‘Basel iii: A global regulatory framework for more resilient
banks and banking systems’, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel .
Committee, B. et al. [2013], ‘Basel iii: The liquidity coverage ratio and liquidity risk
monitoring tools’.
Cont, R., Moussa, A. et al. [2010], ‘Network structure and systemic risk in banking
systems’, Edson Bastos e, Network Structure and Systemic Risk in Banking Systems
(December 1, 2010) .
Cordell, L. R. and King, K. K. [1995], ‘A market evaluation of the risk-based capital
standards for the us financial system’, Journal of Banking & Finance 19(3), 531–562.
Corsetti, G., Pericoli, M. and Sbracia, M. [2005], ‘’some contagion, some interdepen-
dence’: More pitfalls in tests of financial contagion’, Journal of International Money
and Finance 24(8), 1177–1199.
Covitz, D. M., Liang, N. and Suarez, G. A. [2009], The evolution of a financial crisis:
Panic in the asset-backed commercial paper market, Division of Research & Statistics
and Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board.
167
Craig, B. and Von Peter, G. [2014], ‘Interbank tiering and money center banks’, Journal
of Financial Intermediation 23(3), 322–347.
Curry, T. and Shibut, L. [2000], ‘The cost of the savings and loan crisis: truth and
consequences’, FDIC Banking Review 13(2), 26–35.
Danielsson, J., Embrechts, P., Goodhart, C., Keating, C., Muennich, F., Renault, O.,
Shin, H. S. et al. [2001], ‘An academic response to basel ii’.
De Masi, G., Iori, G. and Caldarelli, G. [2006], ‘Fitness model for the italian interbank
money market’, Physical Review E 74(6), 066112.
De Nicolo, G. and Kwast, M. L. [2002], ‘Systemic risk and financial consolidation: Are
they related?’, Journal of Banking & Finance 26(5), 861–880.
Degryse, H. and Nguyen, G. [2007], ‘Interbank exposures: An empirical examination of
contagion risk in the belgian banking system’, International Journal of Central Bank-
ing 3(2), 123–171.
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, A. and Detragiache, E. [2005], ‘Cross-country empirical studies of sys-
temic bank distress: a survey’, National Institute Economic Review 192(1), 68–83.
Diamond, D. W. [2007], ‘Banks and liquidity creation: a simple exposition of the
diamond-dybvig model’, FRB Richmond Economic Quarterly 93(2), 189–200.
Diamond, D. W. and Dybvig, P. H. [1983], ‘Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity’,
The journal of political economy pp. 401–419.
Diamond, D. W. and Rajan, R. G. [1999], Liquidity risk, liquidity creation and financial
fragility: A theory of banking, Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Re-
search.
Docking, D. S., Hirschey, M. and Jones, E. [1997], ‘Information and contagion effects of
bank loan-loss reserve announcements’, Journal of Financial Economics 43(2), 219–
239.
Dong, F., Miao, J. and Wang, P. [2015], ‘The perils of credit booms’. [Accessed: Febru-
ary 18 2016].
URL: http://people.bu.edu/miaoj/DMW10.pdf
Dow, J. and Han, J. [2015], ‘The paradox of financial fire sales’, Available at SSRN
2578626 .
168
e Santos, E. B., Cont, R. et al. [2010], The brazilian interbank network structure and
systemic risk, Technical report.
Eisenberg, L. and Noe, T. H. [2001], ‘Systemic risk in financial systems’, Management
Science 47(2), 236–249.
Elsinger, H., Lehar, A. and Summer, M. [2006], ‘Risk assessment for banking systems’,
Management science 52(9), 1301–1314.
Englund, P. [1999], ‘The swedish banking crisis: roots and consequences’, Oxford re-
view of economic policy 15(3), 80–97.
Erdo¨s, P. and Re´nyi, A. [1960], ‘On the evolution of random graphs’, Publ. Math. Inst.
Hungar. Acad. Sci 5, 17–61.
Fagiolo, G. [2007], ‘Clustering in complex directed networks’, Physical Review E
76(2), 026107.
FDIC [2015], ‘Definitions of variables of the FDIC SDI database’. [Accessed: Septem-
ber 01 2015].
URL: https://www5.fdic.gov/sdi/main.asp
Felsenfeld, C. [1990], ‘Savings and loan crisis, the’, Fordham L. Rev. S7 59.
Ferguson, T. and Temin, P. [2003], ‘Made in germany: the german currency crisis of july
1931’, Research in Economic History 21, 1–54.
Ferguson, T. and Temin, P. [2004], ‘Comment on ”the german twin crisis of 1931”’, The
Journal of Economic History 64(03), 872–876.
Finger, K. and Lux, T. [2014], Friendship between banks: An application of an actor-
oriented model of network formation on interbank credit relations, Technical report,
Kiel Working Paper.
Fisher, I. [2006], The Purchasing Power of Money: Its’ Determination And Relation to
Credit Interest And Crises, Cosimo, Inc.
Fishman, M. J. and Parker, J. A. [2015], ‘Valuation, adverse selection, and market col-
lapses’, Review of Financial Studies 28(9), 2575–2607.
Foster, J. G., Foster, D. V., Grassberger, P. and Paczuski, M. [2010], ‘Edge direction
and the structure of networks’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
107(24), 10815–10820.
169
Fredrickson, G. [2013], The equilibrium theory of inhomogeneous polymers (interna-
tional series of monographs on physics), Oxford University Press.
Freeman, L. C. [1977], ‘A set of measures of centrality based on betweenness’, So-
ciometry pp. 35–41.
Fricke, D. and Lux, T. [2012], ‘Core–periphery structure in the overnight money market:
evidence from the e-mid trading platform’, Computational Economics 45(3), 359–395.
Friedman, M. and Schwartz, A. J. [2008], A monetary history of the United States,
1867-1960, Princeton University Press.
Furfine, C. H. [2003], ‘Interbank exposures: Quantifying the risk of contagion’, Journal
of money, credit and banking pp. 111–128.
Gai, P. and Kapadia, S. [2010a], Contagion in financial networks, in ‘Proceedings of the
Royal Society of London A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences’, The
Royal Society, p. rspa20090410.
Gai, P. and Kapadia, S. [2010b], Liquidity hoarding, network externalities, and interbank
market collapse, in ‘Proc. R. Soc. A’, Vol. 466, p. 439.
Galati, G. and Moessner, R. [2013], ‘Macroprudential policy–a literature review’, Journal
of Economic Surveys 27(5), 846–878.
Gale, D. and Yorulmazer, T. [2013], ‘Liquidity hoarding’, Theoretical Economics
8(2), 291–324.
Galeotti, A., Goyal, S., Jackson, M. O., Vega-Redondo, F. and Yariv, L. [2010], ‘Network
games’, The review of economic studies 77(1), 218–244.
Georg, C.-P. [2013], ‘The effect of the interbank network structure on contagion and
common shocks’, Journal of Banking & Finance 37(7), 2216–2228.
Gilles, R. P. and Sarangi, S. [2010], ‘Network formation under mutual consent and costly
communication’, Mathematical social sciences 60(3), 181–185.
Girardi, G. and Ergu¨n, A. T. [2013], ‘Systemic risk measurement: Multivariate garch
estimation of covar’, Journal of Banking & Finance 37(8), 3169–3180.
Gorton, G. [1988], ‘Banking panics and business cycles’, Oxford economic papers
pp. 751–781.
Gorton, G. B. [2008], The panic of 2007, Technical report, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
170
Gorton, G. and Metrick, A. [2012], ‘Securitized banking and the run on repo’, Journal of
Financial economics 104(3), 425–451.
Gorton, G., Metrick, A., Shleifer, A. and Tarullo, D. K. [2010], ‘Regulating the shadow
banking system [with comments and discussion]’, Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity pp. 261–312.
Goyal, S. [2002], Learning in networks, Springer.
Gropp, R., Lo Duca, M. and Vesala, J. M. [2006], ‘Cross-border bank contagion in
europe’.
Gros, D. and Alcidi, C. [2010], ‘The impact of the financial crisis on the real economy’,
Intereconomics 45(1), 4–20.
Groth, D. and Skandier, T. [2005], ‘Network+ study guide, fourth edition’. sybex’, Inc..
ISBN 0-7821-4406-3 .
Gu, C. [2011], ‘Herding and bank runs’, Journal of Economic Theory 146(1), 163–188.
Hahm, J.-h., Shin, H. S. and Shin, K. [2013], ‘Noncore bank liabilities and financial
vulnerability’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 45(s1), 3–36.
Hakwa, B. [2011], ‘Measuring the marginal systemic risk contribution using copula’,
Available at SSRN 1934894 .
Haldane, A. G. and May, R. M. [2011], ‘Systemic risk in banking ecosystems’, Nature
469(7330), 351–355.
Haldane, A. G. et al. [2009], ‘Rethinking the financial network’, Speech delivered at the
Financial Student Association, Amsterdam, April pp. 1–26.
Hannoun, H. [2010], ‘The basel iii capital framework: a decisive breakthrough’, discurso
pronunciado en el seminario de alto nivel BoJ-BIS Financial Regulatory Reform: Im-
plications for Asia and the Pacific, www. bis. org/speeches/sp101125a. pdf .
Hanson, S. G., Kashyap, A. K. and Stein, J. C. [2010], ‘A macroprudential approach to
financial regulation’, Chicago Booth Research Paper (10-29).
Hardach, G. [1976], Weltmarktorientierung und relative Stagnation, Vol. 27, Duncker
und Humblot.
Haubrich, J. G. [1988], ‘Optimal financial structure in exchange economies’, Interna-
tional Economic Review pp. 217–235.
171
He, Z. and Xiong, W. [2012], ‘Rollover risk and credit risk’, The Journal of Finance
67(2), 391–430.
Heath, D., Delbaen, F., Eber, J. and Artzner, P. [1999], ‘Coherent measures of risk’,
Mathematical Finance 9, 203–228.
Heider, F., Hoerova, M. and Holthausen, C. [2009], ‘Liquidity hoarding and interbank
market spreads: The role of counterparty risk’.
Heider, F., Hoerova, M. and Holthausen, C. [2015], ‘Liquidity hoarding and inter-
bank market rates: The role of counterparty risk’, Journal of Financial Economics
118(2), 336–354.
Hellwig, M. F. [2009], ‘Systemic risk in the financial sector: An analysis of the subprime-
mortgage financial crisis’, De Economist 157(2), 129–207.
Hirshleifer, D. and Hong Teoh, S. [2003], ‘Herd behaviour and cascading in capital
markets: A review and synthesis’, European Financial Management 9(1), 25–66.
Holmstrom, B. and Tirole, J. [1997], ‘Financial intermediation, loanable funds, and the
real sector’, the Quarterly Journal of economics pp. 663–691.
Ho¨rdahl, P. and King, M. R. [2008], ‘Developments in repo markets during the financial
turmoil’, BIS Quarterly, December .
House, C. L. and Masatlioglu, Y. [2010], Managing markets for toxic assets, Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hurd, T. R. and Gleeson, J. P. [2011], ‘A framework for analyzing contagion in banking
networks’, Available at SSRN 1945748 .
Iazzetta, C. and Manna, M. [2009], ‘The topology of the interbank market: developments
in italy since 1990’, Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No 711.
IMF [2009], Global financial stability report: Responding to the financial crisis and mea-
suring systemic risk, Technical report, International Monetary Fund.
Inaoka, H., Takayasu, H., Shimizu, T., Ninomiya, T. and Taniguchi, K. [2004], ‘Self-
similarity of banking network’, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
339(3), 621–634.
In’t Veld, D. L., Van der Leij, M. and Hommes, C. [2014], ‘The formation of a core
periphery structure in heterogeneous financial networks’.
172
Iori, G., De Masi, G., Precup, O. V., Gabbi, G. and Caldarelli, G. [2008], ‘A network
analysis of the italian overnight money market’, Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control 32(1), 259–278.
Iori, G., Jafarey, S. and Padilla, F. G. [2006], ‘Systemic risk on the interbank market’,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 61(4), 525–542.
Iyer, R. and Peydro´-Alcalde, J. L. [2005], Interbank contagion: Evidence from real trans-
actions, Mimeo. Presented at the 4th Joint Central Bank Research Conference on
Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk, November.
Jacklin, C. J. [1987], ‘Demand deposits, trading restrictions, and risk sharing’, Contrac-
tual arrangements for intertemporal trade 1.
Jackson, M. O. and Wolinsky, A. [1996], ‘A strategic model of social and economic
networks’, Journal of economic theory 71(1), 44–74.
Jaeger-Ambrozewicz, M. [2013], ‘A critical note on delta-covar’, Available at SSRN
2210045 .
Jang, B.-G., Lee, S. and Park, S. [2014], ‘Liquidity crashes and robust portfolio man-
agement’, Available at SSRN 2406563 .
Jaynes, E. T. [1957], ‘Information theory and statistical mechanics’, Physical review
106(4), 620.
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. [1976], ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure’, Journal of financial economics 3(4), 305–
360.
Kaiser, M. [2008], ‘Mean clustering coefficients: the role of isolated nodes and
leafs on clustering measures for small-world networks’, New Journal of Physics
10(8), 083042.
Katz, L. [1953], ‘A new status index derived from sociometric analysis’, Psychometrika
18(1), 39–43.
Kaufman, G. G. [2000], ‘Banking and currency crises and systemic risk: Lessons from
recent events’, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives 24(3), 9–
28.
Kaufman, G. G. and Bank, N. [2000], Banking and currency crises and systemic risk:
A taxonomy and review, Citeseer.
173
Kaufman, G. G. and Scott, K. E. [2003], ‘What is systemic risk, and do bank regulators
retard or contribute to it?’, Independent Review 7(3), 371–391.
Kleinberg, J. M. [1999], ‘Authoritative sources in a hyperlinked environment’, Journal of
the ACM (JACM) 46(5), 604–632.
Krause, A. and Giansante, S. [2012], ‘Interbank lending and the spread of bank failures:
A network model of systemic risk’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
83(3), 583–608.
Kuong, J. C.-F. [2014], ‘Self-fulfilling fire sales: Fragility of collateralised short-term debt
markets’, Available at SSRN 2506661 .
Leo´n, C., Machado, C. L. and Sarmiento, M. [2014], ‘Identifying central bank liquidity
super-spreaders in interbank funds networks’, Available at SSRN 2413056 .
Li, S. and He, J. [2012], ‘Fitness model for tiered structure in the interbank market’,
Complexity 17(5), 37–43.
Li, S., He, J. and Zhuang, Y. [2010], Directed and weighted network models of the inter-
bank market, in ‘Networking and Digital Society (ICNDS), 2010 2nd International
Conference on’, Vol. 1, IEEE, pp. 164–166.
Lublo´y, A´. [2005], ‘Domino effect in the hungarian interbank market’, Hungarian Eco-
nomic Review 52(4), 377–401.
Mainik, G. and Schaanning, E. [2014], ‘On dependence consistency of covar and some
other systemic risk measures’, Statistics & Risk Modeling 31(1), 49–77.
Malherbe, F. [2014], ‘Self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups’, The Journal of Finance 69(2), 947–
970.
Margavio, G. W. [1993], ‘The savings and loan debacle: The culmination of three
decades of conflicting regulation, deregulation, and re-regulation’, The Accounting
Historians Journal pp. 1–32.
Markose, M. S. M. [2012], Systemic risk from global financial derivatives: A network
analysis of contagion and its mitigation with super-spreader tax, number 12-282, In-
ternational Monetary Fund.
Markose, S. M., Giansante, S., Gatkowski, M. and Shaghaghi, A. R. [2010], ‘Too inter-
connected to fail: Financial contagion and systemic risk in network model of cds and
other credit enhancement obligations of us banks’.
174
Martinez-Jaramillo, S., Alexandrova-Kabadjova, B., Bravo-Benitez, B. and Solo´rzano-
Margain, J. P. [2014], ‘An empirical study of the mexican banking system’s network
and its implications for systemic risk’, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
40, 242–265.
Mashal, R. and Zeevi, A. [2002], ‘Beyond correlation: Extreme co-movements between
financial assets’, Unpublished, Columbia University .
Mastromatteo, I., Zarinelli, E. and Marsili, M. [2012], ‘Reconstruction of financial net-
works for robust estimation of systemic risk’, Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory
and Experiment 2012(03), P03011.
May, R. M. and Arinaminpathy, N. [2010], ‘Systemic risk: the dynamics of model banking
systems’, Journal of the Royal Society Interface 7(46), 823–838.
May, R. M., Levin, S. A. and Sugihara, G. [2008], ‘Complex systems: Ecology for
bankers’, Nature 451(7181), 893–895.
Merton, R. C. [1977], ‘An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan
guarantees an application of modern option pricing theory’, Journal of Banking &
Finance 1(1), 3–11.
Mester, L. J. [1987], ‘A multiproduct cost study of savings and loans’, Journal of Finance
pp. 423–445.
Mester, L. J. [1991], ‘Agency costs among savings and loans’, Journal of Financial
Intermediation 1(3), 257–278.
Mester, L. J. [1993], ‘Efficiency in the savings and loan industry’, Journal of Banking &
Finance 17(2), 267–286.
Mistrulli, P. E. [2011], ‘Assessing financial contagion in the interbank market: Maximum
entropy versus observed interbank lending patterns’, Journal of Banking & Finance
35(5), 1114–1127.
Mitra, J., Yu, P. and Pan, D. Z. [2005], Radar: Ret-aware detailed routing using
fast lithography simulations, in ‘Design Automation Conference, 2005. Proceedings.
42nd’, IEEE, pp. 369–372.
Moe, T. G., Solheim, J. A. and Vale, B. [2004], The Norwegian banking crisis, Norges
Bank Oslo.
Moore, J. [2013], ‘Contagious illiquidity i: Contagion through time’.
175
Moreno, Y., Go´mez, J. B. and Pacheco, A. F. [2003], ‘Epidemic incidence in correlated
complex networks’, Physical Review E 68(3), 035103.
Mu¨ller, J. [2006], ‘Interbank credit lines as a channel of contagion’, Journal of Financial
Services Research 29(1), 37–60.
Nakamura, L. I. [1990], ‘Closing troubled financial institutions: what are the issues?’,
Business Review (May), 15–24.
Newman, M. [2010], Networks: an introduction, Oxford University Press.
Newman, M. E. [2003], ‘Mixing patterns in networks’, Physical Review E 67(2), 026126.
Nier, E., Yang, J., Yorulmazer, T. and Alentorn, A. [2007], ‘Network models and financial
stability’, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31(6), 2033–2060.
O’Connor, J. F. T. [1938], The banking crisis and recovery under the Roosevelt admin-
istration, Callaghan.
Ojo, M. [2014], ‘Basel iii and responding to the recent financial crisis: progress made by
the basel committee in relation to the need for increased bank capital and increased
quality of loss absorbing capital’.
Page, L., Brin, S., Motwani, R. and Winograd, T. [1999], ‘The pagerank citation ranking:
bringing order to the web.’.
Pazarbas¸iog˘lu, C. [1997], ‘A credit crunch? finland in the aftermath of the banking
crisis’, Staff Papers-International Monetary Fund pp. 315–327.
Perotti, E. C. and Suarez, J. [2002], ‘Last bank standing: What do i gain if you fail?’,
European Economic Review 46(9), 1599–1622.
Pozsar, Z., Adrian, T., Ashcraft, A. B. and Boesky, H. [2010], ‘Shadow banking’, Avail-
able at SSRN 1640545 .
Pushkin, D. O. and Aref, H. [2004], ‘Bank mergers as scale-free coagulation’, Physica
A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 336(3), 571–584.
Repullo, R. and Saurina Salas, J. [2011], ‘The countercyclical capital buffer of basel iii:
A critical assessment’.
Rochet, J.-C. and Tirole, J. [1996], ‘Interbank lending and systemic risk’, Journal of
Money, credit and Banking pp. 733–762.
176
Rørdam, K. B., Bech, M. L. et al. [2009], ‘The topology of danish interbank money
flows’, Banks and Bank Systems 4, 48–65.
Rosato, J. F. [2010], ‘Down the road to perdition: How the flaws of basel ii led to the
collapse of bear stearns and lehman brothers’, Conn. Ins. LJ 17, 475.
Roukny, T., Georg, C.-P. and Battiston, S. [2014], A network analysis of the evolution
of the german interbank market, number 22/2014, Discussion Paper, Deutsche Bun-
desbank.
Sandal, K. [2004], ‘The nordic banking crises in the early 1990s–resolution methods
and fiscal costs’, The Norwegian banking crisis 33, 77–111.
Schnabel, I. [2004], ‘The german twin crisis of 1931’, The Journal of Economic History
64(03), 822–871.
Schnabel, I. [2009], ‘The role of liquidity and implicit guarantees in the german twin
crisis of 1931’, Journal of International Money and Finance 28(1), 1–25.
Schwierz, C. [2004], ‘Economic costs associated with the nordic banking crises’, The
Norwegian banking crisis p. 117.
Seeley, J. R. [1949], ‘The net of reciprocal influence; a problem in treating sociometric
data.’, Canadian Journal of Psychology Revue Canadienne de Psychologie (3), 234–
240.
Shin, H. S. [2009], ‘Reflections on northern rock: the bank run that heralded the global
financial crisis’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives pp. 101–120.
Shin, H. S. [2011], ‘Macroprudential policies beyond basel iii’, BIS papers 1, 5.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. [1992], ‘Liquidation values and debt capacity: A market
equilibrium approach’, The Journal of Finance 47(4), 1343–1366.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. [2010], Fire sales in finance and macroeconomics, Tech-
nical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Snijders, T. A. [1996], ‘Stochastic actor-oriented models for network change’, Journal
of mathematical sociology 21(1-2), 149–172.
Sorama¨ki, K., Bech, M. L., Arnold, J., Glass, R. J. and Beyeler, W. E. [2007], ‘The topol-
ogy of interbank payment flows’, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
379(1), 317–333.
177
Steigum, E. [2004], ‘Financial deregulation with a fixed exchange rate: Lessons from
norways boombust cycle and banking crisis’, The Norwegian banking crisis pp. 23–
75.
Sui, P. [2012], Essays on financial networks, systemic risk and policy, PhD thesis, Uni-
versity of Warwick.
Tabak, B. M., Takami, M., Rocha, J. M., Cajueiro, D. O. and Souza, S. R. [2014], ‘Di-
rected clustering coefficient as a measure of systemic risk in complex banking net-
works’, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 394, 211–216.
Taylor, J. B. [1993], Discretion versus policy rules in practice, in ‘Carnegie-Rochester
conference series on public policy’, Vol. 39, Elsevier, pp. 195–214.
Taylor, J. B. [2007], Housing and monetary policy, Technical report, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Temin, P. [2008], ‘The german crisis of 1931: evidence and tradition’, Cliometrica
2(1), 5–17.
Thakor, A. V. [2014], ‘Bank capital and financial stability: an economic tradeoff or a
faustian bargain?’, Forthcoming, Annual Review of Financial Economics .
Thomson, J. B. [2009], ‘On systemically important financial institutions and progressive
systemic mitigation’, FRB of Cleveland Policy Discussion Paper (7).
Thurner, S. and Poledna, S. [2013], ‘Debtrank-transparency: Controlling systemic risk
in financial networks’, Scientific reports 3.
Tirole, J. [2010], ‘Illiquidity and all its friends’.
Toivanen, M. [2009], ‘Financial interlinkages and risk of contagion in the finnish inter-
bank market’, Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper (6).
Turnbull, S. M. [2014], ‘Counterparty risk: A review’, Annu. Rev. Financ. Econ.
6(1), 241–258.
Turnbull, S. M., Crouhy, M. and Jarrow, R. A. [2008], ‘The subprime credit crisis of 07’,
Available at SSRN 1112467 .
Uhlig, H. [2010], ‘A model of a systemic bank run’, Journal of Monetary Economics
57(1), 78–96.
Upper, C. [2007], ‘Using counterfactual simulations to assess the danger of contagion
in interbank markets’.
178
Upper, C. [2011], ‘Simulation methods to assess the danger of contagion in interbank
markets’, Journal of Financial Stability 7(3), 111–125.
Upper, C. and Worms, A. [2004], ‘Estimating bilateral exposures in the german in-
terbank market: Is there a danger of contagion?’, European Economic Review
48(4), 827–849.
Van Lelyveld, I. and Liedorp, F. [2004], Interbank contagion in the Dutch banking sector,
Citeseer.
van Lelyveld, I. et al. [2014], ‘Finding the core: Network structure in interbank markets’,
Journal of Banking & Finance 49, 27–40.
Vandermarliere, B., Karas, A., Ryckebusch, J. and Schoors, K. [2015], ‘Beyond the
power law: Uncovering stylized facts in interbank networks’, Physica A: Statistical
Mechanics and its Applications 428, 443–457.
Vihria¨la¨, V. [1997], Banks and the Finnish credit cycle 1986-1995.
Von Peter, G. [2007], ‘International banking centres: a network perspective’, BIS Quar-
terly Review Working Paper .
Wang, T., Sun, Y., Song, L. and Han, Z. [2015], ‘Social data offloading in d2d-enhanced
cellular networks by network formation games’.
Weiss, Y. and Freeman, W. T. [2001], ‘On the optimality of solutions of the max-product
belief-propagation algorithm in arbitrary graphs’, Information Theory, IEEE Transac-
tions on 47(2), 736–744.
Wells, S. J. [2004], ‘Financial interlinkages in the united kingdom’s interbank market
and the risk of contagion’.
White, H., Kim, T.-H. and Manganelli, S. [2010], ‘Var for var: measuring systemic risk
using multivariate regression quantiles.’.
Yedidia, J. S., Freeman, W. T. and Weiss, Y. [2003], ‘Understanding belief propagation
and its generalizations’, Exploring artificial intelligence in the new millennium 8, 236–
239.
Zhou, C. [2009], ‘Are banks too big to fail? measuring systemic importance of financial
institutions’, Measuring Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions (December 1,
2009) .
179
